



**BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT**

IA CASE #: 2018-0040

SUBMISSION DATE: April 8, 2019

INVESTIGATION INITIATION DATE: December 4, 2018

PERIOD TOLLED: February 14, 2018 – December 4, 2018

180th DAY: June 2, 2019
Investigative Timeline (Command 60 Days / IA 90 Days)

INVESTIGATOR: Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667
Sergeant Carlos Carrillo, CCN 7154

COMPLAINANT: MSDHS Commission

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 1: Scott Peterson, CCN 4308

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty-
Unsatisfactory Performance

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
Parkland District

DATE OF HIRE: July 22, 1985 (Retired February 22, 2018)

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA

1 of 2

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 2: Brian Miller, CCN 4643

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(L) Neglect of Duty-Failure to Supervise Effectively

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
Parkland District

DATE OF HIRE: September 2, 1986

RANK: Sergeant

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 3: Edward Eason, CCN 10558

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty-
Unsatisfactory Performance

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

SPM 17.1.3 (B) BWC Recording Protocol

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
Parkland District

DATE OF HIRE: October 16, 2000

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 4: Joshua Stambaugh, CCN 7758

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty-
Unsatisfactory Performance

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
Tamarac District

DATE OF HIRE: August 25, 1994

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 5: Brian Goolsby, CCN 8278

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty-
Unsatisfactory Performance

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
Dania Beach District

DATE OF HIRE: January 06, 1997

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA



SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 6: Arthur Perry, CCN 8016

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty-
Unsatisfactory Performance

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
International Airport

DATE OF HIRE: December 4, 1995

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA

SUBJECT EMPLOYEE 7: Michael Kratz, CCN 11289

SHERIFF'S POLICY: SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty-
Unsatisfactory Performance

SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standards

COMMAND: Department of Law Enforcement
Lauderdale by the Sea

DATE OF HIRE: March 28, 1988

RANK: Deputy Sheriff

**DATE OF MOST
RECENT PROMOTION:** N/A

PROBATION STATUS: N/A

BARGAINING UNIT: IUPA

INTRODUCTION:

On February 14, 2018, at approximately 1421 hours, Suspect Nikolas Cruz entered Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Building 12 (MSDHS), Parkland, Florida, armed with a rifle, unchallenged, and maneuvered through all three floors firing into classrooms and hallways killing or wounding 34 students and school staff. Cruz eventually exited the building, ran across campus, and blended in with students evacuating the school.

Broward Sheriff's Office deputies and assisting law enforcement agencies responded to the scene and discovered multiple deceased and injured victims with apparent gunshot wounds inside Building 12 (Freshman Building). Students were evacuated and escorted out of the building to safety, while injured students were transported to various local hospitals. S.W.A.T. Units from multiple agencies conducted a systematic search of the school until the school was deemed secured. Suspect Cruz was not located and believed to have fled the building. He was subsequently located and taken into custody by Coconut Creek police officers who observed him walking through a nearby Coral Springs neighborhood shortly after the shooting. Cruz was apprehended approximately 1 hour and 16 minutes after the first shots were fired. He was charged with 17 counts of premeditated murder and 17 counts of attempted murder.

Following the shooting, a group of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School students and parents campaigned for gun control and school safety during the 2018 Florida legislative session. On March 9, 2018, Governor Rick Scott signed the MSDHS Public Safety Act (MSDHPSA) into law. This comprehensive legislation focused on identifying and addressing issues surrounding the tragedy that occurred at the school.

A key component of the legislation was the establishment of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission (The Commission) composed of 17 voting members and 4 non-voting members appointed by the Florida Governor, Speaker of the House, Senate President or specified in legislation. The Commission was formed to specifically analyze information from the MSDHS shooting and other mass violence incidents and provide recommendations and system improvements to help mitigate the impacts from and prevent future school shootings. On January 2, 2019, the Commission submitted their Initial Report to the Florida Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Senate for review. The report was reviewed by BSO IA and included in this investigation and it identified issue with the response of several deputies that heard gunshots.

Deputy Scot Peterson was the BSO School Resource deputy assigned to MSDHS and after being alerted to the shooting, responded from his office to Building 12. After hearing and identifying gunfire inside Building 12, Peterson failed to enter the building or immediately confront the shooter. Instead, he relayed information to responding deputies to shut down streets and stay clear, while he remaining in a position of cover outside of Building 12 for the remainder of the incident.

BSO Parkland District Sergeant Brian Miller, who was the road patrol supervisor, responded to MSD, heard a volley of gunfire but did not enter Building 12 or give direction to responding deputies to also enter. Additionally, Miller failed to immediately take command of the incident by not requesting additional resources; not providing supervisory direction; not attempting to locate the shooter or investigate the source of the gunshots, and not coordinating an inner and outer perimeter. Also, as the initial incident commander, he failed to establish a command post and staging areas for incoming resources.

BSO Deputies Michael Kratz, Brian Goolsby, Arthur Perry, Edward Eason, and Joshua Stambaugh also responded and after hearing several gunshots at MSDHS, and receiving dispatched information, allegedly failed to immediately enter the school and confront the shooter or investigate the source of the gunshots.

ALLEGATIONS:

It is alleged that Deputies Peterson, Kratz, Goolsby, Perry, Eason, and Stambaugh failed to perform their duties properly and take timely action on the occasion of a crime when gunshots were heard in Building 12 or attempt to locate and confront the shooter or determine the source of the gunshots as outlined in BSO Policy and SOP related to an Active Shooter response in violation of *SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standard and SPM 2.4.1(C) Neglect of Duty – Unsatisfactory Performance*.

It is alleged that Deputy Eason failed to activate his assigned Body Worn Camera when he responded to the MSD Shooting as a backup unit with his emergency equipment activated in violation of *SPM 17.1.3 (B) BWC Recording Protocol*.

It is alleged that Sergeant Miller failed to properly perform his duties and assume responsibility for his position as a road patrol supervisor responding to a shooting at MSDHS, by not taking immediate command of the incident and failing to coordinate resources in an attempt to identify and stop the shooter or locate the source of the gunshots in violation of *SPM 2.4 Meeting BSO Standard and SPM 2.4.1(L) Failure to Supervise Effectively*.

THE FOLLOWING SHERIFF'S POLICIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLEGATIONS:

SPM 2.4 MEETING BSO STANDARDS:

A. Employees will perform their duties properly and assume the responsibilities of their positions.

B. Employees will perform their duties in a manner which tends to establish and maintain the highest standards of efficiency, competency, and professionalism in carrying out the functions and meeting BSO objectives.

C. Keeping Informed of BSO Literature:

1. Employees will be familiar with and stay current on all applicable policies and procedures by reviewing BSO literature including, but not limited to:

- a. Sheriff's Policy Manual
- b. General Orders
- c. Standard Operating Procedures
- d. Operations Orders
- e. Post Orders
- f. Administrative Orders
- g. Training and legal bulletins
- h. Internal Memorandum

2. Employees with questions regarding BSO literature will request assistance from their supervisor.

D. Failure to meet BSO standards includes, but is not limited to: [CALEA 26.1.1]

1. Lack of knowledge of laws, policies, and procedures relevant to the performance of duty.
2. Failure to follow a rule, order, or directive governing the operation of BSO.
3. Failure to promote BSO's policies, goals, and objectives.
4. Unwillingness or inability to perform assigned duties or satisfy standards of performance established for the position.

SPM 2.4.1(C) NEGLECT OF DUTY – UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE

Unsatisfactory Performance: Incompetent or unsatisfactory performance may be demonstrated by, but is not limited to; unwillingness or inability to perform assigned tasks, failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or any other violation deserving official attention, repeated poor evaluations or written record of repeated infractions of rules, orders, or directives.

SPM 2.4.1(L) NEGLECT OF DUTY – FAILURE TO SUPERVISE EFFECTIVELY

SPM 17.1.3 (B) BODY WORN CAMERAS (BWC) - RECORDING PROTOCOLS

B. Activation/Deactivation: [CALEA 41.3.8 B, CFA 13.17c]

1. Deputies will activate (initiate a recording) their BWC prior to initiating any investigative or enforcement activity to include:
 - a. Vehicle Stops
 - b. Pedestrian stops (to include deputy initiated consensual encounters)
 - c. Calls for service (to include responding to backup other employees)
 - d. Code 3 responses (to include vehicle pursuits)
 - e. Foot pursuits
 - f. Searches
 - g. Arrests
 - h. Prisoner transports (to include anyone such as Baker/Marchman Act)
 - i. Use of Force
 - j. Crowd management and control
 - k. Witness or victim interviews (See Exceptions)
 - l. Other investigative or enforcement activities where, in the deputy's judgment, a video recording would assist in the investigation or prosecution of a crime or when a recording of an encounter would assist in documenting the incident for later investigation or review

INVESTIGATION:

On February 22, 2018, BSO Internal Affairs Captain Joseph Achilarré, CCN 7848, Executive Officer Lieutenant Barry Lindquist, CCN 13979, and Sergeant Aldemar Rengifo, CCN 9981, met with Deputy Peterson, accompanied by his wife, at the Division of Internal Affairs Office. During this meeting, Peterson was provided with a written notification of this investigation, and a change of status to Suspended with Pay. Peterson advised that due to the recent events related the shooting at MSDHS on February 14, 2018, he decided to retire effective immediately.

This Internal Affairs investigation was Tolted per Chapter 112 Public Officer and Employees Bill of Rights on February 14, 2018, due to a criminal investigation initiated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the BSO Homicide Division who is conducting an on-going criminal investigation.

On February 26, 2018, this case was assigned to Sergeant Rengifo by Lieutenant Lindquist for follow-up investigation.

On October 5, 2018, this case was assigned to Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667, by Lieutenant Lindquist for follow-up investigation. Sergeant Carlos Carrillo, CCC 7154, is assisting.

On December 4, 2018, Sergeant Miller, Deputy Eason and Deputy Stambaugh were added as subject employees. This investigation was Un-tolted on the same day. All were placed on Restricted Administrative Assignment.

On February 14, 2019, Deputies Kratz, Perry and Goosby were added as subject employees.

The initial focus of the investigation was to identify Deputy Peterson's actions during the shooting, but it was later learned through various media outlets, that several Coral Springs Police officers alleged that BSO deputies failed to enter the school during the shooting and maintained perimeter points instead. Additionally, the MSD Commission Report submitted their report on January 2, 2019 and indicated that there was an unsatisfactory law enforcement response by the BSO, and as a result, the investigation was expanded to include the review of all BSO personnel that responded to the scene during the initial stages of the shooting and heard gunshots.

911 System – While the Broward Sheriff's Office operates the Regional 911 system that is maintained by Broward County, the City of Coral Springs is not part of this system and operates its own separate center. The City of Parkland contracts BSO for its law enforcement services and the Coral Springs Fire Department for its fire rescue and emergency medical services. Under this arrangement, ALL Parkland cellular 911 calls are routed to the Coral Springs Communications Center. Coral Springs is then tasked with routing these calls to either CSFD for fire rescue and/or BSO for law enforcement calls.

911 Call Records provided by BSO Regional Communications showed the following:

- BSO received an estimated 71 incoming calls into their communications center during the incident (14:22 to 15:35 hours).
- No abandoned calls have been identified at this time.
- Only one inbound call has been identified as originating from the school. (14:27:04 hours) (A male whispering that someone was shooting at the school and the line disconnected).

911 Call Records provided by Coral Springs Communications showed the following:

- Coral Springs received an estimated 86 incoming calls into their communications center during the incident (14:22 to 15:35 hours).
- Callers abandoned 30 of these calls (i.e hung-up, disconnected, dropped prior to being answered).
- Three (2) calls were transferred to BSO for the police response.

(14:22:44 to 14:25:41 hours)

Coral Springs Operator 546 contacted BSO Communications with second hand information.

- **BSO time stamp – 14:23:37 PM:**

Coral Springs advised a caller (student) informed them there is a shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School. Call updated and CS Operator advised shots were heard in the background. Update: No initial location could be provided. Attempt by CS operator to re-contact caller was unsuccessful.

- **BSO time stamp: 14:24:32 PM:**

Update: separate call received of someone shot in 1200 building.

- **BSO time stamp: 14:25:00 PM**

Update: multiple calls with shooting in background.

- **BSO time stamp: 14:25:18 PM Update:**

One confirmed patient in the 1200 building (Call ended 14:25:41 PM)

(14:27:38 PM to 14:28:53 PM)

Coral Springs Operator with a transfer. Caller disconnected before transfer advised that the shooter is in the student parking lot on the north side of the school. No description.

(15:00:00 PM to 15:03:18 PM)

Coral Springs transfer. Third hand information that suspect "is wearing a vest."

After the initial exchanges, BSO did not receive updates concerning the suspect (number(s), location, description, activities).

Radio Communications:

BSO uses the Broward County radio system and has the ability to monitor and merge channels on those systems during joint operations. The Coral Springs Communications System operates separately and attempts to patch these systems prior to the entry of Building 12 were unsuccessful. Therefore, **BSO and CSPD personnel were not able to communicate via a common channel during the outlined time line provided below.**

Radio System Failures:

The current radio infrastructure is maintained by Broward County and nearing its end of life. Broward County has indicated it is scheduled to replace the current system in CY 2019. The capacity of radio communications can become impaired when an excessive number of users access the system. This impairment, otherwise known as "throttling," occurred at some point during the incident and hindered radio communications; whereas users may have been unable to transmit or receive some radio messages. This issue is being further analyzed.

Regional Communications Assistant Director Angela Mize, CCN 7520, explained to the MSD Commission that the Broward County radio system suffered transmission problems she referred to as "throttling," a term used to describe an overload of radio transmissions which hindered the ability for new transmissions to be sent during BSO's response to the shooting. In addition to the throttling, Mize advised that all of the 911 telephone calls made via cellular phone were received by Coral Springs Communications and all of the 911 telephone calls made via landline were received by Broward County Regional Communications. Mize explained that once jurisdiction is established, Coral Springs Communications' protocol is to forward the calls to Broward County Regional Communications.

Assistant Director Mize stated that Coral Springs Communications received approximately twenty-five telephone calls, ten of which were identified as cellular, and two of which were transferred to Broward County Regional Communications. Additionally, approximately thirty telephone calls were abandoned by Coral Springs Communications in which an unknown amount were unanswered and/or forwarded to the Broward Emergency Operation Center (EOC). She also advised that the Boca Raton Police Department and Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (PBSO) had also received an unknown number of 911 telephone calls.

A Memorandum of Understanding regarding the City of Parkland and the City of Coral Springs in which it was agreed that all 911 calls from Parkland would be directed to Coral Springs (Sometime during 2000).

In an email to BSO Detective Curcio, Office of Regional Communications Jose De Zayas wrote that the regional radio system that BSO was utilizing on February 14, 2018, between the hours of 2:00 PM and 4:00 PM had control channel saturation (Throttling) at 2:33:01 PM, approximately 5 minutes after Suspect Cruz leaves the 1200 Building. At 2:55:20 PM, the radio system switched from primary to secondary (Channel Patching).

School Security Video:

The 45 acre campus is equipped to record 70 different camera angles. Most of these views provide coverage of student buildings, walkways and hallways. Building 12 was covered by thirteen interior cameras. School video time stamps are not exactly synchronized with BSO dispatch records. Cameras are also motion activated leaving gaps in coverage.

School Radio:

Throughout the incident SRD Peterson communicated with school security personnel over their hand held radio system. Transmissions are not recorded.

Policy and Training: BSO SOP ACTIVE SHOOTER 4.37

The Broward Sheriff's Office active shooter policy is based upon current law enforcement best practices and calls for personnel to interrupt and engage suspects who are actively engaged in the shooting of others. This procedure was reinforced through an extensive active shooter and rescue task force training program delivered to BSO Department of Law Enforcement sworn personnel between 2014 and 2016. Instruction included scenario based training for single and multiple officer responses. This training stresses the engagement of a suspect who is actively shooting to:

1) Eliminate the threat. 2) Cause the suspect to barricade. 3) Cause the suspect to surrender.

If the sounds of shooting cease, deputies are to group and search for victims with the formation of a rescue task force being the ultimate goal.

The BSO Active Shooter Policy SPM 4.37.2 Response/Responsibilities states (In effect on Feb 14, 2018):

- If real time intelligence exists the sole deputy or a team of deputies [may] enter the area and/or structure to preserve life. A supervisor's approval or on-site observation is not required for this decision.

The policy became a topic that the MSD Commission believed hindered BSO's response to the shooting. During this investigation, the deputies being investigated will explain their actions in detail in regards to the policy.

On December 18, 2018, the BSO Active Shooter policy SPM 4.37.2 Response/Responsibilities was amended and it states:

A. Deputies responding to active threat(s) incidents [shall] attempt to protect the life of innocent persons through immediate tactical intervention to eliminate the threat. In such scenarios, the prioritization of activities in order of importance will be:

1. Stop the active assailant(s);
2. Rescue the victims;
3. Provide medical assistance;
4. Arrest suspects and preserve the crime scene.

Note: While deputies are expected to tactically intervene, there may be very limited extenuating circumstances when entry by a solo deputy must be delayed until the situation changes, or additional deputies or resources are present.

Ballistic Vests (Body Armor):

BSO had a policy that mandated wearing a ballistic vest prior to the MSD shooting, but a signed waiver would allow you not have it worn. Wearing the ballistic vest became mandatory on February 15, 2019.

Body Worn Cameras (Parkland District)

The City of Parkland did not approve Body Worn Camera for their deputies; therefore, no Parkland District deputies were wearing one, except for Deputy Eason (County Budget) and Deputy Stambaugh (City of Tamarac).



MAP OF MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS.

Building 12 is in red. The floors and classroom numbers are below.



Figure 1. Map of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School



12a

The following investigative timeline was utilized in the completion of report:

- Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) Homicide interviews (No report), MSD surveillance video, BSO body-worn cameras (BWC).
- BSO and CSPD 911 calls and radio traffic.
- BSO police reports and statements
- Coral Springs Police Department (CSPD) police reports and statements.
- MSD Staff
- Interviews by Florida Department of Law Enforcement Office of Executive Investigations (FDLE-OEI).
- After-action reports, and crime scene photos, school records/maps.
- Interviews by MSDHS Public Safety Commission (MSD-PSC) investigators.
- MSDHS Commission animation of the shooting (Three Videos)
- MSD Commission Report January 2, 2019, MSD LE Response and MSD Deputies who heard Gunshots report.
- Civil Deposition of MSD Andrew Medina and former Deputy Scot Peterson

The aforementioned sources are available in the digital case files for review.

The Commission reports include illustrations that mirror the timeline that could assist with visualizing the events (See digital files- 4. MSD Commission Reports

Timeline color codes: Security Video

BLACK - MSD SURVEILLANCE VIDEO

BLUE - CORAL SPRINGS DISPATCH/LAW ENFORCEMENT

RED - BSO DISPATCH/LAW ENFORCEMENT

2:19:00 PM (No Cameras)

Suspect Cruz exited an Uber (ride sharing service) at MSDHS wearing black pants, a burgundy MSDHS JROTC shirt and a dark-colored cap. He was armed with an AR-15 rifle concealed in a rifle bag, and several hundred rounds of ammunition. Once inside the campus, Cruz walked towards and entered Building 12 via the unlocked and unstaffed hallway doors.

02:21:12 PM (Camera):

Suspect Cruz was observed by **Campus Monitor Andrew Medina** enter the school grounds through an unstaffed gate opened for school dismissal located at the northeast section of the school along Coral Springs Drive. Medina was in a golf cart at the northeast corner of building 8, facing Building 12, and was stopped for approximately 18 seconds (**02:21:30 PM**) and then proceeded to drive toward the east side of Building 12. Medina is no longer visible at this point, but at (**02:21:43 PM**) Medina reappeared and traveled south on the golf cart through the hallways between Buildings 7 and 8. *It is presumed that Medina had visual contact of Cruz for approximately 31 seconds, based on the testimonial and video evidence.* Medina testified that he transmitted his observations via the school radio during this period but did not issue a Code Red (school lockdown).

At 2:21:16 PM (Camera):

Students [REDACTED] enter the east doors of Building 12's hallway first floor. Simultaneously, **Campus Monitor David Taylor** entered the first floor from the west stairwell and observed Suspect Cruz enter the east doors carrying a three-foot long duffle bag and make a right turn into the base of the east stairwell. Taylor testified that he was attempting to cut off Cruz on the second floor, but after hearing several gunshots, he hid in a room for the remainder of the shooting. *Taylor had a school radio and did not call a Code Red (Lockdown).* While in the stairwell, Cruz removed his **Smith and Wesson M&P 15 Semi-Automatic Rifle** from the rifle case and donned a magazine-carrying vest (the vest did not have any anti-ballistic qualities). While Cruz is loading his rifle, student [REDACTED] is observed exiting a classroom into the hallway and entered the east stairwell, where he walks up on Cruz, who is removing his rifle from the case, and testified that Cruz warned him, *"You better get out of here, something bad is about to happen. 'He told me to run.'* [REDACTED] turned and fled out of the east stairwell door of Building 12 away from the building unharmed.

02:21:33 PM (Camera):

Suspect Cruz exited the stairwell into the east hallway, raised his rifle to a firing position, and then immediately lowered the rifle to possibly disengaging the safety or charge the rifle. He again raised the rifle to a firing position and discharged the first rounds toward the west section of the hallway in the direction of [REDACTED] **(non-fatal)** striking [REDACTED] leg, and then [REDACTED] **(fatal)**, [REDACTED] **(fatal)** and [REDACTED] **(fatal)** who were inside the alcove of classroom

02:21:40 PM (Camera):

Percussion from the gunshots caused dust to fall from the drop-ceiling tiles that activated the campus fire alarms. Suspect Cruz then turned his rifle toward classrooms along the first floor of Building 12. *It is important to note that Cruz never entered a single classroom in building 12 and only shot those people in his line of site in a classroom or hallway. All gunshots were fired through the door or the door window of the listed classrooms.* Cruz then fired into classroom 1216 on two occasions that resulted in 3 student fatalities and 5 students being injured:

[REDACTED]

The speed with which this attack happened prevented some students from taking cover.

2:21:41 PM (Camera),

Suspect Cruz lowered the rifle again and removed a knit ski-mask and camouflage shirt from the bag and placed them on the ground, and he never put them on. [REDACTED] runs from the alcove of the restroom into classroom 1210, and hides with other students and the teacher until rescued. After Cruz lowered the rifle, he took a knee in the hall outside of the alcove of classroom 1216.

From approximately 2:21:48 to 2:22:10 (Camera),

Suspect Cruz's movements were not recorded due to dust affecting the motion-sensor cameras.

2:22:13 (Camera)

Suspect Cruz is standing and begins to fire into classrooms 1214 and 1215. Cell phone video from within classroom 1215 recorded sounds of the gunfire and reaction by the students. There were six victims within classroom 1214. The two fatalities from this classroom [REDACTED]

Simultaneous to Cruz firing those rounds, the first phone 911 call was received by the Coral Springs Communications Center. The call came from someone inside Building 12.

02:22:14 PM (Camera):

Deputy Peterson is observed walking from between Buildings 8 and 1 to the east and then south along the east side of Building 1. He and **Security Director Kelvin Greenleaf** walk south towards a golf cart, and Peterson can be seen talking on his radio (appears to be school radio). He then turns abruptly and begins running north towards another golf cart. He and Greenleaf climb onto the golf cart being driven by Mr. Medina and they are observed travelling north towards Building 12

02:22:30 PM (Camera):

Deputy Peterson is recorded by cameras walking southbound with Mr. Greenleaf towards a golf cart parked outside room 172. They then turn northbound and Peterson is observed talking on his school radio. The fire alarm strobe is observed.

02:22:41 PM (911 timestamp)

First 911 call comes in to Coral Springs regarding the shooting.

02:22:49 PM (Camera):

Campus Monitor Chris Hixon entered the first floor from the west end main doors and Suspect Cruz shoots him in the leg causing him to fall. *Hixon then crawled to the north side of the hallway and attempted to hide behind a wall with a school radio but does not issue a Code Red (Lockdown) possibly due to his injuries.* Cruz continues to walk west down the hall where he stops at Rooms 1212 and 1213. He fired through the door window of 1213 into the classroom where three suffered non-fatal injuries: [REDACTED]

02:22:59 PM (Camera: 30-Bldg 13, North to Gate)

Coach Aaron Feis (school employee), is observed driving a golf cart from the north parking lot towards the 1200 building after meeting with Student [REDACTED], who informed him that he observed a student with a gun. *Feis had a school radio and did not call a Code Red (Lockdown) after receiving real time information from [REDACTED].*

02:22:59 PM

First CAD entry on Coral Springs Fire Dispatch regarding possible active shooter incident.

02:23:00 PM (Coral Springs Dispatch timestamp)

Coral Springs Fire Dispatched in reference to active shooter at Stoneman Douglas.

02:23:10 PM (Camera: 61-Bldg 7 & 8, Walkway, Facing South)

The golf cart carrying Deputy Peterson, Mr. Greenleaf, and Mr. Medina is observed driving north through the hallway between building 7 and 8 towards the 1200 building.

02:23:16 PM (Camera: 54-Bldg 13 East to Bldg 12)

Exterior video shows the golf cart containing Deputy Peterson, Mr. Greenleaf, and Mr. Medina driving north from the 800 building towards the 1200 building. Deputy Peterson is at the east side of Building 12 as Suspect Cruz is approaching the west end of the first floor. At this point, Peterson is the only law enforcement present that could have confronted Suspect Cruz if he would have entered Building 12 via the east entrance doors.

02:23:22 PM (Camera: 13-Bldg 12, 1st Fl, West)

Suspect Cruz walks toward injured Coach Hixon, who is hiding in the corner and fires several more fatal rounds at him, but does not immediately succumb to his injuries.

02:23:22 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: calls 17J3 (Peterson), 17B3 (Seward) & 17B4 (Hanks) with an alert tone.

02:23:25 (Camera: 53-Bldg 12, 1st & 2nd Fl, West Stair)

Suspect Cruz immediately enters the west first floor stairwell and encounters Coach Aaron Feis opening the exterior west side stairwell door. Cruz turns and fires two fatal rounds and Feis drops to the ground just outside the door. Cruz walks up the stairs to the second floor.

02:23:26 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Be advised we have possible ah, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 building." *(Multiple gun shots are captured during this transmission. Someone in the background advises "Shots fired.")*

Dispatch: (Alert tones) "Attention all units in District 15, possible shots fired at 5901 Pine Island Road at Stoneman Douglas High School, possible shots fired at Stoneman Douglas High School."

17T2 (Kratz): "Enroute" 15Y4 (Valdes): "Enroute"

02:23:31 PM (Camera: 54-Bldg 13 East to Bldg 12)

The golf cart is observed driving away from the 1200 building with one occupant (Campus Monitor Medina/driver).

02:23:35 PM (Camera: 20-Bldg 12, 2nd Fl, West)

Suspect Cruz exits the west stairwell on the second floor and is observed walking east down the hallway looking into classrooms. He fires into room 1234 and 1232 on the east end of the hallway, but no victims are shot or injured because the Code Red was initiated on that floor. Cruz is observed entering the east stairwell on the second floor.

02:23:44 PM (Camera: 54-Bldg 13 East to Bldg 12)

Deputy Peterson is observed walking south from the 1200 Building with Mr. Greenleaf. He takes a position on the edge of the stairwell on the northeast corner of the 700 building facing the south side of the 1200 building. He remains at this position for the duration of the incident and only transmits information via his radio.

02:23:51PM (Camera: 17-Bldg12, 2nd & 3rd Fl, East Stair)

Students on the 3rd floor exit their classrooms due to the fire alarm and begin to go down the east stairwell. As the students appear to hear gunshots, they begin to turn around and flee back to the third floor. Suspect Cruz walks up the stairs and enters the third floor.

02:23:55 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Make sure we get some units over here, I need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the intersection." Dispatch: "10-4"

02:24:14 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "We're talking about the 1200 building, it's gonna be the building off Holmberg Road."

17T2 (Kratz): "Any description? I'm coming up from West Glades Middle."

02:24:24 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "We don't have any description yet, we just hear shots, appears to be shots fired."

02:24:30 PM (Camera: 23-Bldg 12, 3rd Fl, East)

Suspect Cruz exits the east third floor stairwell and fires at approximately twenty student and staff remaining in the hallway. Cruz shot ten people and of the ten victims, six were fatalities:

Four persons suffered non-fatal injuries:

02:24:35 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "I'm over on the south side over by 700 building."

17T2 (Kratz): "I'm shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the divide between Glades and the high school."

02:24:40 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17B1 (Eason): "I'll get the west side of ah Stoneman on Holmberg."

Dispatch: "10-4, west side of Holmberg."

02:24:52 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J4 (Perry): "17J4 Responding" 17J1 (Volpe) "17J1 too."

02:25:08 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17T2 (Kratz): "I hear shots fired by the football field, shots fired by the football field."

Dispatch: "Shots fired by the football field heard."

02:25:18 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "We're looking at the 1200 building, it's going to be the 300 building, and it's gonna be right off Holmberg road, by the senior lot."

02:25:22 (Camera: 24-Bldg 12, 3rd Fl, West)

Suspect Cruz continues down the hallway and fires several more rounds [REDACTED]. Cruz then shoots door window to room 1240, a vacant teacher planning room, and reaches in and opens the door. Once inside, he shoots at third floor windows toward passing students, but the impact glass prevents the rounds from penetrating.

02:25:38 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Get the school locked down, gentlemen!"

02:25:42 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: "Attention all units not working the signal 33 go to Bravo channel for regular traffic."

17T2 (Kratz): "Some students saying it started with some kind of firecrackers but we're not sure, by the football fields."

02:25:56 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "All right, 26 (received). Also heard it's over by, inside the 1200 building. We're locking down the school right now, make sure there's no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road."

02:26:08 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2 I'm 51" (enroute)

Dispatch: "Unit advising 51" (enroute)

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2, and if we have any district 15 motor units, they can respond also."

(Unknown female unit) "15B4 is going to respond, LT."

02:26:31 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Kilo 23: "Just had a Fire Admin guy make reference and active shooter at Douglas, anything to that?"

Dispatch: "10-4, K23, There is an active shooter working at Douglas, multiple gun shots are being fired. We can hear them in the background our 911 lines "blowing up." We have multiple units on the phone. Some are getting EMD. It is confirmed.

02:26:34 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch "Any units not working the signal 33 (Shooting) go to Bravo."

17T2 (Kratz): "I got more students running west towards the football field."

02:26:40 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Juliet 3 we're going to Bravo...I hear shots fired....shots fired." (Multiple gun shots are heard during this transmission)

02:26:45 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: "All units on the shots fired stay on main."

02:26:56 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15Y1 (Sergeant Thyroff): "15Y1, all Yankee units are enroute."

02:27:03 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp) The last volley of Gunshots

17Y4 (Goolsby): "We definitely have shots being fired."

(Multiple units stepping on transmission)

Dispatch: "All District 7 units go to Bravo."

17T2 (Kratz) "(Unreadable)...right by the football field."

02:27:06 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (CSPD Officer Burton) advises 10-97 at Douglas.

Dispatch: "I am going to put you on the 68 (service call) that's open at 5901 Pine Island."

J38: Just passing Sawgrass and there is a bunch of kids to the left side of the school."

Dispatch: "10-4"

02:27:30 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Make sure I have a unit over in front of the school, make sure nobody comes inside the school." Dispatch "I need a unit to the front, advise."

02:27:30 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

B46: "10-8, 51 (enroute) to that." B44: "51 (enroute)" Dispatch: "10-4 B46, 10-4 B44"

02:27:35 (Camera: 53-Bldg 12, 2nd & 3rd Fl, West Stair)

The suspect exits the teacher lounge, enters the stairwell and drops his rifle and magazine carrying vest. He then flees down the stairwell and out of the west side door on the first floor.

02:27:42 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17B3 (Seward): "B3 we need somebody to shut down Holmberg at Pine Island."

Dispatch "Unit to shut down Holmberg, advise."

02:27:50 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

B37: "51(enroute) (sirens)"

02:27:50 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J4 (Perry): "Holmberg is shut down, we're in front of building 13 of the 900 building, and we have shots fired. I'm trying to get the fence opened."

Dispatch "Building 13 and 900 building."

02:27:54 PM (Camera: 53-Bldg 12, 1st & 2nd Fl, West Stair)

The suspect comes down the last flight of stairs and exits the building, running west from the building.

2:27:54 (+ 6m 16s)

- Cruz exited the west end of building 12 and ran southwest.
- 6 minutes and 16 seconds elapsed since the first shot was fired.



02:28:00 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "(Unreadable) Do not approach the 12 or 1300 building, stay at least 500 feet away at this point."

Dispatch: "Stay away from 12 and 1300 building."

02:28:00 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Dispatch: "D28 want me to 10-3 (No radio traffic) the air for this?"

02:28:01 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (CSPD Burton): "J39, I need more details, I'm 97 (arrived) the south side of the school."

02:28:10 PM (Camera: 55-Bldg 13 West)

Suspect is observed running westbound towards the tennis courts.

02:28:14 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J4 (Perry): "I had a parent tell me that there is a child down, have Fire Rescue stage in the area until we've make contact, there is a child down, have them stage."

02:28:18 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Unknown CSPD Unit: "Units go to the north side... Units go to the north side of the school."

02:28:23 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17T2 (Kratz): "I got a victim with a gunshot to the right leg, gunshot to the right leg, show me at the west end of the high school by the football field."

Dispatch "GSW right leg west end by the football field"

02:28:35 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (Burton): "White male with ROTC uniform, burgundy shirt."

Dispatch: "White male... ROTC uniform, burgundy shirt."

02:28:39 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2 to the Yankee units, set up for active shooter response when you go 97 (arrive)."

02:28:46 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J5 (Marchese): "17Juliet 5, I have the gunshot victim, I have the gunshot victim, he's by the by the entrance to West Glades on the West side of the school."

Dispatch "10-4 fire rescue is being notified."

02:29:00 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (Burton): "J39 Last seen... in the three story building, north parking lot."

D28 "D28, have him advise if he's still shooting."

J39 (Burton): "54 (negative)... I'm with Douglas' SRO, getting info."

02:29:02 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Perry, does he know where the shooter is?"

02:29:06 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J4 (Perry): "We don't know, but we're entering the building in front of the 13 building, building 13, 17K4 and myself are entering."

17J5 (Marchese): "Does anybody have bolt cutters, I can get this kid out of the fence. He's stuck in the fence, I need bolt cutters."

Unknown Unit: "The coach is with him, see if he can help him over the gate."

02:29:09 PM (Camera: 54-Bldg 13 East to Bldg 12)

A golf cart carrying CSPD Officer Burton (according to Burton's report) is observed arriving on the northwest corner of Building 8.

02:29:14 PM (Camera: 37-Bldg 9, 1st Fl, SE, Facing West)

Suspect is observed running southbound towards an open field and joining a large group of students leaving the area, walking westbound.

02:29:33 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17K4 (Goolsby): "Let's get a command post set up on the south side of the Sawgrass in Coral Springs off of Pine Island...The gate for the student entrance is unlocked. We need to get units in here, so we can start trying to find this guy."

02:29:34 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J5 (Marchese): "Victim saying it's a male in a hoodie, he could not describe with at least an AR15 if not an AK47."

Dispatch: "10-4, all units be advised a male in a hoodie, possible AR15 or AK47."

02:29:47 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Dispatch advises that there are three victims down in room 1216 in the freshman building.

02:30:00 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J5 (Marchese): "Hey Art (Perry), can I get this kid out down that way? I got the victim but we can get him over a fence."

Dispatch "I need a unit with bolt cutters. To the west side by the football field."

02:30:11 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17Y4 (Goolsby): "17Y4 I see a student down on the...right next to the parking lot of the student lot."

Dispatch: "Additional student down?"

17J5 (Marchese): "Get me EMS code 3 by the entrance to West Glades Middle School. Are we 48(acknowledge) on that? I need rescue code 3!" (Emergency response)

02:30:18 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Yankee 35: "Y35 I'm at the North end of building 13 with two BSO guys, moving forward."

02:30:30 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

K23: "Any information on what type of weapon system is being used out there?"

Y35: "Alright, he's saying long gun...I see one...looks like a custodian down in front of the building. We're trying to locate, we don't know where he's at."

02:30:46 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17T2 (Kratz): "I was advised possibly three more victims, the shooter possible inside 3 story building with an ROTC uniform, that was given by Coral Springs Dispatch, if you can check with them and verify."

Dispatch: "You're advising the suspect is in the three story building?"

17T2 (Kratz): "If you can hook up with Coral Springs Dispatch I was advised by one of their officers possibly three additional victims in the three story building, possible suspect in a ROTC Uniform, if we can hook up with them and verify."

Unknown: "I'm 25 (in contact) with a Coral Springs Supervisor, advise...he said also three additional."

02:31:30 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17S1 (Jordan): "I know we have a lot going on, do we have a perimeter set up right now and everybody cleared out of the school?"

Dispatch: "That's Negative."

02:31:31 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (Burton): "I am on the east side of the three story building near the parking lot with my long gun."

J39 (Burton): "I will let you know where it is. It's the three story building is at the Northeast corner it's considered the Freshman Building."

02:31:39 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "We're in total lock down right now. Nobody's leaving the school everybody's in lockdown."

02:31:49 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Unknown Unit: "We might want to consider somebody up on the Sawgrass to the south of the school, 10-4?"

Dispatch: "I'll get someone."

02:32:08 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17D2 (Miller): "17D2"

17B1 (Eason): "Hey India do you have West Glades locked up?"

17F20 (Stambaugh) "Foxtrot 20 I'll go up to the Sawgrass south of the school."

Dispatch: "17 Foxtrot 20, 10-4."

02:32:21 PM (Camera: 30 Bldg 13, North to gate)

Officers (CSPD) are recorded running towards the west end of the 1200 building from the northwest parking lot.

02:32:36 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17D2 (Miller): "17D2"

02:32:42 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: "17D2"

17D2 (Miller): "10-4, can you get the papa unit up please, and also check if we have any K9s, if they can get here."

Unknown unit: "K9s are 26 (received) and enroute."

02:32:48 PM (Camera: 30 Bldg 12, 1st FL, Center)

Four Officers (Appear to be CSPD) make first entry onto the first floor through the west door. They pull Mr. Hixon out through the west door.

02:32:48 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17S1 (Jordan): "17S1"

Dispatch: "17S1"

G11 (Gonzalez): "We have multiple golf units (SWAT) enroute."

Dispatch: "Golf (SWAT) units are enroute, 17S1 go ahead."

02:33:04 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17S1 (Jordan): "I want to make sure that the perimeter is set up, and the school...and all the kids are getting out, but we need to shut down around this school. Is the delta unit have a place for setting up for all the units coming to the area?"

Dispatch: "10-4, they're advising that the school is on lock (gets interrupted)"

02:33:20 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17D2 (Miller): "We do not have a command post set up, we have a perimeter around it, and we have two teams going in, checking right now."

17S1 (Jordan): "10-4, which way are they going into the school?"

17D2 (Miller): "Entering from the north side through the parking lot, where the students park."

17J4 (Perry): "We got a team entered the 900 building (Building 12) on the first floor, west side of the 900 building of first floor, they went in."

02:33:54 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

10F4 (Periu): "You have Deerfield units responding, where would you like them to respond to, the Sawgrass perimeter?"

Dispatch: "I have Foxtrot 20 on the Sawgrass perimeter."



02:34:09 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Quebec 11 (Swanson): "Have Quebec units (QRF) responding give a location for units to meet please."

Dispatch: "I need a command post."

02:34:18 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2 to the delta unit, I'm going to set up a staging location underneath the Sawgrass on Coral Springs Drive under the Sawgrass Overpass."

17D2 (Miller): "I am with all the cars on the south side extended where all the cars are and I can't move."

02:34:36 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17S1 (Jordan): "Have them stage on the south side of the Sawgrass, we'll set up there and move in from the south, have all units set up there."

Dispatch: "All units, the staging spot is south side of the Sawgrass."

02:35:03 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

K542 (Yurchuck): "I'm 97, I'm in the extreme southwest corner by the baseball field with a large group of students as they are evacuating heading west."

Dispatch: "K542 southwest corner by the baseball field. All units on this call be advised Coral Springs called in, they're advising that the shooter is on the north side parking lot, stand by for a description....they do not have a description, they're advising that a student called it in approximately 3 to 5 minutes ago."

17D2 (Miller): "10-4."

02:35:27 PM (Camera: 30 Bldg 13, North to gate)

A CSPD officer and Deputy Volpe (17J1) are observed transporting Mr. Hixon with a golf cart north from the 1200 building.

02:35:52 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

K542 (Yurchuck): "Let springs know you have an extremely large group of students walking along the canal toward Walmart, if they can get a unit over there reference perimeter."

02:36:06 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15E2 (O'Neill): "All additional units responding, respond to just south of the Sawgrass on Coral Springs Drive, we have to shut down the roadway northbound and that's where we'll stage everybody."

02:36:17 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17Y4 (Goolsby): "We need rescue at both locations, south of the Sawgrass and one west of West glades, they can triage patients there, we got'em coming out of both ends."

02:36:29 PM (Camera: 15 Bldg 12, 1st Fl, East)

CSPD Officers (Approximately 12) are observed entering the first floor from the east door. There are two BSO Deputies (Deputy Jermaine Johnson & Deputy Carbocci) with this team.

02:36:32 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Gulf 2 (McCoy): "G2 to the incident commander."

17S1 (Jordan): "17S1"

Gulf 2 (McCoy): "Captain, we have the entire team working their way up to you, we'll be there as soon as we can."

02:36:37 PM (Camera: 13 Bldg 12, 1st Fl, West)

CSPD Officers re-enter the west end of the first floor with Deputy Hanks (17B4) and begin clearing.

02:38:00 PM (Camera: 53 Bldg 12, 1st & 2nd Fl, West Stair)

CSPD Officers and BSO Deputies enter the west stairwell and begin to clear up towards the second floor.

02:38:39 PM (Camera: 15 Bldg 12, 1st Fl, East)

The BSO Deputies with the CSPD officers remove a victim (Believed to be juvenile victim #2) and carry him to rescue as the hall is cleared.

02:39:18 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Sierra 11: "We need to get these radios patched with BSO."

Mike 36: "I got multiple wounded victims out here."

02:39:40 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

7k1 (Rossman): "Have you patched us and Coral Springs?"

Dispatch: "54." (Negative)

02:39:50 (Coral Springs timestamp)

Sierra 11: "If we can patch until we find out where BSO's Command Post is."

Dispatch: "Sierra 11, 10-4. We need to know what channel they are working off of so we can patch."

Sierra 11: "We are like working two separate operations until we do that." Dispatch: "Ok, we are trying."

02:40:01 PM – 2:48:41PM (Building 12 Cameras)

CSPD officers and BSO deputies evacuating students and medically treating the injured inside Building 12.

02:50:00 PM

Suspect Cruz enters the Walmart at 6001 Coral Ridge Drive.

02:52:10 PM

Suspect leaves Walmart.

02:54:32 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

7K1 (Rossman): "10-33 (emergency traffic) for a minute."

Dispatch (tone alerts): "All units hold your traffic, 10-33 only."

7K1 (Rossman): "They are monitoring the subject right now, he went from the third floor to the second floor...third to the second floor. He may have a gas mask on now standby for further, they are monitoring him on camera right now."

Unknown: "What building?"

7Kilo1 (Rossman): "Subject is now back on the Second floor, he was on the third and back now on the second. We are in the 1200 building."

02:54:53 PM – 3:00:15 PM (Building 12 Cameras)

CSPD Officers and BSO SWAT is assessing the rooms have been cleared at the east end hall.

03:01:03 PM

Suspect enters McDonald's parking lot at 5741 Coral Ridge Drive

03:02:13 PM (Camera: Bldg 12, 2nd & 3rd Fl, West Stair)

A BSO Deputy, an unknown SWAT Officer, and two BSO SWAT Deputies join the CSPD Officers on the third floor landing of the west stairwell.

03:02:20 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

7Kilo1 (Rossman): "They have the subject exiting the school about 20 minutes ago...standby for further, he dropped the bag near the stairwell. Standby for further."

Gulf 1 (Robson): "I am 48 (acknowledge) is that a recording from the school."

7Kilo1 (Rossman): "Yes sir, they are following him but it's about a 20 minute delay...they are following him on video on the camera leaving the building running south."

Gulf 1 (Robson): "Confirm the three story building on the north side...build 12... 10-4."

7Kilo1 (Rossman): "According to the school officials, on the video, he may have possibly mixed in with the kids in a westbound location toward Westglades (middle)."

Dispatch: "Possibly mixed in with the kids."

03:02:20 PM 03:21:48 PM (Building 12 Cameras)

Both BSO SWAT and CSPD officer continue to clear rooms and evacuate students.
The last civilian is evacuated from the building.

03:40:00 PM

Suspect detained at 4700 Wyndham Lakes Drive (arrest is 2.1 miles from the shooting scene).

[End of timeline]

**THE FOLLOWING IS A SYNOPSIS OF BODY WORN CAMERA VIDEO
FROM BSO DEPUTIES THAT RESPONDED TO THE MSD SHOOTING**

For the purpose of this investigation, the synopsis will only reflect information up to Suspect Cruz' capture (See video footage via Evidence.com under case number 17-1802-000525).

Deputy Chandler Greetham, CCN 16656, Motor 49, North Lauderdale District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:23PM - BWC captures Greetham arriving at the southeast corner of the school at 2:31PM.

Deputy Joshua Stambaugh, CCN 7758, 17F20, Special Detail in Parkland (6 videos)

Deputy Stambaugh's BWC video will be discussed later in this investigation

February 14, 2018 @ 2:24PM - BWC captures Stambaugh arriving at the north side of the school at 2:26PM. Following Stambaugh's arrival, multiple gunshots are captured. A CSPD officer arrives at 2:29PM. Stambaugh remains at this location until 2:31PM, when dispatch requests a unit to respond to the Sawgrass Expressway. Stambaugh drives to the Sawgrass Expressway and maintains a position overlooking the south side of the school.

Deputy Ralph Mackey, CCN 8520, 7Y2, Tamarac District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:27PM - BWC captures Mackey arriving at the southeast corner of the school at 2:35PM.

Deputy Gerald Kitchell, CCN 17657, 7K8, Tamarac District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:27PM - BWC captures Kitchell arriving at a perimeter near the football field and making contact with Deputy Kratz at 2:25PM.

February 14, 2018 @ 3:38PM - BWC captures Kitchell on a perimeter making contact with a juvenile student.

Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558, 17B1, Parkland District (1 video)

Deputy Eason's BWC video will be discussed later in this investigation

February 14, 2018 @ 2:28PM - BWC captures Eason standing on the roadway, on the west side of Marjory Stone Douglas High School, just east of Westglades Middle School, next to the baseball fields. Several students are observed running through the field, away from the school. Eason's BWC does not capture any gun shots being fired. Eason is observed directing the students away from the school and speaking with school personnel. He is then observed entering his marked unit and relocating towards the middle school. Eason is then observed making contact with Deputy India at 2:59PM.

Lieutenant Stephen O'Neill, CCN 9959, 15E2, North Lauderdale District, (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:30PM - BWC captures O'Neill arriving at the Coral Springs Drive/Sawgrass Expressway overpass (staging area). CSPD Chief Tony Pustizzi is observed on scene.

Deputy Shawn Hogan, CCN 17501, 15B4, North Lauderdale District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:31PM - BWC captures Hogan arriving at the staging area underneath the Sawgrass Expressway overpass and escorting a commissioner (Michael Udine) to the command post.

Deputy Patrick Keegan, CCN 11831, K9 615, Tamarac District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:32PM - BWC captures Keegan arriving at the southeast corner of the school and making contact with Mr. Medina.

Deputy Christopher Moniz, CCN 11461, Motor 74, Tamarac District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:32PM - BWC captures Moniz arriving at the southeast corner of the school near the portables.

Deputy David Yurchuck, CCN 6375, Civil Division (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:33PM - BWC captures Yurchuck arriving at the baseball field.

Deputy Roberto Valdes, CCN 17558, 15Y4, North Lauderdale District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:36PM - BWC captures Valdes running to the entrance of building 12 and checking a student wearing a blue ROTC uniform.

February 14, 2018 @ 2:44PM - BWC captures Valdes assisting a gunshot victim from building 12.

February 14, 2018 @ 3:24PM - BWC captures Valdes at the Walmart, the McDonald's, and suspect's arrest location.

Deputy Jermaine Johnson, CCN 14913, 15Y12, North Lauderdale District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:36PM - BWC captures Johnson arriving at MSD and running into Bldg. 12.

February 14, 2018 @ 2:45PM - BWC captures Johnson entering and clearing building 12.

Sergeant Richard Rossman, CCN 8094, 7K1, Tamarac District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:39PM - BWC captures Rossman on the southeast corner of the school with several CSPD officers, requesting the radios to be patched (unsuccessfully). Rossman obtains and transmits the suspect's description he obtained from Mr. Medina (school employee/witness). Rossman then transmits information he's receiving from a second school employee (b/m), who is receiving information from an employee in the camera room, identifying the suspect's current location (1200 building). At the time, it was believed that the information being provided by the employees inside the camera room was live, but confirmed as being delayed for over 20 minutes. February 14, 2018 @ 3:46PM - BWC captures Rossman transporting Mr. Medina to the arrest location for a show-up.

Deputy Robert Gorman, CCN 13539, Pompano Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:40PM - BWC captures Gorman on an interior perimeter.

Deputy Christopher Krickovich, CCN 16827, 7Y3, Tamarac District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:40PM - BWC captures Krickovich on an interior perimeter.

Sergeant Kirk Carter, CCN 8099, West Broward District (8 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:40PM - BWC captures Carter arriving at staging area - assisting with traffic.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:02PM - BWC captures Carter on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:39PM - BWC captures Carter in the staging area.

Deputy William Upegui, CCN 11566, 7K4, Tamarac District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:40PM - BWC captures Upegui on a perimeter near portables.

Deputy Stacie Nelson, CCN 14807, 7K2, Tamarac District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:41PM - BWC captures Nelson underneath the Sawgrass Expressway.

Deputy Eric Bienkiewitz, CCN 11615, Motor 72, Tamarac District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:42PM - BWC captures Bienkiewitz on a perimeter near portables.

Deputy Richard Van Der Eems, CCN 9717, 10B13, Deerfield Beach District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:43PM - BWC captures Van Der Eems inside the 1200 building, with several other LEO's, securing and assisting with the extraction of students and school personnel.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:04PM - BWC captures Van Der Eems continuing to secure and assist with the extraction of students and school personnel inside the 1200 and 1300 buildings. He is then observed walking to his patrol vehicle.

Deputy Danny Polo, CCN 17626, Deerfield Beach District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:46PM - BWC captures Polo making contact with Captain Jordan and Deputy Perry in the north student parking lot, entering/clearing building 12, and assisting shooting victims.
February 15, 2018 @ 5:11AM - BWC captures Polo escorting - suspect from the PSB to the jail.

Deputy Timothy Schaub, CCN 15514, Deerfield Beach District (5 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:46PM - BWC captures Schaub making contact with Captain Jordan and Deputy Perry in the north student parking lot, entering/clearing building 12, and assisting victims.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:31PM - BWC captures Schaub inside the 1200 building standing-by.

Deputy Felipe Santamaria, CCN 17564, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:46PM - BWC captures Santamaria on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Jeffrey Beculhimer, CCN 14204, Pompano Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:46PM - BWC captures Beculhimer on the interior perimeter of the school (view obstructed by rifle).

Deputy Gary Berman, CCN 12166, 10B11, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:47PM - BWC captures Berman on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Robert Sokol, CCN 11491, Criminal Investigations (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:48PM - BWC captures Sokol on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Dimitri French, CCN 15284, 15Y3, North Lauderdale District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:48PM - BWC captures French responding.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:33PM - BWC captures French at the McDonald's restaurant.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:47PM - BWC captures French arriving at the arrest location.

Deputy Michael Pianelli, CCN 8289, Motor 12, Tamarac District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:49PM - BWC captures Pianelli on a perimeter.

Deputy Christopher Sherlock, CCN 15258, SWAT, (5 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:49PM - BWC captures Sherlock clearing building 12 with other SWAT operators and LEO's.

Deputy Gary Toth, CCN 11727, 10B4, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:50PM - BWC captures Toth on the Sawgrass Expressway.

Deputy Neil Mondesir, CCN 13376, 10B12, Deerfield Beach District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:50PM - BWC captures Mondesir on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:36PM - BWC captures Mondesir on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Gasner Dolcine, CCN 14521, 10B5, Deerfield Beach District (5 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:52PM - BWC captures Dolcine on a perimeter.

Deputy Ryan Glennon, CCN 17685, 10B8, Deerfield Beach District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:52PM - BWC captures Glennon on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:38PM - BWC captures Glennon on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Carlos Periu, CCN 10660, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:52PM - BWC captures Periu on the Sawgrass Expressway.

Deputy Zaida Rojas-Bello, CCN 9883, North Lauderdale District (7 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:52PM - BWC captures Rojas-Bello on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:01PM - BWC captures Rojas-Bello on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:13PM - BWC captures Rojas-Bello at the Walmart store.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:33PM - BWC captures Rojas-Bello at the McDonlad's restaurant.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:47PM - BWC captures Rojas-Bello arriving at the arrest location.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:48PM - BWC captures Rojas-Bello at the arrest location. Crime Scene.

Sergeant Thomas Thyroff, CCN 12577, 15Y1, North Lauderdale District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:52PM - BWC captures Thyroff on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:13PM - BWC captures Thyroff at the Walmart store.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:32PM - BWC captures Thyroff arriving at the McDonald's restaurant.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:41PM - BWC captures Thyroff arriving at the arrest location.

Deputy Arij Larkin, CCN 17784, 10B3, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:53PM - BWC captures Larkin on a perimeter.

Deputy Thomas Torres, CCN 17009, Pompano Beach District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:54PM - BWC captures Torres on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:21PM - BWC captures Torres on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:39PM - BWC captures Torres at an intersection contact with student.

Deputy Gregory Bishop, CCN 14611, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:55PM - BWC captures Bishop responding to an exterior perimeter.

Deputy Christian Sandberg, CCN 17193, Pompano Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:56PM - BWC captures Sandberg responding.

Deputy Kevyn Williams, CCN 15075, 15B1, North Lauderdale District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:56PM - BWC captures Williams under the Sawgrass Expressway overpass.

Deputy Sean Strzalkowski, CCN 16749, Central Broward District (5 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:56PM - BWC captures Strzalkowski on a perimeter point directing traffic.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:07PM - BWC captures Strzalkowski on a perimeter point directing traffic.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:22PM - BWC captures Strzalkowski on a perimeter point directing traffic.

Deputy Eduardo Perez, CCN 17543, Deerfield Beach District (6 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:58PM - BWC captures Perez on a perimeter.

February 14, 2018 @ 3:38PM - BWC captures Perez on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Yadel Romero, CCN 15134, Dania Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 2:58PM - BWC captures Romero responding to an exterior perimeter.

Sergeant Michael Paparella, CCN 10356, Oakland Park District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:01PM - BWC captures Paparella responding Goddard School in Parkland.

Deputy Neil Dodge, CCN 12568, Dania Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:01PM - BWC captures Dodge on the Sawgrass Expressway.

Deputy Dennis Rolle, CCN 17457, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:02PM - BWC captures Rolle on a perimeter.

Deputy Francisco Perez Palacio, CCN 17762, West Park/Pembroke Park District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:02PM - BWC captures Perez Palacio responding to the Sawgrass Expressway overpass.

Deputy Alyssa Guerres, CCN 15558, 7K3, Tamarac District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:03PM - BWC captures Guerres on an interior perimeter of the school.

Sergeant Louis Pugliese, CCN 6270, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:07PM - BWC captures Pugliese on the Sawgrass Expressway.

February 14, 2018 @ 3:09PM - BWC captures Pugliese on the Sawgrass Expressway.

Sergeant Roger Peterson, CCN 11316, Lauderdale Lakes District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:08PM - BWC captures Peterson on a perimeter.

Deputy Eric Cieza-Aguilar, CCN 10443, Crime Scene (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:08PM - BWC captures Cieza-Aguilar responding to an exterior perimeter.

Deputy Carlos Orteiz, CCN 16702, 10B6, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:09PM - BWC captures Orteiz on a perimeter.

Deputy Charles Young, CCN 11837, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:09PM - BWC captures Young responding to the Walgreens store.

February 14, 2018 @ 4:21PM - BWC captures Young on a perimeter directing students.



Deputy Michael McCloskey, CCN 15679, Pompano Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:14PM - BWC captures McCloskey responding to the McDonald's restaurant.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:56PM - BWC captures McCloskey in the staging area.

Deputy Christopher Favitta, CCN 17020, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:18PM - BWC captures Favitta on a perimeter.

Deputy Marcos Ruiz-Toledo, CCN 12163, Criminal Investigations (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:20PM - BWC captures Ruiz-Toledo inside West Glades Middle School.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:21PM - BWC captures Ruiz-Toledo inside West Glades Middle School.

Deputy Wayne Potvin, CCN 15133, Oakland Park District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:23PM - BWC captures Potvin checking a parking lot with K9.

Deputy Raymond Rogers, CCN 8037, Pompano Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:23PM - BWC captures Rogers entering a school parking lot with K9.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:25PM - BWC captures Rogers checking the parking lot with K9.

Deputy Steven Davis, CCN 10314, Pompano Beach District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:16PM - BWC captures Davis on a perimeter.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:24PM - BWC captures Davis at the command post.
February 14, 2018 @ 3:29PM - BWC captures Davis at the command post and public library.

Sergeant Floyd Baker, CCN 5812, Deerfield Beach District (5 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:25PM - BWC captures Baker on a perimeter.

Deputy Matthew Parrish, CCN 17581, Central Broward District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:28PM - BWC captures Parrish speaking with an adult male who is arrested.

Deputy David Agusti, CCN 16403, Criminal Investigations (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:28PM - BWC Agusti speaking with two juvenile Sawgrass Expressway.

Deputy Kenny Matthews, CCN 17600, 10B1, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:28PM - BWC captures Matthews checking the interior perimeter of West Glades Middle School.

Deputy Javier Morales, CCN 11327, Pompano Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:31PM - BWC captures Morales inside the perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Carlos Brandao, CCN 17359, Central Broward District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:31PM - BWC captures Brandao checking the exterior school perimeter.

Sergeant Thomas Watkins, CCN 11269, 15D5, North Lauderdale District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:33PM - BWC captures Watkins at the McDonald's restaurant.

Deputy Vincent Ciacciarelli, CCN 9744, 7K7, Tamarac District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:38PM - BWC captures Ciacciarelli exterior perimeter - contact with student.

Deputy Bevin England, CCN 9937, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:38PM - BWC captures England on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy James Hyppolite, CCN 15183, West Park/Pembroke Park District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:39PM - BWC captures Hyppolite on a perimeter.

Deputy Darren Rush, CCN 13477, Cooper City District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:40PM - BWC captures Rush responding to the Sawgrass Expressway.

Deputy Edward Earnest, CCN 16979, Oakland Park District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:41PM - BWC captures Earnest clearing WestGlades with other deputies.

Lieutenant Warnell Phillips, CCN 11435, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:42PM - BWC captures Phillips at the Command Post (Sheriff Scott Israel is observed on scene).

Deputy Omar Osbourne, CCN 17542, Oakland Park District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:42PM - BWC captures Osbourne on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Jessica Abrams, CCN 16757, West Park/Pembroke Park District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:42PM - BWC captures Abrams arriving at the arrest location.

Deputy Reginald Cleophas, CCN 14706, Deerfield Beach District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:43PM - BWC captures Cleophas arriving at the arrest location.

Deputy Joshua Willis, CCN 17083, Central Broward District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:46PM - BWC captures Willis at (7200 Loxahatchee Road, Parkland).

Sergeant Scott Bures, CCN 7035, Oakland Park District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:56PM - BWC captures Bures clearing rooms inside WestGlades.

Deputy Phillip Reynolds, CCN 15667, Criminal Investigations (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:57PM - BWC captures Reynolds at the arrest location.

Deputy Dimos Charoudis, CCN 14467, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:03PM - BWC captures Charoudis on a perimeter speaking with an adult female wearing a "Police Attorney General" vest, and then transporting a juvenile student witness to the Marriott Hotel.

Deputy Anthony Ciaravino, CCN 16718, Deerfield Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:05PM - BWC captures Ciaravino on a perimeter gathering biographical information from students.

Sergeant Kevin McClure, CCN 9171, Digital Evidence Unit (6 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:52PM - BWC captures McClure on a perimeter directing students out.

Deputy Dallas Chisholm, CCN 6011, COPS Grant Pompano Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:15PM - BWC captures Chisholm at the arrest location.

Deputy Wilinne Renard, CCN 14039, COPS Grant Pompano Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:21PM - BWC captures Renard at the hospital with the suspect.

Sergeant Gregory Lacerra, CCN 11331, Tamarac District (3 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 3:52PM - BWC captures Lacerra at the arrest location.

Deputy Kathy Jackson-Hunsucker, CCN 5912, Grant Pompano Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:22PM - BWC captures Hunsucker escorting Fire Rescue (with Suspect Cruz) to the hospital.

Deputy Shaun Halleran, CCN 17835, Central Broward District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:25PM - BWC captures Halleran on a perimeter.

Deputy Ryan Schnakenberg, CCN 16660, Dania Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:32PM - BWC captures Schnakenberg speaking with a juvenile male witness at the McDonald's restaurant.

Sergeant Ian Doriot, CCN 6521, Deerfield Beach District (2 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:46PM - BWC captures Doriot with the suspect at the hospital.

Deputy Derek Diaz, CCN 14028, Deerfield Beach District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:49PM - BWC captures Diaz with a juvenile male witness at the McDonald's.

Deputy Giovani Zamora, CCN 14621, Deerfield Beach District (4 videos)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:32PM - BWC captures Zamora speaking with a juvenile male witness at the McDonald's restaurant.

Deputy Andrew Gianino, CCN 6222, Dania Beach District (1 video)

February 14, 2018 @ 4:52PM - BWC captures Gianino on a perimeter.

[END OF BWC SYNOPSIS]

INTERVIEWS OF THE MSD SCHOOL STAFF

The following is a synopsis of MSD Security Kelvin Greenleaf's statements and the MSD Commission Report regarding his actions during MSD shooting:

On February 14, 2018, Specialist Greenleaf heard a transmission over the school radio from Monitor Medina saying something weird is happening in the 1200 Building to Monitor Taylor, so he and Deputy Peterson left the main office and headed towards the building where Medina said that a suspicious male was on campus carrying a bag and a backpack. As they were walking through the hallways, they heard gunshots and Medina picked them up on a golf cart and dropped them off near 1200 Building, where Peterson instructed him to take cover, while he utilized his radio to call for backup. Greenleaf heard additional gunshots and testified that they appeared to be coming from the 1200 Building. Greenleaf stated that he then ran back on campus and started pushing the students back into the classrooms. Once this was accomplished, he reported to the camera room to review the video from the 1200 building in an effort to assist with locating the suspect.

Mr. Greenleaf stated that he and Assistant Principal Morford were corresponding with Deputy Peterson regarding their observations of the suspect's location. He stated that he was able to positively identify the suspect as Nikolas Cruz, a former student. Greenleaf did not provide any further information. Mr. Greenleaf never called a Code Red.

The following is a synopsis of MSD Monitor Andrew Medina's statements and the MSD Commission Report regarding his actions during MSD shooting:

Monitor Medina identified himself as the campus monitor and baseball coach for Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Medina stated that he has been the school's baseball coach for the last 6 years and a campus monitor for the last 3 years. He stated that he arrived at the school at approximately 7:10am on February 14, 2018, the date of shooting. Medina stated that one of his responsibilities is to provide security by patrolling the school. He stated that prior to school

dismissal, he routinely closes the front of the school (east side of the school on Pine Island Road) and prepares for dismissal. He stated that as he was performing his duties, at approximately 2:20pm, he observed an Uber vehicle (small gold SUV with a sign on the window) parked on Pine Island Road, on the east side of the school. He observed an older white female occupying the driver's seat and Nikolas Cruz, a former student whom he personally knows, occupying the rear passenger seat. He observed Cruz exit the vehicle, carrying a large black bag in his hand and wearing backpack, and walk quickly through the bicycle rack gate heading towards the school campus. Medina stated that as he attempted to make his way towards Cruz on his golf cart, he advised Coach Taylor, who was inside Building 12, that there was a suspicious subject on campus carrying a black bag heading into the east side of building 12. Medina stated that Taylor acknowledged and advised that he was coming out of the west side of building 12 to investigate.

Monitor Medina stated that as he approached Nikolas Cruz on his golf cart, Cruz ran into Building 12. He recalled that within 1 minute, he heard a loud noise coming from inside Building 12. As Medina got back on his golf cart, he heard approximately 15 loud bangs coming from inside Building 12. He stated that he was unsure what the noises were and that he advised over the radio that he heard suspicious noises coming out of building 12. Medina explained that he did not want to report the noises as being gun shots, fearing that if they were not, he would be responsible for the response of law enforcement to a false alarm. Medina stated that as he drove to Deputy Peterson's office, he observed Peterson outside walking in his direction. He advised that he reported this information to Peterson and transported him to Building 12. Medina stated that someone transmitted over the school radio that the noises sounded like fireworks, but that someone else stated that the noises were not fireworks. He stated that once they arrived at Building 12, he heard the noises again. He asserted that Peterson knew that there was a shooter on campus, and directed him to report to the front of the school, while Peterson jumped off the golf cart and ran off.

Monitor Medina met with CSPD Officer Butler after Suspect Cruz left the building and provided him with specific information about Cruz, Building 12-Three Story Building and other pertinent information that Butler forwarded to responding officers. This information assisted officers with locating the building inside MSD and addressing the threat; information BSO did not have.

During the statement, Monitor Medina stated that they (unknown who exactly he was referring to) had a meeting sometime in 2017, where it was discussed that Nikolas Cruz was capable of being involved in a school shooting. He stated that they have been training for this type of scenario for the last two weeks. Medina never called a Code Red.

The following is a synopsis of MSD Monitor David Taylor's statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his actions during MSD shooting:

Monitor Taylor identified himself as a baseball coach for Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. He stated that on February 14, 2018, at approximately 2:24pm, the date of the shooting, school security team member Monitor Medina notified him via school radio of a suspicious male that was heading towards the back side of the building he patrols (Freshman Building 12). He recalled being on the second floor of the west side of the building and walking down to the first floor. He observed Nikolas Cruz inside on the east side of the building wearing a burgundy ROTC shirt and carrying a 3 foot long duffle bag in his right hand. He stated that upon making eye contact with Cruz, Cruz moved into the east stairwell. Taylor stated that he went into the west side stairwell and headed up to the second floor in an attempt to "head him off." He stated that he did not see Cruz, but as he stepped into the hallway, he heard multiple gun shots. Taylor stated that he immediately took cover inside a custodial closet on the second floor and recalled hearing multiple gun shots as he hid

inside. He stated that he never heard any screaming. After approximately 10 minutes, Taylor walked out of the closet after he heard police activity. He stated that he was evacuated out of the building and subsequently onto Holmberg Road.

Monitor Taylor was asked about his understanding of a Code Red. He explained "Code Red, my interpretation of a Code Red would be from you know, since the training with Detective Butler, primarily an active shooter or an immediate threat as somebody or persons or staff on campus. It doesn't have to be a shooter; it could be somebody wielding a knife or something like that." Taylor, like all other staff members, said he had never participated in a Code Red drill. Taylor was asked when you can and can't call a Code Red, and he responded, "*You know, I don't recall the specific verbiage, but I remember, like if you see a gun or somebody with a gun, call a Code Red and anybody—they said anybody can call a Code Red.*" Mr. Taylor never called a Code Red.

The following is a synopsis of MSD Monitor Elliot Bonner's statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his actions during MSD shooting:

Monitor Bonner said that the first thing that caused him to realize something unusual was taking place on February 14, 2018, was when he heard the fire alarm. He also heard radio traffic about firecrackers and something about someone getting out of an Uber. At approximately 2:24:44, he was seen on a camera driving east in his golf cart between Buildings 6 and 13; Cruz was on the east end of the third floor of Building 12. Approximately five seconds later, Bonner approached the southeast corner of Building 13. Bonner said in his interview that he saw Coach Feis lying on the ground and heard gunshots coming from the 1200 Building.

Monitor Bonner travelled westbound with is radio to his mouth, presumably, the moment he transmitted the [only] Code Red over the school radio at 2:24:54 PM. This was confirmed by several staff members at the school. Prior to the Code Red being called, students and staff were walking away from Building 9 in a calm manner—very much consistent with evacuation for a fire drill. Within seconds of Bonner holding his radio up to his mouth, these students and staff reacted almost simultaneously from calm to panic mode.

The following is a synopsis of the MSD Commission Report regarding Coach Aaron Feis' response to the shooting:

Monitor Medina said that minutes prior to opening the gates on Pine Island Road (where Cruz entered), he and Coach Feis were engaged in conversation. This was approximately ten seconds after Cruz fired the first shots. Feis drove south in his golf cart in the direction of the north side of Building 13, where he met with met with student [REDACTED] in the parking lot directly north of Building 13. In his interview, [REDACTED] said that he told Feis that someone with a gun was inside Building 12. He parked his golf cart on the north side of Building 13 with [REDACTED] riding on the back, while holding his school radio in his hand. He then walked [REDACTED] to the doorway, unlocked the doors and directed [REDACTED] inside and drove his golf cart between Buildings 12 and 13 and began walking toward the west side of Building 12, and approached the single door that led directly into the west stairwell. While Feis himself was not seen opening that door, a flood of sunlight entered the stairwell at 2:23:25. Simultaneously, Cruz entered the stairwell from the door separating the stairwell and the west end of the first floor so that Cruz was immediately facing Feis. Cruz raised and fired his rifle fatally wounding Feis. He would later be found outside of the exterior west stairwell door. He had his school radio with him at the time. It is unknown why Feis did not call a Code Red after being told by a student that there was someone with a gun inside Building 12.

The following is a synopsis of the MSD Commission Report regarding Campus Monitor Chris Hixon' response to the shooting:

At approximately 2:22:43, Monitor Hixon was seen on camera sprinting toward the east doors of Building 12, while Monitor Medina was in the courtyard with Deputy Peterson and Specialist Greenleaf; Taylor was behind a locked door on the second floor of Building 12.

At 2:22:48, Monitor Hixon opened the west end double doors of the first-floor hall in building 12 and ran east down the hall. Simultaneously, Cruz exited the alcove to classrooms 1216 and 1217 and turned toward Hixon's direction, raised and fired, causing him to fall to the ground. Hixon crawled to cover near an office doorway between the elevator and the men's restroom. At approximately 2:23:22, Cruz walked in Hixon's direction and fired additional rounds at him. He remained alive and rescued by law enforcement, where he was placed on a golf cart and transported him to the triage area. He was later pronounced deceased. He was found with his school radio in his possession.

The following is a synopsis of MSD Maximo Rosario's, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his actions during MSD shooting

Mr. Rosario stated that on February 14, 2018, he heard a fire alarm activation while inside the 100 building, and identified building 1200 as the source of the alarm. He stated that he utilized a golf cart and drove towards the 1200 building to further investigate, and stopped near the 700 building located west of the 1200 building. He then overheard one of the security officers advising over the school radio that there were fireworks/firecrackers coming from the 1200 building. When he approached the 1200 building, he heard four to five gunshots coming from inside and, observed Deputy Peterson standing by the wall of the staircase on the east side of the 1200 building with his firearm drawn and Mr. Greenleaf directing students back into their classrooms nearby. Rosario stated that after hearing what he determined were gun shots, he stopped, turned around, and began directing students, who were coming out of surrounding buildings, back into their classrooms.

The following is a synopsis of MSD Assistant Principle Winfred Porter's, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his actions during MSD shooting:

Mr. Porter is the Assistant Principal at MSDHS and oversees the security of the school. On February 14, 2018, he was inside the front office when he was alerted to an alarm activation of gas inside the 1200 Building. Porter said that there were no transmissions being made relating to any other incidents, until he made a notification via the school intercom to evacuate the school. Porter stated that he then heard Monitor Bonner transmit a "Code Red" on the radio; therefore, he silenced the alarm and changed his previous order from an evacuation to a "Code Red," and began securing students inside the front office. This is when he observed two BSO deputies [Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita] inside the office. He then heard five to six gunshots, but failed identify the location, but described them as if they were "outside" in direction of the 1200 building. . Porter stated that Assistant Principal Morford and Deputy Peterson were responsible for transmitting the information captured on the cameras.

SUMMARY:

- Several MSD staff who had an opportunity to call a Code Red failed to do so, and there is no evidence to support the claims of other staff members calling a Code Red.

- Monitor Bonner called the first Code Red at 2:24:54 PM, 3 minutes 16 seconds after Suspect Cruz fired the first shots, while Cruz was halfway down the third-floor hallway shooting students. While there are other staff members who claim to have called a Code Red, there is no evidence to support those claims.
- Monitor Medina was the first school employee to observe Suspect Cruz walk onto the MSD campus carrying a bag that was obviously a rifle bag and that Cruz was a threat, a fact that he admitted to on video. Medina failed to call a Code Red, or engage Cruz preventing him from entering Building 12. Even after hearing gunshots Medina failed to call a Code Red. There were many conflicting statements that Medina's made post-incident.
- Student [REDACTED] informed Coach Aaron Feis that Suspect Cruz was in Building 12 with a rifle, and Coach Feis proceeded to enter Building 12 with a school radio and did not call a Code Red.
- Monitor Medina notified Monitor David Taylor via school radio that Suspect Cruz was entering Building 12. Taylor observed Cruz enter the building but failed to call a Code Red. Taylor was experienced with guns and recognized Cruz when he entered Building 12, as someone they had previously discussed as being a potential school shooter. Taylor had an opportunity to call a Code Red and never did.

MARJORY STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCHOOL





LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE WEST GATE (HOLMBERG ROAD) TOWARD BUILDING 12 WEST DOORS

The following is a synopsis of the reports and statements provided to the MSD Commission and BSO investigators by Coral Springs police officers and BSO deputies that responded to the MSD shooting and were the first to enter the 1200 Building from the west senior parking lot gate entrance on Holmberg Road. Their testimony was key to determining Deputies Perry's and Goolsby's response to the shooting and Sergeant Miller's testimony that he directed CSPD officers.

The listed officers had no radio communications with BSO, since they are on different channels and did not patch until later. It should be noted that all CSPD officer provided detailed information about their active shooter training during their statements.

Coral Springs Sergeant Jeffrey Heinrich – Road Patrol (Heard Gunshots)

Heinrich was not part of the group that entered the WEST GATE.

Sergeant Heinrich was off-duty, dressed in plain clothes on February 14, 2018, assisting with maintaining MSD's school grounds specifically the baseball field when the shooting occurred. His son is a baseball player at the school. His testimony is relevant because he had made incidental contact with Deputies Goolsby and Perry.

Sergeant Heinrich stated that he was watering the baseball infield lawn when he heard the fire alarm at the school but disregarded it as accidental and shortly after he "*heard five to six loud bangs.*" First he "*thought they were fireworks...somebody threw a thing of fireworks into the building*" tripping the alarm. He then observed students exiting the school screaming and yelling, but no running between the gymnasium and the 1300 Building. He then heard a second round of 7 to 10 gunshots and knew this was real, because the students were running in a panic down the hallways into the senior parking lot. He immediately ran in the direction of the buildings and met with Security Monitor Bonner, the baseball coach, and he alerted him that a Code Red had been initiated and an active shooter was on the campus and that Coach Feis was deceased. Heinrich made his way to the 1200 Building and encountered injured student [REDACTED], who had a gunshot. He assisted him north to the football field toward the fence line at Holmberg Road. At that point, he recalled walking behind the parked vehicles yelling, "*Active shooter,*" and he heard possibly a police officer [Deputy Perry] yell back, "*Get the fuck down. They're shooting at us.*" He said that he heard additional gunshots and believed that he was being shot at (Deputy Perry and Goolsby presumably heard the same volley of gunshots corroborating their testimony that they were also being shot at).

Sergeant Heinrich then assisted Student [REDACTED] to the northwest end of the school, where he met with two unknown deputies [Deputies Kratz and Marchese]. He recalled providing the deputies with information about the active shooter (Marchese and Kratz both broadcasted the information and in addition Marchese requested bolt cutters to enter the fence and rescue personnel). After releasing [REDACTED] to rescue, Heinrich paired up with CSPD Captain McKeon at the west end of the school and then proceeded back toward 1300 Building, where he met with an unknown deputy [Deputy Goolsby] and remained there for the remainder as backup.

Coral Springs Detective Gill Monzon – SWAT TEAM (No Gunshots)

Detective Monzon heard a dispatched call of an active shooter at Douglas (MSD). He entered his unmarked vehicle, grabbed his rifle and responded to the school arriving within 40 seconds. He recalled observing some [BSO deputies] along the way with their firearms drawn, but failed to remember how many. Simultaneously, he stated that CSPD Officer Burton was providing real-time information about the 1200 Building being three stories and its location to the northeast of the school. He then stopped in front of the west gate to the senior parking lot off of Holmberg Road, and was contemplating ramming the gate, but immediately abandoned that plan when he observed two unknown BSO deputies on either side, one behind a tree (presumably Deputy Perry) and one behind a vehicle inside the senior parking lot (presumably Deputy Goolsby). Based on the information that was provided, he was able to immediately identify Building 12. (Prior to entering the gate, he was joined by CSPD Sergeants Mazzei and Myers, and Officer Wilkins, but not mentioned until later).

Detective Monzon exited the vehicle and observed bullet holes to the third floor windows, and theorized that the shooter was upstairs, so he grabbed his SWAT helmet, walked through the west gate and asked the deputies where the shooter was (Perry and Goolsby were not together once inside). Monzone said that he never heard any gunshots.



Based on Detective Monzon's testimony, he advanced toward Building 13 with the two unknown deputies [Goolsby and Perry] and Officers Mazzei, Myers and Wilkins, but briefly took a position of cover to evaluate the scene, because he had not additional intelligence where the shooter, and then moved forward where they encounter Coach Feis deceased. At this point, Monzon said he had no other interaction with the two deputies [Goolsby and Perry] and no further information. His team entered Building 12 and rescued shooting victim Coach Hixon onto a golf cart with the assistance of a deputy [Volpe], who arrived at the scene, and assisted with transporting Hixon to medical personnel. They reenter with Deputy Hanks, who arrived on scene and begin clearing the first floor of Building 12. The remainder of his testimony is related to CSPD's Active Shooter policy, radio communication and his actions inside Building 12.

Coral Springs Sergeant Nicholas Mazzei - SWAT (No Gunshots)

Sergeant Mazzei was at the CSPD office when he heard dispatch transmit that they had multiple calls of an active shooter at MSD involving injured students in classrooms. He used a map to locate the school, and then travelled south toward Holmberg Road, where he observed [BSO deputies] along the way with their firearms drawn in a position of cover next to their vehicles. He stated that CSPD Officer Burton was providing real-time information about the 1200 Building being three stories and its location to the northeast of the school, which was extremely beneficial, since he had no knowledge of MSD's layout. He then stopped in front of the west gate to the senior parking lot off of Holmberg Road. Mazzei recalled parking near Detective Monzon at the west gate and exited with this rifle, where he met with met Monzon and they had a brief conversation, about the bullet holes on the third floor. He also observed two BSO deputies on either side, one behind a tree (presumably Deputy Perry) and one inside the senior parking lot (presumably Deputy Goolsby), but conflicted about how many were actually there and their position, because he was focused on the shooter Mazzei does not have a conversation with either BSO deputy and provided no additional information about them. Additionally, he testified that he never heard gunshots.

Sergeant Mazzei then directed Detective Monzon to move forward toward Building 12 and provide cover while he followed and then begin their approach through the center of the driveway, where he observed Coach Feis outside of the building deceased. He asserted that no other law enforcement personnel where ahead of him and Monzon, he was focused on someone" popping out with a machine gun." His team entered Building 12 and rescued shooting victim Coach Hixon onto a golf cart to medical personnel. They reenter with Deputy Hanks, who arrived on scene and begin clearing the first floor of Building 12. The remainder of his testimony is related to CSPD Active Shooter policy, radio communication and his response inside Building 12.

Coral Springs Sergeant Scott Myers – SWAT (No Gunshots)

Sergeant Myers was at the CSPD office when he heard a sergeant on the radio say there was a shooting in progress. He wrote that CSPD Officer Burton was providing real-time information about the 1200 Building being three stories and its location to the northeast of the school. He recalled leaving the station and travelling south toward Holmberg Road, where he observed [BSO deputies] along the way next to their vehicles. He then stopped in front of the unlocked west gate to the senior parking lot on Holmberg Road and observed Sergeant Mazzei and Detective Monzon running toward Building 12, so he followed, and observed Coach Feis. He then entered Building 12, and assisted the injured and clearing the building.



Sergeant Myers never observed or had any interaction with the two deputies approaching Building 12, Deputies Goolsby and Perry. He recalled that it was not until they made entry into the building that he interacted with BSO deputies, Deputies Volpe and Hanks. The remainder of his testimony is related to CSPD Active Shooter policy, radio communication and his response to Building 12.

Coral Springs Officer Lee Wilkins – Road Patrol (FTO) (No Gunshots)

Officer Wilkins said he was leaving the CSPD office when he heard from a firefighter that there was an active shooter at MSD, and then received immediate confirmation from a dispatcher. He recalled leaving the station and travelling to the school without any direction but began receiving information from CSPD Officer Burton, who was providing real-time information about the 1200 Building being three stories and its location to the northeast of the school. Once he arrived, he travelled south and then west on Holmberg Road, where he observed [BSO deputies] along the way next to their vehicles, one being a sergeant [Presumably BSO Sergeant Miller]. He then drove past them and parked near the open west gate. He testified that he donned his ballistic vest and grabbed his rifle.

Officer Wilkins testified that he entered the school via the gate and made contact with Detective Monzon, who is speaking to a BSO deputy [Deputy Perry] behind a tree and heard Monzon ask him, "Where is he at?" Wilkins was adamant that Perry told them that the shooter was on the third floor. Because he had his rifle pointed in that direction, and also stated, "We all can't stand behind this tree, we're going to get shot," referring to Perry. He also observed another deputy [Deputy Goolsby], who had established a position by the corner of Building 13 with his rifle pointed at the third floor of Building 12. Wilkins explained that everyone at the scene discussed later that they had tunnel vision, and difficulty remembering a lot of what actually occurred. He testified that he never heard gunshots.

Officer Wilkins reiterated that he made contact with Detective Monzon at Building 13 and after evaluating that they were covered, they moved toward Building 12, followed by a BSO deputy [Deputy Volpe]. They approached Coach Feis and determined that he was deceased. He then entered with the Mazzei group and observed an injured Coach Hixon with his school radio in his hand. At that point, they dragged Hixon out, locate the golf cart keys on Feis and transport him to medical personnel. Wilkins, who had transitioned to the east side of Building 12, testified that he had observed Deputy Peterson east of Building 12, approximately 5 minutes after their initial entry into the building.

Coral Springs Officer John Harrison – Motorman (No Gunshots)

Officer Harrison heard a detective asking dispatchers about an active shooter at MSD specifically 911 calls from MSD and they can hear gunshots in the background. Harrison left Coral Park Elementary School on his motorcycle and travelled west on the Sawgrass Expressway and exited Coral Ridge Drive to Holmberg Road, where he observed a deputy who had blocked traffic and it had backed up considerably. He recalled parking near his vehicle, because he had no information where Building 12 was located inside the school. At that point, he said that Sergeant Heinrich had approached him with a student shot in the leg, on the campus side of the fence at the far northwest gate. He said that Heinrich pointed toward the three-story, 1200 Building and told him that is where the shooting occurred. He retrieved his rifle and attempted to enter the nearest gate, but it was locked. He said that an unknown deputy was assisting Heinrich when he left. He never heard gunshots.



Officer Harrison explained that he began running toward the building and passed another unknown deputy exiting his vehicle and getting his patrol rifle. Harrison informed him that there is shooting at that building (presumably pointing at the 1200 Building). The deputy replied, "*How do you know that?*" (Evidence that BSO deputies had conflicting or erroneous information when they responded to the shooting). Harrison proceeded to inform him that he was receiving real-time information from his sergeant, and then ran toward the west gate, where he entered and met with the other officer, who were placing Coach Hixon on the golf cart. He then established a position of cover with Deputy Goolsby at the 1300 Building. At some point, Sergeant Heinrich meets with him and he relinquishes his firearm to him for protection.

Coral Springs Officer Paul Murray – Road Patrol (No Gunshots)

Officer Murray heard of an active shooter at MSD, responded to the scene and followed the other CSPD officers through the west gate and bounded from vehicle to vehicle and observed one BSO deputy [Perry] near the tree line to the east pointing his gun (Perry had a rifle) at Building 12, but never spoke to him. He then passed Deputy Goolsby by Building 13, who he observed pointing his handgun (Goolsby had a rifle) at Building 12 also. He recalled that Goolsby yelled at them that the shooting was coming from the third floor. Murray said that he was ignored and moved forward and the remainder of his testimony is consistent with the other officers. He heard no gunshots.

Coral Springs Officer Andrew Dintelman – Road Patrol-FTO (No Gunshots)

Officer Dintelman heard a detective asking dispatchers about an active shooter at MSD specifically 911 calls from MSD and they can hear gunshots in the background. He observed [BSO deputies] parked along Holmberg behind their vehicles. He then parked in close proximity to a marked unit and asked a deputy (possibly Deputy Stambaugh), "Where is he? The deputy replied, "Over there," and pointed in the direction of the 1200 Building, somewhere in that area. He then entered the west gate with Officer Murray and bound and cover utilizing the trees for cover until they reached the 1200 Building and the remainder of his statement is materially consistent with the other officers. Deputies Goolsby and Perry were not mentioned. He heard no gunshots.

Coral Springs Sergeant Stephan Weising - Road Patrol (No Gunshots)

Sergeant Weising heard a detective asking dispatchers about an active shooter at MSD and responded to the scene. During his response, he heard updated information regarding a description of the 1200 Building and upon arrival, parked next to a marked BSO patrol unit. He forgoes his rifle and heard an unknown BSO deputy broadcast over his radio, "I am out with a Coral Springs sergeant." Weising and the deputy never exchanged words and decided to meet with CSPD Sergeant Myers, who is running through the west gate, so he donned his vest and followed him. He recalled approaching an unknown deputy (Goolsby) near the 1300 Building, grabbing his belt, and informing him that he was going to the 1200 Building. He never mentioned Deputy Perry. The remainder of his statement is materially consistent with the other officers. He heard no gunshots.

BSO Deputy David Hanks - Parkland District Road Patrol (No Gunshots)

Deputy Hanks was on Parkside Drive, east section of Parkland, when he heard Deputy Peterson broadcast via the radio, "Shots fired at the school. Possible firecrackers," and responded toward MSD. He believed that he heard updated information regarding the 1300 Building or the 1200 Building, shots on the football field area, so he travelled west on Holmberg Road and drove up to a perimeter point along Holmberg Road near the east gate entrance, where he observed other deputies present outside of their vehicles looking at the school. He heard someone broadcast shots fired by the football field, but never heard any gunshots himself, so he exited his vehicle and ponders his next move, because there was conflicting information about the shooting; 1200 Building and football field. At that point, an unknown CSPD officer joined him for a few seconds and then runs westbound. Instead of running blindly, Hanks stood behind his vehicle for three to four seconds and observed Sergeant Miller behind his patrol vehicle in close proximity, so he proceeded to run to him to gather additional information. As Hanks moved forward, he observed five CSPD officers and a deputy [Deputy Volpe] running as a group through the west gate entrance toward a group of buildings, so he bypassed Miller and ran to them to assist. He recalled yelling out to Miller that he was going in, and ran with the Mazzei Group (Above) toward Building 12. The remainder of his testimony was materially consistent with CSPD officers. Hanks never mentioned observing Deputies Perry or Goolsby at the scene. He indicated that he never received any information from CSPD officers, either verbal or via the radio, since the channel were never patched. Hanks recalled his Active Shooter/RTF training and the dates he attended and stated that during an active shooting that you engage the threat.

BSO Deputy Gennaro Volpe - Parkland District Road Patrol (No gunshots)

Deputy Volpe was the SRD at River Glades Elementary School located in the east end of Parkland on February 14, 2018. He recalled hearing Deputy Peterson scream, "Shots fired." He left the school in his marked unit and travelled Code 3 (Emergency Response) toward MSD and parked on Holmberg Road near the west gate entrance. He then retrieved his rifle and observed a small group of officers [CSPD] and Deputies Hanks and Goolsby moving through the gate and he joined them around the 1300 Building where they took cover for a moment, and then ran toward the 1200 Building. Volpe stated that he never heard any transmission or obtained information from CSPD officers about the 1200 Building, he just followed the officers and that is where his determination was leading him. According to Volpe, he observed Coach Feis deceased and assisted transporting Coach Hixon to medical personnel on a golf cart. He returned and assisted with addition transports of the injured. He asserted that he never heard gunshots or had any knowledge where the shooter was. He recalled his Active Shooter/RTF training and the dates he attended and stated that during an active shooting, you may enter using real-time intelligence without supervisor approval. Volpe never mentioned Deputy Perry or Sergeant Miller in his report or statements.

[END OF SYNOPSIS]

The following is a synopsis, screen shots and illustrations of the CSPD officers' and BSO deputies' response through the west gate entrance on Holmberg Road:




2/14/2018 02:31:52.080 PM (EST)



2:31:50 (+ 10m 12s)

Reminder: Previous video was approximately 1m long

- A group of law enforcement arriving from Holmberg Rd. sprinted south toward the west side of building 12.
- Poor video quality prevented positive identification but this is likely Mazzei, Myers, Monzon, Wilkins, Harrison, Volpe, Goolsby and Hanks (CSPD and BSO).



Synopsis:

The aforementioned MSD video surveillance (motion activated) screenshot is from the (West Student Parking) camera date "2/14/2018" time stamped at 2:31:52 PM. The camera perspective is northeast and it captured the moment law enforcement ran toward the 1200 and 1300 Buildings. The actual video begins at 2:31:52 PM with the first CSPD officer approaching the threshold of the buildings. The following is the approximate timeline and travel route for each segment:

<u>2:31:52 PM</u>	<u>CSPD</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:31:52 PM</u>	<u>CSPD</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:31:57 PM</u>	<u>CSPD</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:32:02 PM</u>	<u>BSO Goolsby</u>	(Parked cars to the left-Bounding and Cover)
<u>2:32:13 PM</u>	<u>BSO Hanks</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:32:21 PM</u>	<u>BSO Volpe</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:32:24 PM</u>	<u>CSPD</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:32:27 PM</u>	<u>CSPD</u>	(Center of Driveway)
<u>2:32:44 PM</u>	<u>CSPD</u>	(Center of Driveway)

Deputy Perry can be seen behind the vehicle to the right of the driveway.

It should be noted that the camera surveillance video is grainy and blurry; therefore, I could not determine the identification of each individual law enforcement officer/deputy entering except for Deputy Goolsby, who had taken a different route and testified to his position.

I questioned the effectiveness of the motion detection camera system due to instances that students were captured running in the middle of the field and suddenly disappeared. This was evident when I reviewed the statements of the 11 officers/deputies entering the west gate, but only counted nine entering, according to the surveillance video.

SUMMARY:

Coral Springs Police Officers:

- Except for Sergeant Heinrich, who was off-duty working at MSD, all the officers that entered the MSD west gate had detailed information from their dispatch:

Dispatch: "10-4, K23, There is an active shooter working at Douglas, multiple gun shots are being fired. We can hear them in the background our 911 lines "blowing up." We have multiple units on the phone. Some are getting EMD. It is confirmed.

Dispatch: "There are three victims down in room 1216 in the freshman building."

- Except for Sergeant Heinrich, all the officers that were en route to MSD received updated information by Officer Butler, via their radio (All the officers testified that Butler's information became a key component in locating Building 12):



J39 (Burton): "I am on the east side of the three story building near the parking lot with my long gun."

J39 (Burton): "I will let you know where it is. It's the three story building is at the Northeast corner it's considered the Freshman Building."

- Except for Sergeant Heinrich, every officer testified that they observed several BSO deputies, and one a sergeant, along Holmberg Road, just north of the 1200 Building, behind their vehicles with their firearms drawn. (The BSO deputies and sergeant were: Deputies Hanks, Stambaugh and Seward and Sergeant Miller).
- Sergeant Heinrich while on the field, he heard the MSD fire alarm and several loud bangs that he thought were "fireworks inside the building." Then he heard a second volley that he identified as gunshots. He headed toward the buildings and encounter gunshot victim [REDACTED] and assisted him toward the north fence line, near the west gate. Deputy Perry yelled at him, "*Get the fuck down. They're shooting at us.*" Heinrich heard the last volley and testified that he was being shot at. He handed [REDACTED] to Deputies Kratz and Marchese."
- Several of the officers testified that they interacted with Deputies Goolsby and Perry:
 - Monzon: Two unknown BSO deputies; one behind a tree [Perry] and the other cover behind a vehicle in the lot [Goolsby].
 - Mazzei: Same as Monzon.
 - Myers: Had no interaction with Goolsby or Perry or observed them at the scene.
 - Wilkins: Recalled that Monzon asked the deputy behind the tree {Perry} where the shooter was at and that he replied that he was on the third floor. Additionally, that the deputy [Perry] said, '*We all can't stand behind this tree, we're going to get shot.*' He observed Deputy Goolsby near 13 Building (No interaction).
 - Harrison: Arrived later and established a position with Goolsby at the 13 Building.
 - Murray: Observed a deputy near a tree [Perry] and [Goolsby] by the 13 Building.
 - Dintelman: Made no reference to either deputy.
 - Weising: Never interacted or observed Perry and observed Goolsby by the 13 Building.
- All the officers testified that they never exchanged verbal information with Deputies Perry or Goolsby in reference to their real time intelligence (mentioned above). Additionally, CSPD utilizing a different radio system than BSO.
- The officers stated that they that entered Building 12 with two BSO deputies assisted them; clearing, evacuations and assisting the injured (Deputies Volpe and Hanks). Some officers took cover and bounded from vehicle to vehicle when they approach (similar to Perry and Goolsby).
- Based on their reports and testimony, it appeared that none of the officers ever interacted with Sergeant Miller or received any direction from him at any time during this incident.

BSO Parkland District Deputies:

- Deputy Volpe and Hanks responded from the east side of Parkland responding to a radio transmission of shots fired at MSD, possibly firecrackers, possibly the 1200 Building, and possibly at the football field by Deputy Peterson and Deputy Kratz.

17J3 (Peterson): "Be advised we have possible ah, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 building." (No physical description was provided of the building).

17T2 (Kratz): "I hear shots fired by the football field, shots fired by the football field."


- Deputy Volpe and Hanks responded to Holmberg Road just north of the 1200 Building. Hanks stopped at the perimeter point where Deputy Seward and Sergeant Miller were stationed. Volpe moved forward just west of Deputy Perry's vehicle, near the west gate. Both did not have information of the layout of the school nor where the 1200 Building was located inside the MSD Campus. Neither deputy heard gunshots.
- Deputy Hanks exited his vehicle, and assessed the situation because of all the conflicting information provided by several deputies; 1200 Building and football field. He took cover behind his vehicle and decided to obtain updated information from Sergeant Miller, who was in close proximity. At that point, he observed the group of deputies and CSPD officer running as a group through the west gate toward the buildings, so he bypassed Miller and informed him that he was going in and then joined the entry group. Hanks never mentioned Deputies Goolsby or Perry in any of his statements or report.
- Deputy Volpe exited his vehicle, retrieved his rifle and joined the group entering the west gate and recalled Deputies Hanks and Goolsby, but never observed Deputy Perry. Eventually, he assisted with the evacuating the injured from Building 12. Volpe never mentioned interacting with Sergeant Miller or receiving any direction from him at any time.
- CSPD officers never forwarded updated information from Officer Butler to our dispatch as updated information.
- Both indicated that the CSPD officer never provided any of their detailed information to them and that they are on separate radio systems; therefore, there was no radio communication with them and the channels patched much later. Neither one described radio issues with their system, but never made any transmissions either.
- Both provided information is regards to the BSO Active Shooter policy that was consistent with it its mission and recalled their last training.

Please refer to Deputy Goolsby' Synopsis on Page 83 of this report for the summary:
Please refer to Deputy Perry's Synopsis on Page 89 of this report for the summary

[END OF SYNOPSIS LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE WEST GATE]



LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE EAST GATE (HOLMBERG ROAD) TOWARD BUILDING 12 EAST DOORS



The following is a synopsis of the reports and statements provided to the MSD Commission and BSO investigators by Coral Springs police officers and BSO deputies that responded to the MSD shooting and were the first to enter the 1200 Building from the east lot gate entrance on Holmberg Road. Their testimony was key to determining Sergeant Miller's and Deputy Seward's response to the shooting. The listed officers had no radio communications with BSO, since they are on different channels and did not patch until later. It should be noted that all CSPD officer provided detailed information about their active shooter training.

Coral Springs Detective Chad Whittington – SIU (No Gunshots)

Detective Whittington testimony was materially consistent with the other CSPD officers regarding the information about an active shooter at MSD for Officer Burton on February 14, 2018. He left the station and travelled to Holmberg Road and parked in front of the East gate entrance that was secured with a padlock. He observed two deputies [Hanks and Seward] and one sergeant [Miller] using their vehicles as cover pointing their firearms at toward the three story building. He recalled yelling at a nearby BSO sergeant [Miller] that he was cutting the lock. After cutting the lock, he entered with several other CSPD officers: Dittman, Carvalho, and Fernandes, toward the east doors of Building 12. He noticed bullet holes in the windows. They proceeded to open the east doors to Building 12, now joined by CSPD Sergeant Kozlowski, Officer MaClean and BSO Deputies Jermaine Johnson and Richard Van Der Eems. They proceeded to clear the floor and assist the injured inside. They had no radio issues, but that BSO did. Never heard gunshots.

Coral Springs Officer Dereck Fernandes – Motorman (No Gunshots)

Officer Fernandes was conducting a traffic stop on February 14, 2108, when he heard a transmission about an active shooter at Douglas. He ended the traffic stop and travelled south southbound on his motorcycle to north side of the MSD on Holmberg Road near the east gate entrance and donned his rifle. He said that updated information was transmitted on the radio by Officer Burton about the northeast corner of the school and a three-story building He recalled the two unmarked units were at his location and three BSO deputies behind their vehicles; one was a sergeant [Miller]. They never exchanged information with BSO. At that point, three additional CSPD officers arrived and Officer Whittington had bolt cutters for the lock on the gate, and once they cut the lock, they entered bounding off the tree line toward Building 12. He noticed bullet holes in the windows. He mentioned that at least three BSO deputies [BSO Deputies Jermaine Johnson, CCN 14913, Richard Van Der Eems, CCN 9717 and Deputy Seward] assisted them at the building. They make entry into the east doors of Building 12 and proceeded to clear the floor and assist the injured inside. They had no radio issues, but BSO did. Never heard gunshots.

Coral Springs Officer David Dittman – SRD (Part time) (No Gunshots)

Officer Dittman is a retiree that returned to law enforcement services as a part time SRD at Country Hills Elementary, which is relatively close to MSD. On February 14, 2018, he heard a transmission about an active shooter at Douglas, so he travelled south and heard his partner, Officer Burton, transmit updated information about the shooter and Building 12. He arrive at MSD and stopped on Holmberg Road, north of the school east entrance gate, where he observe several BSO deputies behind their vehicles pointing firearms toward Building 12. He admitted using their vehicles for cover until his team gathered, but they never spoke or exchanged information. At that point, the other CSPD officers [The listed CSPD officers] arrived and Officer Whittington cut the lock to the East

gate entrance with bolt cutters and then yelled that we have to go, and the four of them made entry and made their way toward Building 12, bounding from tree to tree for cover. He noticed bullet holes in windows. He then observed Officer Burton standing behind a tree covering them with a rifle. They make entry into east doors of Building 12 and proceeded to clear the floor and assist the injured inside. They had no radio issues, but BSO did. Never heard gunshots.

Coral Springs Officer Augusto Carvalho – Bicycle Unit (No Gunshots)

On February 14, 2018, Officer Carvalho was at the station parking lot when he heard a transmission about a shooting at Douglas High School. He travelled south toward MSD and received additional information that it was the Freshman Building, a three-story building. Upon arrival, he stopped on Holmberg Road, north of the Building 12, and observed the listed CSPD Officer and BSO deputies at the scene. At that point, Officer Whittington had bolt cutters, cut the lock to east entry gate and the four of them made entry. Once inside, they bounded behind several trees for cover and made their way toward the east doors to Building 12, where they were joined by two BSO deputies [Deputies Johnson and Valdez], and observed Deputy Peterson, but did not speak to him. They make entry into the east doors of Building 12 and proceeded to clear the floor and assist the injured inside. They had no radio issues, but BSO did. Never heard gunshots.

SUMMARY:

Coral Springs Police Officers:

- All the officers that entered the MSD East Gate had detailed information from their dispatch:

Dispatch: "10-4, K23, There is an active shooter working at Douglas, multiple gun shots are being fired. We can hear them in the background our 911 lines "blowing up." We have multiple units on the phone. Some are getting EMD. It is confirmed.

Dispatch: "There are three victims down in room 1216 in the freshman building."

- All the officers that were en route to MSD received updated information by Officer Butler, who was the first CSPD officer to arrive on scene via their radio (All the officers testified that Butler's information became a key component in locating Building 12):

J39 (Burton): "I am on the east side of the three story building near the parking lot with my long gun."

J39 (Burton): "I will let you know where it is. It's the three story building is at the Northeast corner it's considered the Freshman Building."

- Every officer testified that they observed several BSO deputies, and one a sergeant, along Holmberg Road, just north of the 1200 Building, behind their vehicles with their firearms drawn. (The BSO deputies and sergeant were: Deputies Hanks, Seward and Sergeant Miller).
- Officer Whittington arrived at the east gate and cut the pad lock with a bolt cutter. He testified informing a BSO sergeant that he was cutting the lock.
- The officers then made entry through the gate and used bounded behind trees and vehicles for cover and made entry to the east doors of Building 12. The officer recalled a couple deputies that assisted them; Deputies Johnson, Van Der Eems and Seward.

- All the officers testified that they never exchanged any verbal information with the deputies and sergeant in reference to their real time intelligence (mentioned above). Additionally, CSPD utilizing a different radio system than BSO.
- Based on their reports and testimony, it appeared that none of the officers ever interacted with Sergeant Miller or received any direction from him at any time during this incident

BSO Parkland District Deputies:

- CSPD never forwarded updated information from Officer Butler to our dispatch as updated information.

Please refer to Deputy Seward's Synopsis on Page 71 of this report for the summary:

Please refer to Sergeant Millers Synopsis on Page 72 of this report for the summary:

BSO PARKLAND DISTRICT RESPONSE

The following Parkland District Law Enforcement personnel responded to the MSD and did not hear gunshots. Their responses will be evaluated based on their reports, statements, MSD surveillance video, and The Commission report.

CAPTAIN JAN JORDAN, CCN 7523

Resigned November 20, 2018

The following is a synopsis of Captain Jordan's reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding her response to the MSD shooting:

On February 14, 2018, Captain Jordan was advised by Lieutenant Mike Devita, CCN 7523, that there was a shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. The radio traffic was extremely heavy causing the radio system to malfunction and suffered from intermittent reception, making it impossible to broadcast information. She heard radio transmissions that deputies were reporting gunshot victims at various locations around the school campus, and summoning EMS for a victim at the front entrance to Westglades Middle School, by the football field. She never heard Deputy Peterson broadcast anything on the radio.

Captain Jordan recalled that she and Captain DeVita responded together the main office (Building 1) of MSD, and upon arrival, heard no gunshots. They proceeded to enter the administration office, however, not knowing how many shooters there were or their location the campus, so she feared the suspect/suspects would escape the area and pose a threat to the thousands of students on the school campus. Knowing the large size of the campus, she then inquired over the radio if a perimeter had been set, because multiple deputies reported over the radio that victims injured throughout the campus. At this point, she had not been able to transmit and was apprehensive to enter the school believing this would further hinder her ability to transmit. Additionally, she was obtaining information from staff that the shooter was occurring inside Building 12. At this point she realized that she had to take control and provide a command presence. The following is Captain Jordan's first transmission:

At 2:31:30 PM (Capt. Jordan) transmits: *"I know we have a lot going on, do we have a perimeter set up right now and everyone cleared out of the school?"*

At 2:33:04 PM (Capt. Jordan) transmits: *"17S1, I want to make sure that we have a perimeter set up and the school (unintelligible), all the kids are getting out, but we need to shut down around this school. Does the Delta unit have an area for all the units coming into the area?"*

Because the shooter is unknown, Captain Jordan testified that she recognized the need for a perimeter to contain and locate the shooter(s), and was also concerned about student pick up area where parents were waiting for their children; limiting access to the school campus by these parents and other citizens.

Captain Jordan stated that she separated from Lieutenant Devita and responded with Sergeant Sklar, CCN 15113, to the north side of Building 12, where she was being advised were the shooting last occurred and that there were numerous teams of deputies and officers assisting victims and searching for the suspect. Additionally, students were being evacuated out of Building 12 and directed onto Holmberg Road. She met with Deputy Perry north of Building 12 in the senior parking lot, where she observed several gunshots to the third floor window. He provided her with information about the teams that had entered Building 12.

Captain Jordan requested to know where the command post was and Sergeant Miller responded via the radio. She testified that she had radio issues during the entire incident and attempted to use several radio, but to no avail (At this point, Throttling had taken effect and radio inoperability was an issue). SWAT Commander Robson arrived on scene and relieved her. She responded back to the east side of the school to start establishing a command post.

LEUTENANT MICHAEL DEVITA, CCN 7523

Retired April 03, 2018

The following is a synopsis of the Lieutenant Devita's reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

On February 14, 2018, at approximately 1425 hours, Lieutenant Devita received a text message from Lieutenant Chris McCoy, CCN 7029, requesting to know "What's going on at the high school?" At the time that he read the text, he was speaking with a complainant on her desktop telephone, and looked at his laptop screen (CAD) and discovered that every Parkland District Road Patrol Unit was assigned to a shooting call at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, so he immediately ended his telephone conversation, and alerted Captain Jan Jordan, CCN 16931, of the incident. Lieutenant DeVita drove with Captain Jordan to the school and arrived at the main entrance. Radio traffic was heavy, as deputies were requesting medical response due to students with gunshot wounds, and upon arrival, he heard no gun fire and had no information regarding the number of shooters or the shooting location. Jordan and he entered the administrative offices (Building 1) and were met by staff members who appeared to be hiding behind their desks. Immediately, we were having issues transmitting any information our radios, especially Captain Jordan, who commandeered my radio. He immediately returned to his vehicle to retrieve his ballistic vest and patrol rifle. Upon returning to the offices a school employee (security monitor) advised that the incident was located at the 1200 Building. He moved toward the main corridor and observed a small team of Coral Springs Police detectives that appeared at the main entry doors, and assisted by opening the door for them and they moved as a team toward the 1200 Building. Captain Jordan and he separated at that time.



The CSPD detectives and Lieutenant DeVita cleared the auditorium and found a class of students and a teacher inside. They were instructed to shelter in place. They then moved as a team to the main N/S corridor that leads to the Building 12. As we arrived at the Building 12 there were multiple police officers moving into and out of the building. At that point, he observed Deputies Peterson and Seward near the Building 12. He said that Seward was holding the east doors to Building 12 open, and at some point Seward yelled at Peterson to give him the classroom keys, but Peterson did not react, so DeVita grabbed the keys from him and gave them Seward. He described Peterson standing between buildings with his firearm out and appeared stressed and really high strung, speaking in a really high pitched voice. DeVita indicated that during a debriefing, Deputy Peterson said that he was devastated and upset because he was friend with the staff members that perished, but never discussed his actions on that day.

Lieutenant DeVita said that several LEO's in SWAT gear were inside and blocking the stairways. Once information was received that the shooter had left the building, the CSPD detectives and he continued westbound through the campus checking structures and hallways for the subject. He later returned to the Command post following those efforts.

In conclusion, Lieutenant DeVita said that he attempted to formulate a game plan with Captain Jordan, but radio issues plaque their response and both got caught up on the "shots fired," and "people down" transmissions. Even though he was familiar with the campus, he did not know the building numbers.

SUMMARY:

Captain Jan Jordan & Lieutenant Mike DeVita

- Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita responded to MSD after they received information in regards to the shooting. Upon arrival, they heard no gunshots and proceeded to the MSD front office (Building 1). They recalled that several deputies were broadcasting that they were treating gunshot victims at various locations within the campus.
- Captain Jordan indicated that she was having radio issues during the entire incident, and could not transmit. As the incident progressed, she transmitted information in reference to establishing a perimeter, because she feared the suspect would escape and pose a threat to others.
- Captain Jordan made her way toward the north side of the 1200 Building, where she partnered with Deputy Perry, who was overwatch behind a vehicle. There, she several teams of deputies and officers assisting victims and searching for the suspect. Lieutenant DeVita partnered with CSPD officer and cleared the auditorium and proceeded to the 1200 Building.
- Lieutenant DeVita met with Deputy Peterson outside of Building 12, and he indicated that Peterson was devastated, upset, and unresponsive to questions. DeVita eventually grabbed the school keys from Peterson's hand and provided him to Deputy Seward.
- Both Jordan and DeVita cited numerous issues with the radio and their inability to transmit, which ultimately hindered their response and their ability to formulate a "game plan."

DEPUTY LOUIS MARCHESE, CCN 10339

The following is a synopsis of Deputy Marchese reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

On February 14, 2018, Deputy Marchese was the SRD for Heron Heights Elementary School, located at 11010 Nob Hill Road in the City of Parkland. He recalled that during dismissal, he heard Deputy Peterson's radio transmission of shots fired and needing assistance, and seconds later he heard possible fireworks or firecrackers. He departed the school and travelled Code 3, south on Nob Hill Road and then east on Holmberg Road, where he met with heavy vehicular traffic (dismissal time) and he was flagged down by construction/electrical workers who advised him that there was a shooting. He exited his vehicle, recovered his patrol rifle from his trunk and began running towards the school (Marchese stopped at the far northwest corner of the football field), but did not hear any gunshots. Deputy Kratz had stopped his vehicle just east of him, and he had shut down Holmberg Road, because of the vehicular and school bus traffic. He recalled hearing Kratz broadcast that he shoot is on the football field. Shortly after, a juvenile victim with a gunshot wound to his leg approached him on the opposite side of the fence and requested bolt cutters and rescue over the radio.

At 2:28:46 PM (Marchese) transmits: *"17J5 I have the gunshot victim, I have the gunshot victim, and he's by the entrance to Westglades on the west side of the school."*

At 2:29:06 PM (Marchese) transmits: *"Does anybody have bolt cutters? I can get this kid out of the fence. He's stuck in the fence, I need bolt cutter?"*

At this point, Deputy Marchese transmitted his location, requested Fire Rescue, and searched for an opening in the fence to find an area to secure the victim. He attempted to transmit on the radio and kept getting a busy or buzzing sound (throttling). Once fire truck arrived, he secured the student in a building on the baseball field, maintaining his position on the outside perimeter and listened to the radio after he learned that the suspect had fled the school, but because the information was Marchese stated that he later responded back to Heron Heights Elementary to assist due to the school being on a code red lockdown, and never entered MSD's grounds near the buildings.

SUMMARY:

- Deputy Marchese responded from Heron Heights Elementary school in reference to Deputy Peterson's transmission of shots fired and later fireworks, and upon arrival he assisted Deputy Kratz and was immediately tasked with providing medical care for gunshot victim, [REDACTED]. He broadcasted his observations and requested medical personnel. He then maintained a perimeter point at the west end of MSD, and later reported back to Heron Heights and assisted with the lockdown. He testified that he never heard gunshots

Deputies Volpe and Hanks were included in this response.
Refer to pages 48 and 52 of this report for their synopsis and summary

The Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission submitted their initial report to the Florida Governor on January 2, 2019. They indicated that there was an unsatisfactory law enforcement response mentioned in the following chapter:

Chapter 5. Off-Campus Law Enforcement Response to the Shooting

The Commission wrote that deputies Kratz, Eason, Stambaugh, Perry, Seward and Goolsby remained on Holmberg Road and did not immediately move toward the gunshots and confront the shooter and their actions appear to be in violation of accepted protocol. The Broward County Sheriff should conduct an internal review into the conduct of these deputies. If there is cause to believe their actions violated agency policy, the Sheriff should conduct a formal internal affairs investigation and take whatever action he deems appropriate.

FORMER DEPUTY SCOT PETERSON

Retired February 22, 2018

In evaluating Deputy Peterson's response, the MSD Commission has considered Deputy Peterson's interviews with BSO and the media, Deputy Peterson's training file, surveillance video, body camera footage and witness statements.

On February 14, 2018, Deputy Scot Peterson of the Broward County Sheriff's Office was the only School Resource Deputy (SRD) assigned to (MSDHS). Peterson, who had been a law enforcement deputy for 32 years, was a SRD for approximately 28 years, and assigned to MSDHS for 9 of those years. In Florida, the SRD is a certified law enforcement deputy employed by a municipal police department, sheriff's office or a school board police department, and is under the auspices of the policies and procedures of his or her respective agency.

Deputy Peterson was the only SRD/armed person assigned to 3,300 students at MSD on February 14, 2018. Peterson was not issued a body-worn camera (BWC) because the City of Parkland had not yet provided funding to equip each deputy. Peterson was wearing a standard BSO patrol uniform, but not his ballistic vest. Surveillance video from the school confirmed that Peterson had both his agency radio and a school radio in his possession. Peterson's handgun was secured in a holster attached to his gun belt, but was not in possession of his patrol rifle, even though he is trained and certified to carry it.

I obtained and reviewed a statement provided by Deputy Scot Peterson on February 16, 2018, taken by BSO Homicide Detectives Curtis and Curcio. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

Deputy Peterson was employed by BSO for 32 years, 28 years as a School Resource Deputy (SRD), and 8 of those years at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Peterson recalled that he was on duty at MSD on February 14, 2018. At approximately 1425 hours, Peterson said that he was attending to a student issue inside his office inside Building 1 and heard Monitor Medina transmit over the school radio *"I think I hear a firecracker in 1200 building."* Peterson stated that he and Specialist Greenleaf ran out of the office and immediately noticed the golf cart he utilizes was missing, so they ran northbound through the corridor where they heard the fire alarm activate. Peterson stated that as he passed Building 7, and when he was approximately 10 feet from Building 12, he heard 2 to 3 gunshots; described as being close and loud, possibly coming from the exterior

of Building 12, but observed no muzzle flash coming from the windows or students exiting the building. He radioed "*shots fired, shots fired,*" and provided the location of occurrence described as "Three-story building" [1200 Building]. Peterson also requested "to shut down Holmberg Road and Pine Island."

According to Deputy Peterson, he told Specialist Greenleaf to move away from the immediate area, because he was unarmed. Peterson stated that once he realized that he was standing out in the open, he pulled Greenleaf to cover and positioned himself at the corner of the 700 and 800 building, which he described as having a good view of the 1200 building, and drew his firearm. He recalled yelling, "*Lockdown, lockdown code red, code red to ... so you know so the school was aware to put the school on lockdown that we possibly have an active shooter*" on his [school] radio." He positioned himself at this location because he was unaware of where the gunshots had come from. He stated that while he was maintaining this position, he directed his attention towards the doorway of Building 12, in the event the suspect exited, but heard no additional gunshots.

Deputy Peterson stated that Coral Springs School Resource Officer Tim Burton arrived at MSD armed with a long gun, running through the parking lot and took cover behind a nearby tree. Peterson informed Burton that he heard gunshots and both remained behind cover as additional units arrived. He recalled hearing over the radio that a shooting victim by the football field, which Peterson described as being "quite a distance" from the 1200 Building.

Deputy Peterson recalled that after Lieutenant DaVita arrived, he ran towards the 1200 Building doors and observed Coral Springs Police Department SWAT personnel on scene. He stated that one of the CSPD SWAT officers asked if he had a key to the building, and he provided them with his keys that allow access into the classrooms.

According to Deputy Peterson, he and MSD Assistant Principal Morford reported to the camera room to review the school surveillance cameras to assist with locating Suspect Cruz and when they relayed the information, it was discovered that the video was not live but a 20 minute delay. The review did provide an accurate description of Cruz that assisted with the investigation and his eventual arrest.

The remainder of his statement was related to prior contact with Suspect Cruz, unrelated to his response to the MSD Shooting. Refer to Peterson's statement for further details.

[END OF STATEMENT]

TIMELINE OF EVENTS FEBRUARY 14, 2018

At 2:22:13 PM, Deputy Peterson walked to the northwest corner of Building 1, while School Security Specialist Kelvin Greenleaf exited the west side of Building 1, facing each other. The following is a summary of Deputy Peterson's only sworn, recorded statement to BSO Homicide Detective Curcio on February 16, 2018:

Deputy Peterson stated that as he and (Specialist) Greenleaf met with each other. He looked for a golf cart but did not see one. He pointed out that typically they will get on a golf cart when responding to address an incident. He said to Greenleaf, "I don't know about this," and they both began running north toward Building 12. After approximately five steps the fire alarm began. They continued running north past Building 7, and, within approximately 10 feet of getting to Building 12, he heard gunfire. Peterson stated, "I thought it was outside. It was so loud...and so close I thought it was probably outside."

Deputy Peterson's statement regarding the events appeared to be contradictory to the video surveillance evidence: Peterson and Greenleaf met near the northwest corner of Building 1, they both walked south along the west side toward a golf cart that was parked on the side of the building. Greenleaf knocked on a nearby door and attempt to get keys to the cart. Peterson had his left hand near his school radio and appeared to be transmitting, but based on the evidence, Peterson never spoke on the radio during that time. Greenleaf and Peterson turned around and began walking north along the west side of Building 1 and then began running the same direction. Within seconds the fire alarm was activated at various locations on campus. Greenleaf and Peterson then met with Monitor Medina, who was on his golf cart.

At 2:22:51 PM, surveillance video captured Deputy Peterson in the front passenger seat of a golf cart as it turned north toward Building 12.

At 2:23:15 PM, the golf cart carrying Mr. Medina, Deputy Peterson and Mr. Greenleaf traveled north into the courtyard area between Buildings 7 and 12. Two seconds later the golf cart was out view of the surveillance camera and near the east side of Building 12. At that time, Suspect Cruz had just left the alcove for classrooms 1212/1213 and was moving west on the first floor (*Twenty-one victims had already been shot, nine of whom were fatally wounded*). Medina stated that he dropped Peterson off near water pipes next to the east doors of Building 12 and then made a right U turn in his golf cart away from the building and had nothing further to add in regards to Peterson's actions.

Specialist Greenleaf stated that he and Deputy Peterson were dropped off between Buildings 7, 8 and 12. Peterson testified that he told Greenleaf to leave the area since he did not have a weapon (this was corroborated in Greenleaf's statement). *This is evidence that Peterson knew there were gunshots and it posed an immediate threat.* Greenleaf recalled that Peterson approached the east doors, but did not look into the windows, and did not access his keys or ask him [Greenleaf] for his keys. Additionally, Greenleaf said that Peterson had his firearm drawn and seemed "stressed." During that time, Greenleaf estimated that he heard 5 to 7 gunshots coming from within Building 12.

Based on the surveillance video timeline, if Deputy Peterson would have entered the east doors, he would have been in a position to engage Suspect Cruz, who was on the first floor walking west toward Coach's Hixon and Feis.

The following is the animation video screenshot and a surveillance video screenshot utilized in the MSD Commission presentation with the video caption of Peterson's position in relation to Suspect Cruz on the first floor of Building 12:



Deputy Peterson testified that the gunfire was so “clear and loud at that point, I knew it was close to this building, but I wasn’t even sure if it was in the building, was it outside the building, but I knew it was close.” Peterson stated that he did not observe muzzle flashes or observe anything come from the windows. When asked how many rounds he heard, Peterson said, “It wasn’t many, two... three.” Peterson asserted to BSO detectives that he was on his school radio “yelling lockdown, lockdown, Code Red, Code Red.” (Based on witness statements, the only person who called a Code Red was Campus Monitor Elliot Bonner).

At 2:23:26 PM, Deputy Peterson interrupted the BSO dispatcher who was attempting to contact him and responding deputies and yelled, “Be advised we have possible, uh – could be firecrackers. I think we’ve got shots fired. Possible shots fired. 1200 building.” (This transmission occurred while Peterson was out of view of any cameras on the east side of Building 12 with Specialist Greenleaf).

This is additional evidence that Peterson should have known that the shooting was occurring inside Building 12 requiring immediate intervention. Peterson and Greenleaf spent approximately 27 seconds on the east side of Building 12 during which time Greenleaf recalled hearing 5 to 7 gunshots coming from inside Building 12. During that same time, Peterson never entered or attempted to enter Building 12 to investigate the gunshots and immediately fled toward Building 7 where he remained for entire incident.

Deputy Peterson described this location in the following manner to BSO, *"I'm a taking a position on the east side of the doorway. And I can also see down the sidewalk looking out west. I get a good...I get a good two dimensional of...of that whole building at that point."*

At 2:23:30 - 2:23:44 PM, Deputy Peterson walked back between Buildings 7 and 8, while Specialist Greenleaf was observed on surveillance video to the left of the east side of Building 12. Suspect Cruz was nearly halfway down the second-floor hall and quickly moving east.

At 2:23:48 PM, Based on surveillance video, Deputy Peterson reached his position of cover at the base of a stairwell at the northeast corner of Building 7. Peterson would remain at this location for approximately 48 minutes, well after Suspect Cruz fled the campus and other law enforcement officers had entered Building 12, Peterson ran north.

At 2:23:55 PM, Deputy Peterson's provided a second radio transmission, where he stated, *"...make sure we got – get some units over here. I need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the intersection."*

At 2:23:58 PM, Suspect Cruz fired approximately three rounds in classroom 1234. Classroom 1234, the south side of the second floor of Building 12. The rounds were fired southeasterly (there is evidence that the projectiles penetrated windows in room 1234) in the direction Deputy Peterson's current location, approximately 70 feet south of Building 12. In regard to the gunshots, Peterson provided the following:

"And my concern was because I didn't know if the shots were coming out of the building, or were they coming somewhere out on this west side somewhere 'cause it sounded like it might've been even outside." Additionally, he stated, "I'm keeping cover on the east side of the building to keep them cover with my firearm directed towards the doors, possible with an anticipation if maybe the... the if the shooter or whoever it was which someone maybe was going to come out of this door."

The following are radio transmissions and actions relevant in evaluating Peterson's response. See the following timeline of events and radio transmissions:

2:24:14 PM Peterson: *"17 Juliet 3. We're talking about the 1200 building, it's going to be the building off of Holmberg Road."*

2:24:24 PM Peterson: *"We don't have any description yet, we just hear shots, appears to be shots fired."*

2:24:32 PM Event: Suspect Cruz made it to the east end of the third floor and began firing. Cruz went on to fire 61 rounds on the third floor.

2:24:35 PM Peterson: *"I'm over on the south side over by the 700 building."*

2:24:54 PM Event: Campus Monitor Bonner called the first Code Red over the school radio.

2:25:08 PM Kratz: *"Tango 2, I hear shots fired by the football field, shots fired by the football field."*



2:25:18 PM Peterson: "17 Juliet 3. We're looking at the 1200 building. It's gonna be the 300 building. It's going to be right off of Holmberg Road by the senior lot."

2:25:38 PM Peterson: "Get the school locked down, gentlemen." [BSO Radio]

2:25:42 PM Kratz: "Sounds like there's some students say they thought it was firecrackers, but we're not sure - by the football field."

2:25:56 PM Peterson: "Uh, 26 (received). Yeah. We also heard it over by inside the 1200 building."

2:26:00 PM Peterson: "We're locking down the school right now. Make sure there's no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road."

2:26:10 PM Peterson: Video showed that Peterson had his firearm drawn and pointed directly north of his location.

2:26:40 PM Peterson: "I hear shots fired."

2:27:03 PM BWC: Stambaugh's body worn camera (BWC) recorded the five final gunshots.

2:27:50 PM Perry Deputy Perry broadcasted that he was trying to get the fence open to move to Building 13. .

2:27:54 PM Event: Suspect Cruz exited the west doors of Building 12.

2:28:00 PM Peterson: "Broward, do not approach the 12 or 1300 buildings. Stay at least 500 feet away at this point."

At 2:29:09 PM, Coral Springs PD School Resource Officer Tim Burton was seen on surveillance video being dropped off by Monitor Medina near the north side of Building 8, northeast of Deputy Peterson's location. Burton arrived with his rifle and assumed cover behind a tree. According to Peterson's testimony, he informed Burton that he heard a couple gunshots, and had not heard anything since. Additionally, that the shooter may be in the parking lot (At that point, Suspect Cruz had dropped his rifle and had fled south away from the school).

At 2:33:48 PM, Coral Springs PD Sergeant Bruce Kozlowski and Officer Rich Best, arrived at the scene and ran south to Deputy Peterson's location. In an interview with Officer Best, he asked Peterson for additional details, and he replied, "Shots fired. The shooter is on the second or third floor."

At 2:36:00 PM, Approximately 18 law enforcement officers/deputies entered the east end of Building 12 in view of Deputy Peterson, however, he remained at his position and never assisted with the entry.

At 2:41:46 PM, CSPD officers and BSO Lieutenant Michael DeVita approached Deputy Peterson's location from the south. DeVita stated that Peterson was on his school radio talking with someone who had been watching the cameras and was in the process of attempting to track the

suspect (Sergeant Rossman's BWC captured audio from a nearby school radio that confirmed Peterson was communicating with Assistant Principal Morford as he and Greenleaf were reviewing the surveillance video).

According to Lieutenant DeVita, Deputy Peterson had his firearm drawn and down by his side. He described Peterson as "...like the rest of us, I think, really stressed, really high-strung at the time." DeVita said that he observed Deputy Seward holding the east doors of Building 12 open to allow students and staff to flee the building. He heard Seward asking Peterson for his keys but Peterson never moved or responded, so DeVita took Peterson's keys and handed them to Seward.

At 3:11:20 PM, Deputy Peterson ran north from his position at Building 7 toward the east side of Building 12. This is the first time that Peterson left his position. Sunrise Police Lieutenant C. Cardinale had responded to Building 12 and he recalled observing Peterson pacing back and forth saying, "*Oh my God. Oh my God.*" Cardinale asked Peterson, "Who the fuck are you?" Peterson responded, "*I'm the SRO.*" Cardinale asked, "*What's the deal? What's going on?*" While pacing back and forth and breathing heavily, Peterson replied, "*I don't know. I don't know... Oh my God, I can't believe this.*"

BSO SWAT Lieutenant Christopher McCoy and Captain Steven Robson confirmed that Deputy Peterson was escorted to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) inside Building 13 at 3:45:00 PM, where he assisted them with a layout of the campus. Peterson's whereabouts and actions are unknown from 3:11:20 PM to 3:45:00 PM.

On February 16, 2018, BSO Homicide Unit obtained a sworn, recorded statement from Deputy Peterson as part of their investigation without reviewing the MSD external school surveillance video, because the FBI had secured the footage as evidence for presentation to Broward County State Attorney's Office. Without access to the surveillance video, the BSO Homicide Unit had no reason to suspect that Peterson had violated any agency policies or engaged in any wrongdoing.

On February 20, 2018, BSO first became aware of Deputy Peterson response to the shooting when it gained access and reviewed to the MSD video surveillance from the FBI. BSO Internal Affairs changed his status to Suspended without pay and explained to him that there were issues regarding his response. Peterson opted to resign from BSO. The FDLE – Office of Executive Investigations attempted to interview Peterson in regard to their investigation, but Peterson's attorney respectfully declined.

Deputy Scot Peterson Television and Newspaper Interviews

Deputy Peterson provided interviews to the *Washington Post* on June 4, 2018 and NBC's *The Today Show* in June 5 and 6, 2018 respectively. The interviews are the only responses made by Peterson in regard to his actions during the shooting.

Deputy Peterson provided answers to various questions that were inconsistent with his training by BSO. Peterson called into question his ability to hear the gunshots stating, "*Out...when you're outside there, and, and that building, it's a three story, it's a hurricane-proof building. You can, it's hard to even hear.*" Additionally, Peterson stated, "*I believe there was a sniper. So, in my mind, I'm thinking to myself there's possibly maybe somebody up in there shooting out, but I didn't think they were shooting at the kids, I thought they were shooting out at the building, outside.*" Deputy Peterson's actions were contrary to his previous statements specifically that he remained exposed in an extremely vulnerable position north of Building 7, which would have placed him in imminent

danger of a sniper attack. Also, Peterson made no radio transmissions warning anyone that a [sniper] was firing gunshots. This was contrary to his testimony that he heard gunshots [inside Building 12]. Additionally, if Peterson truly believed that there was a sniper at the onset of shooting, he would have been in a tactical position to enter the building and confront the sniper when he was dropped off near the east entrance of Building 12.

Deputy Peterson was challenged on *The Today Show* about his decision not to enter Building 12 confront the shooter. Peterson said, "*What I was trained is you contain the area.*" This is inconsistent with BSO Policy and Training in regards to Active Shooter responses that require deputies to confront the shooter. Peterson was provided adequate training on single-deputy, two person and team active shooter responses. In addition, Peterson was certified to provide Active Shooting training to the teachers and staff at other schools throughout Broward County.

[END TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPER INTERVIEWS]

On November 12, 2018 Deputy Peterson was subpoenaed to appear before the MSD Commission and Peterson was absent. His attorney made an appearance and provided a statement and then presented the Commission with a lawsuit challenging the subpoena.

Deputy Peterson's Training:

In 1986, Deputy Scot Peterson completed his BSO Corrections Deputy Academy. Two years later, Peterson received his Basic Law Enforcement Recruit certification.

In 1991, Deputy Peterson completed a 40-hour School Resource Officer Course. Peterson completed in-service Active Shooter Training three times during his career: in 2007, 2012 and 2016. He attended at least 126 other in-service and career development courses throughout his career.

Since 2008, Deputy Peterson attended annual Florida Association of School Resource Officers (FASRO) Conferences. These week-long conferences for SROs and school administrators provided training to address current issues facing school safety, security and crime prevention. In 2017, one of these conferences included a four-hour presentation on school shootings and a discussion of the evolution of law enforcement active shooter response to the single-officer response.

According to BSO records, Deputy Peterson's most recent in-service training for an active shooter response was on April 19, 2016. Four hours was allocated to this training topic with a limited section dedicated to scenario-based training.

Deputy Peterson attended and completed the Broward County Joint Law Enforcement Active Killer course on June 15, 2016. This was also known as a "train the trainer course." This course was designed to train law enforcement officers to instruct school faculty and other personnel about target hardening, lockdown procedures and what to expect when law enforcement officers responded to the school for an active shooter. It also taught safe actions and reactions for students and faculty when law enforcement encountered them during an active shooter situation. BSO chairs this training group for all law enforcement agencies in Broward County. Peterson was part of a cadre of 8-10 instructors who taught active assailant response procedures and tactics to school personnel at two different elementary schools. In August of 2018, all Broward County elementary and middle schools received this training.

The following is a synopsis of the two CSPD Officers that interacted with Deputy Peterson during the incident and mentioned in this investigation.

Coral Springs Officer Tim Burton – Road Patrol- (No Gunshots)

Officer Burton is the SRO for Eagle Ridge Elementary School, Coral Springs, and on February 14, 2018, when he heard a radio transmission of an active shooting at Douglas [MSD], followed by a confirmation and shots being heard in the background. He travelled to MSD and parked in close proximity to the school in the front lot bus loop, and recalled that he did not hear gunshots, and never did at any time. He exited his vehicle and retrieved his rifle and then ran toward an open fence line to the east and met with Monitor Medina, who was very animated and stated, *"It's the Freshman building in the back... it happened in the 1200 Building...the big building."* Somehow Burton knew it was the three-story building to the north of the campus and relayed that via the radio to oncoming units. He and Medina used the golf cart and travelled toward the building and as they turned the corner by the 800 Building, Medina pointed out the 1200 Building, took a position and prepared for battle. At that point, he observed Deputy Peterson, who he has known personally for 7 years, asked him where the shooter was and he replied he had not heard shots in a few minutes (Suspect Cruz had exited the building three to four minutes earlier), but did not know where the shooter was.

Officer Burton said that several officers and deputies approached the east doors of Building 12 and entered, while others entered from the west. Shortly after the delayed video issue occurred that cause confusion for the law enforcement inside clearing the building. Burton admitted that he never entered Building 12 at any time.

Coral Springs Officer Richard Best – Road Patrol- FTO (No Gunshots)

On February 14, 2018, Officer Best was at the CSPD station when he heard a radio transmission confirming shots fired and multiple victims down at Douglas High School, so he ran outside into his patrol vehicle and travelled south with a caravan of other vehicles. Upon arrival, he parked in the southeast corner near the school staff parking lot, grabbed his rifle and ran toward the front of the school; Building 1 and 2, secured the doors and proceeded north and received updated information about a Building 12, a three-story building on the Northeast corner of Holmberg. He headed that way and met with CSPD Officer Burton, who had just exited his vehicle and is now facing Building 12. Additionally, he observed Officers Carvalho, Whittington, and Capri, who had responded from Holmberg Road and they met up near Burton. At that point, Best recalled that he spoke to an unknown deputy [Peterson] by Building 7 and 8, who was alone, and attempted to solicit updated information from him and asked, *"Hey brother, what do you got?"* Peterson replied, *"Shots fired. The shooter is on the second or third floor."* He then verbally repeated the information to his team and then broadcasted it over the radio.

Officer Best explained that he stayed with Deputy Peterson covering the windows, while CSPD officers began to enter the east doors of Building 12, and left his position to assist them, but Peterson never moved or assisted. Best stated that the team went inside and faced the Mazzei group entering the west doors, and they communicated to avoid a crossfire and shortly after Peterson walked over by the door and informed him that they were receiving information that the shooter is on the third floor with a gas mask (Suspect Cruz had exited the building- it was the video delay issue). No other real involvement.

[END OF SYNOPSIS]

The following is an email from Deputy Peterson's attorney, dated February 28, 2019, after a request to provide a voluntary statement was sent to his home address. This was his response:

From: Joseph DiRuzzo [mailto:jd@diruzzolaw.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2019 11:05 AM
To: Razi, Mohammad
Subject: scot peterson

Mr. Razi,

I represent Mr. Peterson and I have been provided your Feb. 27th letter to him. It is my understanding that before Mr. Peterson gives a statement he is able to review the documentation IA has gathered. Given the nature and scope of the investigation I would request that I be given an advance opportunity to review the documentation. Please let me know how we can accomplish this in the most efficient manner possible.

Kind Regards,



Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III, Esq., CPA

Because Deputy Peterson is no longer employed with BSO, he is not entitled to review all the evidence in this case prior to his giving a statement. Deputy Peterson was advised of our policy and subsequently declined our invitation.

Civil Deposition review:

I obtained and reviewed a transcribed deposition of Former Deputy Peterson dated February 26, 2019. The deposition was in response to a Civil Lawsuit filed by Andrew Pollock and Shara Kaplan (Plaintiffs) against Andrew Medina and Scot Peterson. Peterson's statement was obtained at the Broward County Courthouse by the attorneys representing the plaintiff.

Deputy Peterson's statement was materially consistent with his previous interviews and statements: He contends that that he was responding to firecrackers and later gunshots, but could not determine if it was occurring inside Building 12, and more likely outside. He explained that Andrew Medina provided him with inaccurate information and that he never heard Medina's initial transmission in regards to Suspect Cruz' description and actions when Cruz arrived at the school on February 14, 2018. He added that he was locking down the school, summoning units and maintained a tactical position at the 700 Building. He recalled calling out building number, but did know where it was occurring.

SUMMARY:

- Deputy Peterson failed to act consistently with his BSO Active Shooter training and engage Suspect Cruz who was inside MSD Building 12 shooting at students and staff. Instead he retreated to a nearby building and assumed cover for the remainder of the incident. Peterson was only armed law enforcement person on campus that was in a position to engage Cruz and mitigate further harm to others, but failed to do so.
- Based on the testimonial, video and physical evidence, Deputy Peterson should have or did have knowledge that the gunshots were emanating from within or the immediate area of Building 12, but never attempted to investigate the source of the gunshots and retreated to an area of safety instead of addressing the threat when he was directly in front of the east entrance doors

to Building 12. According to video surveillance timeline, if Peterson would have entered the east doors, he would have been in position to confront Suspect Cruz, who was on the first floor walking west slowly approaching Coach Hixon.

- Deputy Peterson's made statements that he had difficulty identifying the source and the location of gunshots due to echoes around the structures; his explanation for not entering Building 12, even though Monitor Medina informed him of the noises he heard inside that same building. The abundance of evidence to the contrary was discovered including, but not limited to:
 - Deputy Peterson was dropped off at the east doors to Building 12.
 - Specialist Greenleaf testified that he heard several gunshots inside Building 12.
 - Deputy Peterson repeatedly referenced Building 12 on his BSO radio.
 - Deputy Peterson told Officer Best that the shooter was on the second or third floor.
 - In his BSO interview, Peterson identified the gunshots as coming from within or in the immediate area of Building 12.
- Deputy Peterson's radio transmissions in regards to directions and information that he relayed to responding law enforcement, including directing responding deputies to shut down nearby intersections and stopping pedestrian traffic from entering the area hindered their response to MSD. He instructed deputies to *"stay at least 500 feet away from the 12 or 1300 buildings"* contrary to BSO current law enforcement Active Shooter response procedures; deputies should try to eliminate any immediate threat even if that requires approaching gunfire and danger.


[END OF SCOT PETERSON SYNOPSIS AND SUMMARY]



The following is a MAP (Parkland) showing the positions and proximity to the school in miles of the deputies that responded to the MSD Shooting.



The following map shows the location of each deputy that responded to MSD or were present when last volley of gunshots began.



The following is a map of the Mobile Command Post-Staging Area-Fire/Rescue Command Post and Tactical OPS Command (Toc)



DEPUTY JOHN SEWARD, CCN 11290

Retired October 04, 2018

The following is a synopsis of Deputy Seward's reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

On February 14, 2018, while Deputy Seward was on routine patrol in the 6300 block of Holmberg Road, when heard Deputy Peterson broadcast, "Shots fired", at MSD via the radio and maybe 1200 Building; "a bunch of stuff." He asserted that he knew where the 1200 Building was. He responded with emergency lights and siren activated to the school and stopped on Holmberg Road near the eastern most exit of the student parking lot after making a U-turn at the first break in the median which is located on the north side of the campus. At that point, he heard what appeared to be four or five very loud gunshots that sounded like bomb coming from somewhere on the campus, followed by a radio transmission from an unknown deputy, that there were shots fired by the football field. Additionally, he heard a deputy announce, *"I have a gunshot victim on the west side near Westglades. I need bolt cutters."*[Marchese] He repeated that two or three times.

Deputy Seward recalled exiting his unit and retrieving his ballistic from the rear of his vehicle, and then taking took cover behind the engine block. He then heard another radio transmission from an unknown deputy that said that a student who was running on the football field told him that someone might be shooting off fireworks inside the school. At that point, Deputy Hanks arrived on scene, stopping in close proximity to him, and then observed Hanks run west toward Sergeant Miller. He believed that they were west of the 1200 Building.

Deputy Seward then observed a group of CSPD officers [Whittington, Fernandes, Dittman and Carvalho] approach the east, exit gate of the parking lot, but never communicated with any of them. One of the officers asked Sergeant Miller if he could use bolt cutters to cut the lock on the gate, entered the campus and proceeded to the east side of Building 12 where we began clearing the building. He recalled following them, but that they were young men and he struggled to keep up. Once he arrived at Building 12, he observed Deputy Peterson by the breezeway [Building 7 and 8], but did not immediately interact with him. He then proceeded to assist the law enforcement present that entered the east doors to Building 12 with the injured and evacuations.

SUMMARY:

- Retired on October 4, 2018, prior to this investigation.
- Responded to MSD when he heard Deputy Peterson, shots fired at Douglas and the 1200 Building, a building he was familiar with, and stopped on Holmberg Road, in close proximity to Sergeant Miller, when he heard several loud gunshots, sounding like bombs.
- Heard transmission that there were shots fired by the football field. *I have a gunshot victim on the west side near Westglades. I need bolt cutters.*"[Marchese]. Exited his vehicle, donned his ballistic vest and took cover behind the vehicle, and did not attempt to locate the shooter or the source of the gunshots.
- He observed Deputy Hank arrive and run toward Sergeant Miller. He then observed several CSPD officer arrive and cut the lock to the East Gate entrance and run toward Building 12 and he followed, but struggled to keep up. He then assisted with clearing the building with other law enforcement personnel. He observed Peterson in the breezeway, but made no contact.
- Deputy Seward arrived at approximately 2:27:00 PM and did not immediately enter the campus and attempt to locate the shooter or the source of the gunshots. He eventually followed the CSPD officer inside at 2:35:00 (estimated) at least 8 minutes after his arrival. CSPD officer did not provide him with any information in reference to the shooter or the 1200 building.

[END OF SYNOPSIS]


SERGEANT BRIAN MILLER, CCN 4643

The following is a synopsis of the following reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

- BSO Parkland District Supplemental Incident Report under Case number 17-1802-000525 submitted by Sergeant Miller on February 24, 2018 (See electronic case file for details). *Miller did not review audio or visual evidence prior to drafting his report*

- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Inspectors Keith Riddick and Brandy Burns of the Office of Executive Investigations on May 16, 2018, at 2300 High Ridge Road, Boynton Beach, Florida of Sergeant Miller under case #EI-26-0079. Also present was IUPA Attorney Michael Finesilver (See electronic case file for details). *Miller was provided with only his report and no other information.*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Special Agent Randy Camp and Pinellas County Corporal Walter Valsaro on August 3, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Sergeant Miller under case #SI-75-0072. IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman attended. (See electronic case file for details). *No indication he had reviewed any statements or evidence prior to the interview.*

Synopsis:



Sergeant Miller's position at approximately 2:27:00 PM, on Holmberg Road, North of Building 12, near the east gate entrance to the parking lot.

On February 14, 2018, BSO Sergeant Brian Miller was the on-duty Bravo Shift (Day) patrol supervisor for the Parkland District. Sergeant Miller has been in Law Enforcement for approximately 32 years and served in the military branch of the Army. He recalled that he was at the BSO Parkland District Office when he heard **Deputy Peterson transmit "shots fired," and "firecrackers."** (2:23:26 PM) Miller travelled approximately 1.1 miles from the Parkland Office to his position on Holmberg Road, north of the MSD.

Sergeant Miller said that he failed to hear any of the radio transmissions during his emergency response, but upon arrival, he recalled that Deputy Peterson was establishing perimeters and assumed that the shooter was possibly outside. Additionally, several other law enforcement units arrived at the scene with their emergency lights activated, and because of the dismissal time, parents and buses had were in close proximity to MSD and Westglades Middle School. Fearing that parents would following him further, he stopped short, near the east gate, directly in front of Building 12 (See page 71 for a photograph).

According to Sergeant Miller, shortly after his arrival, he heard an estimated three to four gunshots as he was arriving and described them as "...rapid, sounded outside, did not sound muffled at all." He then heard Deputy Peterson directing traffic to be shut down, and reiterated that he believed the shooter was outside, possibly toward the football field, so he walked to the rear of his vehicle and donned his ballistic vest. Miller said that he was scanning and evaluating the area, when Deputies Seward and Hanks arrived at the scene, and heard Hanks tell him that he was going inside. He recalled seeing Deputies Goolsby and Perry also at the scene.

At that point, Sergeant Miller observed several deputies and CSPD officers move toward the west gate of MSD, and he testified that he directed Deputy Hanks and the other officers to go to the gap between Building 12 and 13 (Hanks proceeded to assist the west gate officers at the West Gate, further west). Miller explained that at this point, he believed that Deputy Peterson and an unknown CSPD Officer [Butler] are the only law enforcement inside the school.

According to Sergeant Miller, another group of CSPD officers arrived shortly after and asked him if they could cut the lock to the east gate (shown above), so they proceeded to cut the lock and then made entry. Miller never ran toward the east entrance of Building 12, but he did direct Deputy Seward to assist them the officer, and Seward followed them inside the campus.

Sergeant Miller never followed Deputy Hanks, Seward or any of the CSPD officers into the school campus and maintained his position behind his patrol vehicle until 3:00:00 PM, where he moved to the Command Post.

Sergeant Miller said that he experienced radio problems early on in the response (a tone/boink) and that he repeatedly tried to get on the radio to coordinate a response. *"I was controlling the scene as best I could," said Sergeant Miller.* Miller said he was "trying to get resources and people in places to help" and expressed a concern about parents coming to pick up their children. He said that he keyed up at least 40 to 50 times (Miller's radio problems will be explained in detail later in this investigation).

The following are all the transmissions on BSO Radio Channel 8A (Parkland) at this point:

02:23:22 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatcher 8A: calls 17J3 (Peterson), 17B3 (Seward) & 17B4 (Hanks) with an alert tone

02:23:26 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Be advised we have possible ah, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 building." *(Multiple gun shots are captured during this transmission. Someone in the background advises "Shots fired.")*

Dispatch: (Alert tones) "Attention all units in District 15, possible shots fired at 5901 Pine Island Road at Stoneman Douglas High School, possible shots fired at Stoneman Douglas High School."

02:23:55 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Make sure we get some units over here, I need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the intersection." Dispatch: "10-4"

02:24:14 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "We're talking about the 1200 building, it's gonna be the building off Holmberg Road."

02:24:35 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "I'm over on the south side over by 700 building."

17T2 (Kratz): "I'm shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the divide between Glades and the high school."

02:25:08 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17T2 (Kratz): "I hear shots fired by the football field, shots fired by the football field."

Dispatch: "Shots fired by the football field heard."

02:25:18 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "We're looking at the 1200 building, it's going to be the 300 building, it's gonna be right off Holmberg road, by the senior lot."

02:25:38 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Get the school locked down, gentlemen!"

02:25:42 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: "Attention all units not working the signal 33 go to Bravo channel for regular traffic."

17T2 (Kratz): "Some students saying it started with some kind of firecrackers but we're not sure, by the football fields."

02:25:56 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "All right, 26. Also heard it's over by, inside the 1200 building. We're locking down the school right now, make sure there's no pedestrian traffic anywhere on Holmberg Road."

02:26:08 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2 I'm 51"

Dispatch: "Unit advising 51"

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2, and if we have any district 15 motor units, they can respond also."

(Unknown female unit) "15B4 is going to respond, LT."

02:26:34 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch "Any units not working the signal 33 go to Bravo."

17T2 (Kratz): "I got more students running west towards the football field."

02:26:40 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "Juliet 3 we're going to Bravo... I hear shots fired...shots fired..shots." (Multiple gun shots are heard during this transmission)

02:26:45 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: "All units on the shots fired stay on main."

02:27:03 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp) (Miller heard these gunshots)

17Y4 (Goolsby): "We definitely have shots being fired."

(Multiple units stepping on transmission) Dispatch: "All District 7 units go to Bravo."

17T2 (Kratz) "(Unreadable)...right by the football field."

02:27:42 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17B3 (Seward): "B3 we need somebody to shut down Holmberg at Pine Island."

Dispatch "Unit to shut down Holmberg, advise."

02:27:50 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J4 (Perry): "Holmberg is shut down, we're in front of building 13 of the 900 building, we have shots fired. I'm trying to get the fence opened."

02:28:00 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J3 (Peterson): "(Unreadable) Do not approach the 12 or 1300 building, stay at least 500 feet away at this point."

02:28:14 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17J4 (Perry): "I had a parent tell me that there is a child down, have Fire Rescue stage in the area until we've make contact, there is a child down, have them stage."

02:28:23 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17T2 (Kratz): "I got a victim with a gunshot to the right leg, gunshot to the right leg, show me at the west end of the high school by the football field."

02:28:39 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

15E2 (O'Neill): "15E2 to the Yankee units, set up for active shooter response when you go 97."

02:29:33 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp) (COMMAND POST)

17K4 (Goolsby): "Let's get a command post set up on the south side of the Sawgrass in Coral Springs off of Pine Island...The gate for the student entrance is unlocked. We need to get units in here, so we can start trying to find this guy."

02:31:30 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17S1 (Jordan): "I know we have a lot going on, do we have a perimeter set up right now and everybody cleared out of the school?"

02:32:08 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

17D2 (Miller): "17D2"

02:32:42 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: "17D2"

17D2 (Miller): "10-4, can you get the papa unit up please, and also check if we have any K9s, if they can get here."

Up to this time, over 24 transmissions were broadcasted on the Parkland District' radio channel and Sergeant Miller never broadcasted any instructions or directions to deputies, asked for clarification, established perimeters or a command post, never initiated staging areas, did not request additional resources until five minutes after his arrival, and never attempted to secure school security cameras. Additionally, based on the gunshots he heard, never attempted to locate the source of the gunshots nor direct the deputies with him to do the same. Miller admitted that he never entered any of the buildings inside MSD, and did not assist with reviewing video, because he knew law enforcement was inside.

Deputy Miller admitted that he was responsible for the inner and outer perimeter of the scene and with all the law enforcement present and the inoperability of the radio, he began to direct personnel on foot (Miller did not specify what he actually did that day), but did the best he could. *There is no testimonial evidence that Miller ever directed or supervised any deputies or CSPD officers at any time during this incident.*

Sergeant Miller testified that he did not know the shooting occurred inside the 1200 Building until they were finding victims.

Sergeant Miller then jumped ahead and spoke about establishing a command post and staging areas with Captain Jordan on Coral Ridge Drive south of the Sawgrass Expressway. He then discussed meeting with Tamarac District Sergeant Rossman and assisting him with a show-up identification of Suspect Cruz.

Sergeant Miller was asked about the Parkland Active Shooter plan, a binder provided to the supervisors and SRD's comprised of the BSO Active Shooter and Bomb Threat SOP/Policy, in addition, there were schematics, maps and photographs of all the schools within the Parkland District, and locations for staging and commands posts (Sergeant Miller had the binder with him during the MSD shooting and brought it with him to the MSD Commission interviews). Investigators asked him about the BSO Active Shooter SOP, and he responded that a single officer "may"

address the threat, but it was not stipulated in the SOP, but he knew that from his training; If a there is a barricade suspect then wait for additional resources and SWAT will go in.

[End of synopsis]

The BSO Radio Shop provided documentation that Sergeant Miller's radio was issued to him by Senior Digital Evidence Technician Robert Brownstein, CCN 14896, on 04/28/2017. Miller's radio was a Motorola APX 6000 M3- Serial Number 481CRM2467. According to their records, Miller's radio had no reported issues before or after February 14, 2018 (See document File 8 Sergeant Millers radio information).

The following is a thread of emails from BSO Detective Curcio to Jose De Zayas (ORCAT) Broward County Regional Radio Administrator in reference to "radio trunking and the radio identification numbers of the named deputies listed in the email:

From: De Zayas, Jose [<mailto:JDEZAYAS@broward.org>]
Sent: Thursday, January 3, 2019 5:45 PM
To: Curcio, John
Subject: FW:
Importance: High

Good afternoon Det. Curcio,

Attached you will find the some information, in specific those users that you have identified (BSO MSD Curcio Request.pdf). The data is between 2:00:00PM to 4:00:00 PM.

- At 2:33:01 PM radio system reporting control channel saturation, approximately 5 minutes after shooter leaves the building.
- At 2:55:20 PM, radio system controller switched from primary to secondary. During the controller switch, there is loss of communications while the users begin to reaffiliate to the secondary controller, this took approximately 18 seconds.

The BC System Users 180214 14:00-16:00.pdf is a file that shows all who were on with the system during those times.

Please call me with any questions or concerns.

Best regards,

José M. De Zayas

E911 Communications Administrator
Radio Communication Systems
Office of Regional Communications & Technology Department (ORCAT)
115 S Andrews Ave, Room #325
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Office: 954.357.8012 Cell: 954.770.8410 Fax: 954.357.8518
<http://www.broward.org/CommunicationsTechnology>

From: Brownstein, Robert <Robert.Brownstein@sheriff.org>
Sent: Thursday, January 3, 2019 11:16 AM
To: De Zayas, Jose <JDEZAYAS@broward.org>
Subject: RE:

Jan Jordan (BSO-16931) – EID 59335
Mike Devita (BSO-7523) – EID 59812
Ian Sklar – BSO-15113 (primary portable) – EID 61955
Ian Sklar (spare portable) - EID 59426
Ian Sklar (mobile) – EID 61158
Brian Miller (BSO-4643) – EID 60513

An audit was completed by Broward County Radio Administrator Jose De Zayas of Sergeant Miller's radio EID-60513 (See previous illustration). The date of the query is February 14, 2018 between 2:00:00 PM and 4:00:00 PM. Zayas then provided me with a Subscriber Activity report that details

Miller's activity related to his assigned radio specifically the exact time it was keyed and how long the transmission lasted. This is known as Push to Talk (PTT). See below:

Subscriber Activity for Subscriber ID 59335, 59812, 61955, 59426, 61158, 60513

System	RFSI	Site
ALL	ALL	ALL

Start Date: 02/14/2018 02:00:00 PM

End Date: 02/14/2018 04:00:00 PM

Date and Time	Subscriber WACN	Subscriber System	Subscriber ID	Subscriber Alias	Target WACN	Target System	Target ID	Target Alias	Duration (seconds)
02/14/2018 02:30:01 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	2.7
02/14/2018 02:31:08 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.4
02/14/2018 02:31:13 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.5
02/14/2018 02:31:10 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	2.7
02/14/2018 02:31:24 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.9
02/14/2018 02:31:50 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.3
02/14/2018 02:31:52 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	2.8
02/14/2018 02:32:17 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.0
02/14/2018 02:32:26 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.0
02/14/2018 02:32:32 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	3.3
02/14/2018 02:32:35 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	3.0
02/14/2018 02:32:47 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	18.7
02/14/2018 02:33:06 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	1.3
02/14/2018 02:33:08 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	10.1
02/14/2018 02:33:18 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.1
02/14/2018 02:33:22 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	8.1
02/14/2018 02:34:24 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	8.5
02/14/2018 02:34:32 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.5
02/14/2018 02:34:33 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	3.7
02/14/2018 02:34:36 PM	BEE00	544	59812	BSO-12086	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	9.8
02/14/2018 02:35:47 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	3.5
02/14/2018 02:35:51 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	5.5
02/14/2018 02:36:59 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.8
02/14/2018 02:37:00 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	3.3
02/14/2018 02:38:22 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	0.5
02/14/2018 02:38:22 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	5.8
02/14/2018 02:39:24 PM	BEE00	544	61158	BSO-15113M	BEE00	544	1101	BCM-14-CALL	8.8
02/14/2018 02:39:43 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	5.8
02/14/2018 02:40:10 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	1.9
02/14/2018 02:40:12 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	1.8
02/14/2018 02:40:14 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	2.0
02/14/2018 02:40:16 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	0.8
02/14/2018 02:40:17 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	7.3
02/14/2018 02:40:24 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	5.7
02/14/2018 02:41:34 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	0.2
02/14/2018 02:41:51 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	9.3
02/14/2018 02:42:21 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	4.8
02/14/2018 02:42:38 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	2.8
02/14/2018 02:42:43 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	0.8
02/14/2018 02:42:43 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	8.4
02/14/2018 02:42:57 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	9.0
02/14/2018 02:43:11 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	10.3
02/14/2018 02:43:42 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	7.4
02/14/2018 02:45:39 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	10.0
02/14/2018 02:48:36 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	4.0
02/14/2018 02:48:38 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	4.8
02/14/2018 02:49:32 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	321	BSO-09-BRAVO	0.8
02/14/2018 02:49:32 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	2.9
02/14/2018 02:51:34 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.1
02/14/2018 02:51:34 PM	BEE00	544	60513	BSO-13301	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.4
02/14/2018 02:57:24 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.8
02/14/2018 02:57:24 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	5.7
02/14/2018 02:57:25 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	3.7
02/14/2018 02:57:35 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.8
02/14/2018 02:57:36 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	8.8
02/14/2018 02:57:43 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	4.1
02/14/2018 02:57:43 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	4.4
02/14/2018 02:57:55 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	5.8
02/14/2018 02:57:55 PM	BEE00	544	59335	BSO-759335	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	5.4
02/14/2018 03:19:08 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	275	BSO-08-DISP	0.2
02/14/2018 03:19:09 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	1.1
02/14/2018 03:19:10 PM	BEE00	544	61955	BSO-15113	BEE00	544	5121	CSP-JO-1	15.4

Sergeant Miller heard the transmission of shots fired at **2:23:26 PM**, despite his claims, his first attempted radio transmission was captured at **2:30:01 PM**, for 2.7 seconds when he keyed his radio, but his audio transmission was not captured by dispatch. There is no evidence to suggest that the

throttling problems would have begun by the time Miller made his first transmissions. In fact, the evidence is that the radio throttling issues did not begin until approximately seven minutes after Miller arrival time shortly before **2:27:00 PM**.

The following is a breakdown of his PTT:

At 2:31:08 PM Miller keyed his radio for 4.4 seconds: no transmission.

At 2:31:13 PM Miller keyed his radio for 4.5 seconds: no transmission.

At 2:32:17 PM Miller keyed his radio for 4.0 seconds:

Deputy Miller's first attempt to raise dispatch but was cut off by Deputy Eason.

At 2:32:26 PM Miller keyed his radio for 6.0 seconds:

7Delta2 (Miller): "10-4 Can you get the papa unit up please, also check if we have any K9s, we'll be in business."

This is Sergeant Miller's first transmission: Approximately, 7 minutes after he heard the transmission from Deputy Peterson and 5 minutes after he arrived at the scene in front of MSD.

At 2:36:46 PM, Sergeant Miller remained behind his vehicle, while CSPD officer and BSO deputies were clearing Building 12. This screenshot is from Deputy Johnson's BWC:

2:36:46 (+ 15m 8s)



On April 1, 2019, I obtained and sworn, recorded Garrity statement from Sergeant Brian Miller, CCN 4643, at the BSO Office of Internal Affairs. Also present was IA Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667 and IUPA Attorney Michael Finesilver on behalf of Miller. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

GARRITY SUMMARY

Prior to this statement, Sergeant Miller was provided with an electronic file with all the evidence, statements and video related to this investigation. He was allowed to review all the information for approximately two weeks.

Sergeant Miller was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 2004 and was assigned to Unincorporated Pompano Beach for four months and then to Deerfield Beach for almost two years, both as a road patrol supervisor. I asked Miller what his responsibility as a supervisor would be if he was responding to an in progress call; Burglary or Robbery. He explained that he would have communicated via his radio for units to establish a perimeter; respond to scene and determine the crime; request support units: aviation and K9; attempt to locate the suspect(s), and he would have overall control of the scene. I asked if he applied those same supervisory fundamentals when he responded to the MSD shooting on February 14, 2018. Miller replied, "I tried."

Sergeant Miller said that he was at the Parkland District station when he heard a radio transmission from Deputy Peterson advising possible shots fired or firecrackers. He recalled that Deputy Goolsby was inside the officer also, but they each responded in their respective vehicles within seconds of hearing the transmission. He said that he heard an updated transmission in regards to the 1200 Building or 700 Building and heard Deputy Kratz broadcast, "Shots fired on the football field." According to Miller, he travelled south on University Drive and then west on Holmberg Road and stopped directly in front of the east gate entrance directly north of 100 Building. He explained that he stopped there, because he heard transmission in reference to blocking the intersection at Holmberg Road and Pine Island, so he established that perimeter point for traffic control, since numerous vehicle were arriving for student pickup (Dismissal), and at the time, he was the only patrol vehicle in the area (See illustration above that shows where Miller was parked). Shortly after, he heard a volley of gunshots while seated in his vehicle, and since the gunshots stopped, he had no other reference points, so he began to scan the area.

I asked Sergeant Miller why he did not establish control of the scene and begin to direct responding deputies when he was route, since several updated transmissions had been broadcasted. He replied that he believed that Deputy Peterson had the most knowledge of the scene and had real time information; he did not want to interrupt his transmissions until he arrived at the scene and evaluated the incident. Miller expounded to say that in an Incident Command event, rank does not matter, whoever has the most information or experience can run the scene, and he trusted Peterson to provide the best intelligence available.

In his previous statements, Sergeant Miller testified that he failed to hear any transmissions when responding to the scene, and he clarified that today by adding that he had an opportunity to review all the evidence in this case, including the audio, and is able to recollect the events.

Sergeant Miller denied ever hearing any transmission or having verbal confirmation that gunshots were occurring inside MSD Building 12; that it was a three-story building or that there was an active shooter inside Building 12 with injured students and staff. He identified the 1200 Building through the evolution of the incident specifically when the students were being evacuated; some with injuries. He stated that he had no knowledge of MSD's layout, the location of any of the buildings, since so many different building numbers were being broadcasted. I asked Miller why he did not solicit additional information on the radio at that point and take control of the scene. He explained that he heard transmissions about gunshots at the football field compounded by the fact he had an injured student in the same area, in addition, Deputy Perry transmitted information about the parking. Miller said that was why he theorized that the shooter was outside toward the football field.

I asked Sergeant Miller, with everything evolving and all the information out there now, why did he not direct his deputies to establish perimeters or call for additional resources. According to Miller, the moment he arrived on scene, he heard gunshot and believed that he was being shot at, so he walked behind his vehicle, donned his ballistic vest and deployed his firearm. At that point, he

recalled that Deputy Seward was on scene and asked him where the gunshots were coming from and Seward pointed toward the football field. Simultaneously, he was attempting to stop vehicular traffic from entering the scene, and had Seward request additional units for traffic control. He recalled that Deputy Hanks arrived moments later and directed him to join the group of CSPD Officers and Deputies Goolsby and Perry at the West Gate (See Deputy Hanks synopsis for details). I asked Miller if ever attempted to locate Deputy Peterson, and he replied that he had no idea where he was because he was unfamiliar with the layout of the schools (There is no evidence or testimony by any of the deputies that Miller ever provided any type of supervisory direction).

I asked Sergeant Miller, when after he heard the last volley of gunshots occurring at 2:27:03 PM, why did he not respond to the gunshots or the football field to investigate. He reiterated that he could not pinpoint where it was occurring, but did direct officers [CSPD] to those locations, because he believed the shooting was occurring outside, and it was his responsibility to establish a perimeter, but that his radio was not transmitting. I asked if at that point, was he the Incident Commander and deferred to Deputy Peterson, and then Captain Jordan, "she accepted the role of Incident Commander." He recalled that Captain Jordan and Lieutenant DeVita left the Parkland Station shortly after him and he assumed it was her responsibility. He recalled that Deputy Goolsby attempted to establish a Command Post, but assumed Jordan was the Incident Commander (Jordan did not transmit until 2:31:30 PM, 4 minutes after Miller arrived.) He said that his responsibility was controlling the inner and outer perimeter, but his radio was not transmitting, so he verbalized his actions and directed personnel that way. According to Miller, the best way to be effective was to remain at his location and dole out commands and instruct incoming resources. When he did finally transmit, he attempted to call for resources.

Sergeant Miller admitted that he was not effective that day as a patrol supervisor, because his radio not was functioning. He added that there were a couple factors that hindered his response and actions; radio inoperability and failing to have the same intelligence of an active shooter inside Building 12 that CSPD had at the time. He added that during his interaction with CSPD, they never provided any of their information about the active shooter and Building 12, and that the radio channels were never patched. Of all the deputies at the scene, he only recalled directing Deputies Seward and Hanks, and the CSPD officers at the East Gate by allowing them to cut the lock.

Sergeant Miller recalled observing the East Gate officers enter toward the 1200 Building and directed Deputy Seward to assist them, but did not follow them in because he was responsible for the perimeter and responded to Captain Jordan's request on the radio (He testified that he had radio inoperability). He referenced the Fort Lauderdale Airport shooting incident where BSO was criticized for not keeping the roadways clear.

I discuss radio inoperability with Sergeant Miller and he admitted in his previous statements that he misspoke when he referred to keying his radio 40 to 50 times; he was frustrated because he could not transmit. He explained that radio inoperability is an issue in the City of Parkland and inside the district office; intermittent transmission, radio failure, and poor reception as you near the Everglades to the West. They have attempted to remediate this issue on several occasion with Motorola.

I provided Sergeant Miller the evidence in reference to his radio and Push to Talk (PTT) query that shows every time his radio button is pressed (See page 78 of this report for details). I asked Miller, based on the Subscriber Activity report, he pushed his radio button for the first time at 2:30:01PM, approximately six minutes after he received Deputy Peterson's transmission. He replied that the responding units were transmitting several observations in rapid succession, and Peterson was controlling the radio traffic, and he did not want to interrupt. Additionally, he was travelling to the



scene Code 3, and upon arrival, he began to conduct traffic control and direct personnel verbally. Based on those facts, he did not attempt to transmit until six minutes later.

I informed Sergeant Miller that over 24 radio transmissions were broadcasted on the Parkland District channel and asked him why he did not transmit any instructions or directions to deputies or ask for clarification; establish perimeters or command post. He replied that Captain Jordan was commanding the scene and was setting up the command post. His radio was not functioning and later during the incident, Tamarac District Lieutenant Feeley established the Staging Area, and he outranks him.

I asked Sergeant Miller about the Parkland District Active Shooter Plan binder that included the policy and aerials of the different schools with the City of Parkland Boundaries. He indicated that on that day, he had the binder, but that the photographs were antiquated and the 1200 Building did not appear on some of them, because it was not erected until 2007; therefore, it was of no use. I asked Miller about the BSO Active Shooter policy and training and he asserted that a sole deputy could respond to an active shooter when real time intelligence exists.

In conclusion, Sergeant Miller maintained that he did not have the real time intelligence that CSPD had the day of the shooting. If he would have, his actions would have been different: He would have established a perimeter with oncoming personnel, contacted Deputy Peterson with a key and made entry into Building 12; he would have instructed deputies to park their vehicles near the building exposed to gunfire, and address the shooter from a better vantage point.

I asked Sergeant Miller if everything he did during the MSD shooting was to the best of his law enforcement ability and training. *He replied, "Based on all the failure that was occurring, yes."*

I then provided Sergeant Miller the opportunity to correct, clarify or refute and of the evidence against him mention in the MSD Commission Reports, LE Response or Deputies who heard gunshots. He provided the following:

"Well, some of the really upsetting things to me was my radio transmissions that they said I didn't transmit. They also said that I told Coral Springs to cut the lock in their report, which I never did, nor did - I never documented or ever stated that. They asked about cutting it and I just told them where to go. So, that is definitely an inaccuracy."

"Everyone who responded to the scene that day of all the BSO people are parents and have so much compassion for the victims and families. The MSD Committee has pick and chosen from my statements to come up with the conclusions of actions. They never once asked me why I did something or why I didn't do something."

"Furthermore, I've been working here for 32 years for BSO and this is my first Garrity statement that I ever had to give and I'm being judged over three minutes of decision-making on the most stressful thing in my life, not taking into effect that we had ultimate radio failure and we did not have the same intelligence as Coral Springs. And if you look at what Coral Springs has done and their intelligence and how they handled it is because they had everything. They had a working radio; they had the Intel; they knew where everything was. We had to base our information solely on sound and transmissions and I have to say the improper intelligence because it wasn't all accurate"

[END GARRITY SUMMARY]

DEPUTY BRIAN GOOLSBY, CCN 8278

The following is a synopsis of the following reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

- BSO Parkland District Original and Supplemental Incident Report under Case number 17-1802-000525 submitted by Deputy Goolsby on February 21, 2018 (See electronic case file for details). *Goolsby did not review audio or visual evidence prior to drafting his report*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Inspectors Keith Riddick and Brandy Burns of the Office of Executive Investigations on June 25, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Brian Goolsby under case #EI-26-0079. Also present was IUPA Attorney Michael Finesilver (See electronic case file for details). *Goolsby indicated that he had reviewed audio and visual evidence prior to this statement.*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Special Agent Randy Camp and Pinellas County Corporal Walter Valsaro on August 3, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Brian Goolsby under case #SI-75-0072. Goolsby had no Union representation present. (See electronic case file for details). *Goolsby indicated that he had reviewed audio and visual evidence prior to this statement.*

Synopsis:

Deputy Goolsby has been employed with BSO for approximately 22 years and on February 14, 2018, he was assigned to the Parkland District's Criminal Investigations Unit and Crime Suppression Team for approximately 13 years. He recalled that during the time of the incident, he was at the Parkland District Office at 6650 University Drive (approximately 1.1 miles from MSD), when he heard an indiscernible panicked voice on his radio.

The actual transmission 2:23:26 PM (Peterson): *"Be advised we have possible ah, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 building."*

Deputy Goolsby explained that the radios inside the building lack good reception, but the urgency of the transmission got his attention. A second later, he indicated that BSO Dispatch transmitted the following, *"District 15 (North Lauderdale District) units respond."* He recalled being next to Sergeant Miller and looking at him for clarification, when another radio transmission was heard and they identified Deputy Peterson's voice yelling, *"Shots fired."* Both exited the building and responded to MSD in their assigned vehicles.

Deputy Goolsby was asked if he heard any of Deputy Peterson's transmissions and he explained that he was not wearing his earpiece and his radio was attached to the front of his ballistic vest and that his movements were causing the radio to fall out. He secured it the best he could and concentrated more on the mission and less on the radio transmissions. Basically, what he testified to earlier is what he heard from Peterson. Furthermore, he did not want to take up radio airtime because it would overwhelm the system; therefore, he kept transmissions to a minimum.

Deputy Goolsby said that he responded Code 3 (lights and siren) and arrived within a couple minutes and stopped on Holmberg Road directly north of the school. The noise from the siren prevented him from hearing any radio transmissions along the way until he stopped the vehicle and heard, *"football field, and firecrackers"*

At 2:26:34PM (Kratz) transmits: *"Tango 2, I got more students running west towards the football field."*

Deputy Goolsby then exited to the rear of his vehicle, donned his ballistic vest and grabbed his patrol rifle. Simultaneously, two random students ran toward them yelling, *"Active shooter, active shooter,"* and he then asks them, *"Where is he at, where is he at? What is he wearing?"* Both students continued running without providing any information. Goolsby then ran toward the west senior parking lot gate, because it was known to be unlocked during dismissal and met with Deputy Perry, who had parked behind him. At that point, both heard a volley of [five gunshots] not firecrackers.

At 2:27:03PM (Goolsby) transmits: *"We definitely have shots being fired."*

See MAP on Page 71 for details of his position when he heard the last gunshots.

Deputy Goolsby recalled that the gunshots he heard were occurring between Building 12 and 13 (courtyard). Additionally, he described the gunshots as a high pitch crack, the sound associated with a handgun, not an AR-15, which is more of a "boom" sound.

At 2:27:50PM (Perry) transmits: *"Holmberg is shut down, we're by the 900 or 1300 building, we've got shots fired, I'm trying to get the fence opened."*


At that point, he said that CSPD Sergeant Heinrich approached him with injured student [REDACTED] and Heinrich asked him for assistance but Goolsby had to deny his request and explained that they had to get inside the school and find the shooter. He then directed Heinrich to walk westbound toward Deputy Marchese, who was situated further west, for assistance.

The following illustration is the West Gate entrance from Page 125 of the MSD LE Response.



At this point, the first BSO deputies that arrived along Holmberg Road had not entered the school grounds nor observed Suspect Cruz leave the campus. Based on the timeline, Cruz fired his last round inside the teacher's lounge and then exited Building 12 shortly after.

According to Deputy Goolsby, the gate was locked and after a minute he realized that he had the keys to gate (Goolsby lives at another campus and all the keys interchange at the Broward Schools), unlocked the gate and he and Deputy Perry entered, and provided cover for each other as they made their way toward Building 13, which was clearly marked; Building 12 was not (Goolsby later finds out its Building 12). He recalled using the vehicles in the lot as cover believing the shooter was on the roof (A map depicting his route is included from the MSD LE Response).



At 2:29:06 PM (Perry) transmits: "We don't know, but we're heading in the building, in front of the 13 building, building 13. 17K4 (Goolsby) and myself are entering."

Deputy Goolsby began approaching Building 12 and 13, and observed students sporadically exiting the school, and immediately recognized Coach Aaron Feis, who was lying on his back, just outside the west doors to Building 12. He theorized that hearing the gunshots outside, observing students running away from the school, and Coach Feis lying outside the building, that the shooter possibly exited the building and targeted these individuals and then fled south. He recalled that radio traffic was heavy at that time and he did not immediately transmit Feis' status because he was having radio issues.

At 2:29:33PM (Goolsby) transmits: "17K4, Let's get a command post set up on south side of the Sawgrass in Coral Springs off of Pine Island. The gate for the student entrance is unlocked. We need to get units in here so we can start trying to find this guy."

At 2:30:11PM (Goolsby) transmits: "17Y4 I see a student down on the right next to the parking lot on the student lot." He was referring to Feis.

According to Deputy Goolsby, he had not heard any additional gunshots for approximately 2-3 minutes and took cover believing the shooter was in close proximity and he was exposed. At this point, he testified that he was unaware of Deputy Perry's position but after reviewing radio transmissions and aerial evidence, he determined that Perry was taking cover behind a vehicle in parking lot. Soon after, two CSPD officers approached Building 12 and 13, followed by him and then additional CSPD officers and Deputy Volpe joined in. He recalled assuming a position behind a pillar next to Building 13.

- Beginning at 2:31:50PM, Six CSPD officers and three BSO deputies approached Building 12 and 13. At 2:32:02 PM Deputy Goolsby made his approach to Building 13 and assisted with cover for the teams. Deputy Perry remained behind a vehicle. (See LE Response video located in File #5 MSD Animation of the Index).

Additionally, he observed them check Coach Feis for a pulse and determined that he was deceased. He said that the CSPD officers and Deputies Volpe and Hanks entered building 12 and exited with an injured Mr. Hixon, placed him on a golf cart and transported him toward rescue personnel. Approximately 30-45 seconds later, he recalled that CSPD Motorman Harrison approached him but never mentioned anything in reference to an active shooter or Building 12, so they both covered each other and checked the doors to Building 13, which were locked. He asserted that they were prepared to address the shooter if the gunshots resumed.

Deputy Goolsby said that he then scanned the school to the south for the shooter and provided cover for those going inside Building 12. Goolsby asserted that he only knew Building 12 as the "Freshman" building or "900 Building;" MSD has several buildings and it would be impossible to memorize every building in every school and he would have to rely on real time information and guidance.

At that point, Deputy Goolsby made an attempt to enter Building 12 from the west but was confronted by several law enforcement officers entering from the east entrance and to mitigate a crossfire situation, he exited the building and continued to hold cover to the south while the other deputies and officers worked to clear the building and treat the injured. He also made reference to a situation where CSPD Captain McKeon and Sergeant Heinrich, who was given a ballistic vest but was in plain clothes, was almost shot by him believing that he was the shooter. Subsequently, Goolsby broadcasted his concerns and had responding law enforcement come from the north. He also checked Mr. Feis for vital signs and he had none.

At 2:46:33PM (Goolsby) transmits: *"17Y4, don't let anyone enter the school, law enforcement wise unless they are coming from the north. We have only secured first third of the north end, if anyone come in through the hallways, we are going to have a problem. Don't let anybody else come in this direction but the north."*

Deputy Goolsby stated that injured students were being escorted out the east end of the Building 12, but all other students to the south appeared to be on lockdown. During this pinnacle time, Goolsby indicated that he did not have a description of Suspect Cruz and did not see anyone matching his description once it was provided. During that time, Goolsby recalled that he observed Captain Jordan among the vehicles north of Building 13.

Deputy Goolsby recalled that SWAT teams began arriving and began clearing Building 12 and the remaining buildings, while he assisted with the evacuation of students. Shortly after, he responded to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and providing intelligence to the incident command regarding the school, the city, and the district and then was relieved of duty upon the arrival of additional resources. He said that he never entered Building 12.

During the interview with FDLE, Deputy Goolsby was asked questions in regards to the Broward Sheriff's Active Shooter policy. Goolsby immediately recalled that he attended the May 2016 training for active shooter and rescue task force and in 2013 attended an active shooter mock scenario at a school. He asserted that the 2016 active shooter training directed a single deputy to engage a threat without hesitation as long as you hear shooting; you advance and determine the source, but when

the shooting stops, establish a plan, set up a perimeter and make your way toward the last known intelligence. Goolsby surmised that a training manual might provide you with some guidance to address a critical incident but every situation is different with many variables, especially a 45 acre campus, referring to [MSD].

FDLE agents asked Deputy Goolsby if he heard Deputy Peterson's transmission to set up a perimeter and stay back. Goolsby denied hearing that transmission but asserted they it would not have deterred him from going in because he was adamant that the threat was inside the school grounds, and believed that the shooter had a rooftop vantage point. He explained that the deputies that arrived initially at the scene were transmitting conflicting information from their respective locations and where they believed the gunshots were. This made it difficult to pinpoint the exact location of [the shooter].

In conclusion, Deputy Goolsby requested that the Commission evaluate the communications system [radios] for compatibility and easy transition from one jurisdiction to another to avoid radio inoperability in the future. In addition, he researched the timeline and commented that the deputies that responded could [not] have mitigated the shooter's killing spree based their responses and arrival times and the FDLE agent agreed. Furthermore, Goolsby addressed the issue of not receiving real time caller information from the parents and students that called Coral Springs Dispatch/PD during the shooting and that should be corrected.

On March 20, 2019, I obtained a sworn, recorded Garrity Statement from Deputy Brian Goolsby, CCN 8278, at the BSO Office of Internal Affairs. Also present was IA Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667 and IUPA Attorney Michael Finesilver on behalf of Goolsby. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

GARRITY SUMMARY

Prior to this statement, Deputy Goolsby was provided with an electronic file with all the evidence, statements and video related to this investigation.

Deputy Goolsby's statement was materially consistent with the aforementioned statement that he provided to FDLE and the Commission. In addition Deputy Goolsby provided the following explanations or clarifications from his previous statements and reports:

I asked Deputy Goolsby to explain the difference between the Parkland District compared to the other districts on their radio channel (8 Alpha), North Lauderdale and Tamarac Districts, in regards to calls involving critical incidents. He explained that if you combined North Lauderdale and Tamarac, they probably have hundreds of radio tone alerts (a loud tone that predicates an emergency call); therefore, by habit, Parkland District deputies would assume it was another district. In addition, the designator for Parkland "17" is often confused with North Lauderdale "15."

Deputy Goolsby explained in more detail what his actions were once he heard the last volley of gunshots and breaching the gate: He recalled when he was running towards the gate, heard the gunshots, and kept his head down while shots were being fired, but he was not looking at the school. He described the gunshots sounded like they were coming from ground level and from the area between what he knew as the three-story building, the Freshman or 900 Building and the 1300 Building. Once he got there, he stopped and looked into the campus and scanned for a shooter or anybody inside that could provide intelligence. At that point, he and Deputy Perry assessed trying to get through the gate by climbing over it, or getting his car and driving through it or hopefully the next

guy that comes up drive through it. After about 30 to 45 seconds later, he realized that he had a key in his pocket that will open that gate. He testified that he lives on campus at another school and all the keys interchange with the locks. He told Perry to cover him and began to open the gate, but felt very exposed at point. He thought it was a pretty bad idea, and then proceeded to unlocked it, push the gate open and both entered the campus.

I then discussed his route once inside the East Gate and Deputy Goolsby said that it was a true depiction of his route to Building 12 (See Page 84). He then explained the controversy about why he believed the 1200 Building was the 900 Building. He said that the building was built and designed for the freshman students as the 900 Building. Obviously, it was renamed the 1200 Building, and he was not familiar with any of the building numbers at MSD. He always made it a point to know where the cafeteria and the front office were inside the school, because he figured if someone entered the campus it would be through the front office and the cafeteria, because it is has the largest gathering of students

Deputy Goolsby explained his decision to defer Sergeant Heinrich and the injured student to Deputies Kratz and Marchese was that the shooter was the priority, not any injured civilians, and he clearly had somebody there that could help him, so he felt pretty confident that he was in good hands, so he to let him go and they proceeded toward the school. He added that their encounter further delayed their response toward the school.

Deputy Goolsby explained that once they made it through the gate, it was just the two of them. They began walking down the main driveway, which is the exit for the student parking lot; Deputy Perry made his way to the left and started using the vehicles as cover and he moved to the right and made his way down another line of cars that was west of where Perry was. He recalled that he was at the last car, and used it as cover. He then looked up and a building had a plaque on it that said 1300 and observed Coach Feis was laying on the ground, and broadcasted his observation, as a student down, so not to transmit his name over the radio. Prior to moving forward, Perry transmitted that they were going toward the building, and Goolsby transmitted about setting up a command post. Goolsby said he then transitioned toward up to the edge of Building 13. After they separate, he and Perry never communicate.

At 2:29:06 PM (Perry) transmits: *"We don't know, but we're heading in the building, in front of the 13 building, building 13. 17K4 (Goolsby) and myself are entering*

At 2:29:33PM (Goolsby) transmits: *"17K4, Let's get a command post set up on south side of the Sawgrass in Coral Springs off of Pine Island. The gate for the student entrance is unlocked. We need to get units in here so we can start trying to find this guy*

Deputy Goolsby asserted that there was no command presence at the scene either in person or on the radio so he attempted to establish a command post and these were his thoughts:

"Based on my training and prior events, I knew the world was coming. I knew that we were going to have a whole lot of cops there in a matter of minutes. I knew that we had casualties. I knew there were going to be people that were going to have to be evacuated. There were people that were going to have to be treated and, you know, possibly a landing zone and things like that. I thought of the park, which is south of the Sawgrass on Coral Springs Drive and Pine Island."



In addition, Deputy Goolsby indicated that Sergeant Miller provided no direction, either in person or via the radio. Goolsby added that he was probably the BSO deputy with the most experience and had the most intelligence that day to call a command post, so he did.

Deputy Goolsby did not recall any CSPD officers at Building 12 or 13 prior to his arrival, and only after about several seconds, does he observe them immediately run toward Building 12, while he checked the doors and windows to Building 13. He asserted that the CSPD officers that approached the building never made contact with him or provided any real time information about the incident. Goolsby refuted the testimony of the CSPD officers who testified that spoke to him and Deputy Perry or pushed them aside at the fence line. According to Goolsby, no CSPD officers every provided information about the shooter or the 1200 Building at anytime

Deputy Goolsby reiterated from his previous statement that based on his observations of hearing gunshots outside, possibly on the football field, students and teachers shot outside, that the shooter was also outside. He did not have the information CSPD had, so as they entered the building, he provided was to cover them, and he hope someone else would assist him.

In conclusion, Deputy Goolsby said that he would have had the information that CSPD had, he would have responded directly to Building 12 to address the threat.

[END GARRITY SUMMARY]

DEPUTY ARTHUR PERRY, CCN 8016

The following is a synopsis of the following reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

- Deputy Perry did not author a BSO Incident Report.
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by BSO Homicide Detective Jeffrey Curtis, CCN 15795, at the BSO Public Safety Building on February 16, 2018. *He did not have an opportunity to review audio or visual evidence prior to interview.*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Inspectors Keith Riddick and Randy Brown of the Office of Executive Investigations on June 14 2018, at the BSO Parkland District Substation of Deputy Arthur Perry under case #EI-26-0079. No Union representation (See electronic case file for details).
- A recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Special Agent Chuck Massucci and Pinellas County Detective John Suess on August 23, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Arthur Perry under case #SI-75-0072. Perry had Attorney Jeremy Kroll as his PBA representation. (See electronic case file for details). *Perry indicated that he was able to review audio transmission prior to the interview.*

Synopsis:

Deputy Perry has been employed with BSO for approximately 23 years and on February 14, 2018, he was assigned to Park Trails Elementary School in Parkland as a School Resource deputy and during dismissal he heard Deputy Peterson possibly yell, "We got shots fired. I got a shooter on the campus."

At 2:23:26 (Peterson) transmits: "Be advised we have possible ah, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 building."

At 2:25:08PM (Kratz) transmits: "I hear shots by the football field...shots fired by the football field"

At 2:25:18PM (Peterson) transmits: "17J3, We're looking at the 1200 building – it's going to be the 300 building – it's right off Holmberg road – by the senior lot."

At 2:25:38PM (Kratz) transmits: "Some students thought it was firecrackers, but we're not sure, by the football fields."

Deputy Perry said that he was standing in front of his patrol vehicle at Park Trails Elementary, Parkland, called a Code Red at the school, donned his ballistic vest, grabbed his rifle and travelled Code 3, south along Pine Island Road to Holmberg Road and parked in front of the student parking lot (West Gate), where he observed Deputy Goolsby exiting his vehicle. The elementary school is approximately one mile north of MSD off of Pine Island Road.

At 2:26:17PM, Deputy Perry arrived at Holmberg Road and met with Deputy Goolsby at the gate. Shortly after at approximately 2:27:00PM, Perry and Goolsby hear a volley of three to five gunshots.

At 2:27:03PM (Goolsby) transmits: "We definitely have shots being fired."

See MAP on Page 69 and 70 for details of his position when he heard the last gunshots.

At 2:27:50PM (Perry) transmits: "Holmberg is shut down, we're by the 900 or 1300 building, and we've got shots fired I'm trying to get the fence opened."

The following illustration is the West Gate entrance from Page 125 of the MSD LE Response.




At 2:28:00PM (Peterson) transmits: "Broward [BSO], do not approach the 12 or 1300 building – stay at least 500 feet away at this point."

Deputy Perry believed that the gunshots were occurring south of Building 13 at the basketball courts and simultaneously hears **Deputy Kratz transmit**, "We got shots fired from the football field." The gate was locked and while attempting to open it, Coral Springs Sergeant Heinrich, who is plain clothes, approached then with injured student [REDACTED] and requested assistance further delaying their response. Heinrich was directed to walk west toward the west along the fence line while they concentrated on entering the school campus. Perry heard no other gunshots.

At 2:28:14 (Perry) transmits: "I had a parent tell me there is a child down, have Fire Rescue stage in the area until we make contact...A parent told me there is a child down, have rescue stage." Perry was referring to Sergeant Heinrich.

According to Deputy Perry, Deputy Goolsby unlocked the gate with his campus key and entered, making their way toward Building 13, where Goolsby took a position to the west behind the first row of vehicles position, and he assumed cover behind a tree and then behind a vehicle east side of the driveway entrance lot near a stop sign. Perry referred to his training a recalled that it was called overwatch bounding.

The following is the route Deputy Perry took after he stopped on Holmberg Road



At 2:29:06 PM (Perry) transmits: "We don't know, but we're heading in the building, in front of the 13 building, building 13. 17K4 (Goolsby) and myself are entering." This is the approximate time that Deputies Goolsby and Perry make their entry onto the campus begin their approach.

Deputy Perry testified that he observed bullet holes in the window of the third floor, but could not discern whether the gunshots were from the outside or the inside of the building. He recalled that as they approached the building, he observed Coach Feis lying on the concrete floor, and until that point, he had heard no other gunshots, so he established a position of cover behind a vehicle, while

Deputy Goolsby surveyed the area. He theorized that because students were running westbound, and Coach Feis' was lying on the ground, that the shooting possibly occurred near the athletic field (In RED above). He admitted to detectives that he [never] realized that the shooting occurred at Building 12, because it was known to him as 900 Building or the ninth grade building.

Beginning at 2:31:50PM, Six CSPD officers and three BSO deputies approached Building 12 and 13. Deputy Perry remained behind a vehicle providing cover for the teams. (See LE Response video located in File #5 MSD Animation of the Index)

Shortly after, CSPD officers and Deputies Volpe and Hanks approached Building 12 and evacuated a teacher (Hixon) using a golf cart. Deputy Perry asserted that none of CSPD officers provided any additional information (real time intelligence of an active shooter inside) specifically an officer who took a position behind the vehicle with him that would have given him clear direction where the shooter was. Perry stated that he was confused when several of the initial deputies were broadcasting conflicting information about the location of the gunshots that led him to believe that there might be multiple shooters. He held his position because several officers and deputies had entered Building 12 and began evacuating students, so he assumed the position of over watch in case the shooter reappeared. He said that he was scanning in every direction and did not observe anyone to the south. Additionally, the radios began to fail and the transmissions, at times, were inaudible. He indicated that he remained on his main channel, 8 Alpha and never switched to 14 OPS for patching purposes.

According to Deputy Perry, he began assisting with the evacuation when Captain Jordan met with him behind the vehicle. He recalled that her radio was not working, so he gave her his, but it was not transmitting either. Eventually, SWAT arrived and they received information that the shooter [Cruz] was no longer in the building and had travelled westbound. He said that BSO SWAT Sergeant Garcia directed him to move to Holmberg Road and Pine Island Road to assist with crowd control.

Deputy Perry denied ever observing Deputy Peterson at scene but admitted that they spoke a bit about the incident two day after, but not about why he failed to enter the 1200 Building, just to vent. He explained that Peterson said that he heard gunshots, but could not figure out where they came from and that a CSPD officer arrived next to him and took over the spot for him and both agreed that the shooting was coming from outside (*Officer Butler had arrived after the last gunshots were discharged*). Perry was asked about Peterson's interview on the Today Show specifically stating that he was trained to contain the area and was Peterson's statement consistent with BSO Policy. He asserted that [BSO] active shooter training requires us to locate the shooter when gunshots are occurring and if the gunshots stop, assess and begin looking for the shooter; Deputy Goolsby and he reacted that way; they were there first in the gate and attempted to confront the shooter.

During the interview, Deputy Perry was asked questions in regards to the Broward Sheriff's Active Shooter policy. He recalled that he attended training involving active shooter and rescue task force, but could not recall the time before that. He clearly described that you [have] to pursue an active shooter as long as you hear shooting, you advance and determine the source; when the shooting stops. Perry was asked if SRD's have specialized active shooter training during the summertime and he replied that the SRD's do attend a week-long training session required by the Broward County School Board, but could only recall a 2007 mock scenario at Boyd Anderson High School (Perry referred to his records).

In conclusion, Deputy Perry requested that the Commission evaluate the [radios] for compatibility and easy transition from one jurisdiction to another to avoid miscommunication and access to real-time information, especially CSPD, who had real intelligence of students being shot inside Building 12 and a confirmed account of an active shooter. In addition, Perry explained that just one policy will not change what occurred at MSD, but school security needs to be taken seriously by the Broward County School Board and should not fall solely on the hands of law enforcement. He expounded to say that, prior to this incident, the Code Red (Lockdown) had been implemented at the schools, but during the drills, the staff, faculty and student body were not cooperating and not taking the drills seriously, believing that a critical incident would never occur at their school.

On March 26, 2019, I obtained a sworn, recorded Garrity Statement from Deputy Arthur Perry Goolsby, CCN 8016, at the BSO Office of Internal Affairs. Also present was IA Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667 and IUPA Attorney Michael Finesilver on behalf of Perry. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

GARRITY SUMMARY:

Prior to this statement, Deputy Perry was provided with an electronic file with all the evidence, statements and video related to this investigation

Deputy Perry's statement was materially consistent with the aforementioned statement that he provided to FDLE and the Commission. In addition Deputy Goolsby provided the following explanations or clarifications from his previous statements and reports:

Deputy Perry explained the moment he observed Sergeant Heinrich, who in plain clothes, stand up near the vehicles in the parking lot. He recalled that Heinrich pop up, and he screams, "Don't shoot. Don't shoot. I'm an off-duty Coral Springs Officer," He said that he recognized him instantly, and told him to get down because [they] were shooting at them, and then broadcasted his observation.


Deputy Perry recalled after he took cover behind the vehicle, he observed several CSPD officer run past him on the driveway, and into the 900 Building [1200 Building] but had no clue why, because they never communicated with him. Perry was adamant the shooter was outside, so it did not make sense that they were entering a building. Furthermore, CSPD or their officers never shared updated information about the building or the shooter. He never heard any radio transmission from the responding officers, and never heard the radio channels patch.

I asked Deputy Perry in reference to the statement from CSPD officers who entered the West Gate asking him where the shooter was, and he vehemently denied ever having a conversation with any CSPD officer at the scene, and they simply ran past him. Perry refuted the fact that CSPD officers said that he was hiding behind a tree, and he was perplexed that they would testify to that.

Deputy Perry recalled that Deputy Goolsby was the only person to establish a command post, and that Sergeant Miller never directed him or provided him with any instruction during the incident.

In response to my question about the Active Shooter training and policy, Deputy Perry replied that during the MSD shooting, he relied on his training. He heard shots fired, locked down his school, responded to MSD, heard gunshots and immediately began actively looking for a shooter. If he would been provided with the information CSPD had, he would have entered Building 12, but he believed the shooter was around the basketball courts, based on the gunshots he heard and the gunshot victims being outside.

Deputy Perry blamed the local politicians for 911 calls being transferred to CSPD instead of Parkland, because he was never provided with the information others had to act accordingly. Perry also provided me with a map of MSD that shows two Building 12, from 2007.



[END OF GARRITY SUMMARY]

DEPUTY MICHAEL KRATZ, CCN 11289

The following is a synopsis of the following reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

- BSO Parkland District Supplemental Incident Report under Case number 17-1802-000525 submitted by Deputy Kratz on February 24, 2018 (See electronic case file for details). *Kratz did not review audio or visual evidence prior to drafting his report*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Inspectors Keith Riddick and Brandy Burns of the Office of Executive Investigations on May 15 2018, at the 2300 High Ridge Road, Boynton Beach, FL of Deputy Michael Kratz under case #EI-26-0079. No Union representation (See electronic case file for details).
- A recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Special Agent Randy Camp and Pinellas County Detective Walter Valsaro on August 3, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Michael Kratz under case #SI-75-0072. Perry had Attorney Gary Lippman as his IUPA representation. (See electronic case file for details). *Kratz was able to review audio transmission prior to the interview.*

Synopsis:

Deputy Kratz has been employed with BSO for approximately 17 years and prior to this, 12 years with the City of North Lauderdale. He recalled that on February 14, 2018, he was assigned Parkland District Traffic Unit conducting traffic enforcement on Nob Hill Road and Northwest 66 Drive when he heard a garbled radio transmission from what he believed was from another district. He then heard Deputy Peterson yell, "Shots fired," and then "Building 12" but that it meant nothing to him, but responded Code 3 to the scene.

At 2:23:26 PM (Peterson) transmits: *"Be advised we have possible ah, could be firecrackers, I think we have shots fired, possible shots fired, 1200 building."*

Deputy Kratz stated that in his written report, he failed to list some of the radio transmissions from that day, but after reviewing audio evidence for his statements, it was clear that Peterson broadcasted either "lock down the school" or "shut down", to include the intersection.

At 2:23:55 PM (Peterson) transmits: *"17 Juliet 3. Uh, make sure we got – get some units over here. I need to shut down Stoneman Douglas, the intersection."*


Deputy Kratz said that he travelled south through Heron Bay Boulevard which intersects with Holmberg Road, just west of Westglades Middle and MSD. Upon arrival, he observed several school buses but could not discern if they were for MSD or elementary school students, since elementary schools dismiss at 2:00pm.

At 2:24:16 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"Any description? I'm coming up from West Glades Middle School."*

At 2:24:24 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"We don't have any description yet, we just hear shots, appears to be shots fired."*

At 02:24:35 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"I'm shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the divide between Westglades and the high school."*

The following is the GPS DATA map of Deputy Kratz' locations with an approximate timestamp



Analyzing the severity of the incident and being unfamiliar where this is occurring in the school [MSD], Kratz testified that he blocked the buses from entering the area. At that point, he observed six to eight students running west toward his direction from the football field attempting to get his attention, so he stopped his vehicle and engaged the students to obtain information and relay his findings. The students provided no suspect information and were conflicted about the noise being either gunshots or firecracker/fireworks, but all of them pointed in an easterly direction toward Building 12, but never stated it was the location.

At 2:25:08 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"I hear shots by the football field...shots fired by the football field"*

At 02:25:18 PM (Peterson) transmits: *We're looking at the 1200 building, it's going to be the 300 building, it's gonna be right off Holmberg road, by the senior lot."*


At 2:25:42 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"Some students thought it was firecrackers, but we're not sure, by the football field."*

Even at this point, it was not clear to Deputy Kratz where Building 12 was. He then directed the students to run west toward Westglades Middle and at that point, heard a volley of four to five loud gunshots that he perceived were near the east end of the football field. Since he was never provided a suspect description, so he did not know what to look for and then transmitted the following:

At 2:27:03 PM (Goolsby) transmits: *"We definitely have shots being fired."*

(Kratz) transmits: *"We got shots fired from the football field."*

Deputy Kratz said that it was so loud that he thought that it occurred 30 feet in front of him, so he ran to the rear of his patrol vehicle, retrieved his patrol rifle and began scanning the football field, never realizing that a building was in play. Additionally, buses and vehicular traffic continued to move in his direction and he theorized that the shooter would inflict injury to him or others if they passed him, so he was providing traffic control. Shortly after, he observed CSPD Sergeant Heinrich (plain clothes) and injured student (gunshot to the ankle) on the other side of the fence requesting assistance. He heard no additional gunshots after that. (Below is Kratz' location when he stopped and heard gunshots).



At 2:28:03 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"T2 I got a victim with gunshot to right leg, I got a gunshot to the right leg, show me the west end by the football field."*

Deputy Kratz conveyed his concern over the buses and the general public entering the scene and began to cover the area with his rifle and then Deputy Marchese arrived at the scene and took control of the injured student. Marchese requested rescue units and bolt cutters to cut through the fence, but subsequently escorts the injured student out of the area toward medical personnel. As additional law enforcement units arrive, Kratz continued to direct students and other emergency vehicles to prevent chaos. Shortly after, the radios began to malfunction, and CSPD officers began arriving at the scene relaying information to him about the shooting; *"Possible three victim on the third floor with a possible shooter wearing an ROTC uniform."* Kratz never heard this information broadcasted to him on the BSO channel because CSPD is on a different system, so he relayed that information to the other deputies via his radio (See below). He was adamant that the radios were never patched with Coral Springs PD.

At 2:30:46 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"I'm being advised possibly three more victims... shooter possible inside 3 story building with an ROTC uniform – that was given by Coral Springs Dispatch. Check with them and verify. If you can hook up with Coral Springs Dispatch I was advised by one of their officers possibly three additional victims in the three story building, possible suspect in a ROTC Uniform, if we can hook up with them and verify."*

Deputy Kratz realized that vehicular traffic was attempting to bypass their roadblock and coordinated with other CSPD officers to turn vehicles around and clear the roadway for emergency vehicles only. Additionally, they were directing students who had evacuated to safety. Shortly after, BSO SWAT teams arrived and he was providing intelligence and direction until the scene was released.

Inspectors asked Deputy Kratz questions related to BSO's Active Shooter policy and SOP. He recalled attending training that required a sole deputy to stop the threat (knife or gun) when real time information is available and without supervisory approval.

On March 28, 2019, I obtained a sworn, recorded Garrity Statement from Deputy Michael Kratz, CCN 11289, at the BSO Office of Internal Affairs. Also present was IA Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667 and IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman on behalf of Kratz. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

GARRITY SUMMARY:

Prior to this statement, Deputy Kratz was provided with an electronic file with all the evidence, statements and video related to this investigation

Deputy Kratz' statement was materially consistent with the aforementioned statement that he provided to FDLE and the Commission. In addition, Kratz provided the following explanations or clarifications from his previous statements and reports:

Deputy Kratz clarified the following transmission. He indicated that he did not hear gunshots and misspoke

At 2:25:08 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"I hear shots by the football field...shots fired by the football field"*

Deputy Kratz explained that he approached the students because he was a bit further west, and exited his patrol vehicle and spoke to the children trying to gather information. "What did you see, what did you hear. What did he look like?" "I don't know." The students did not know if it was firecrackers or fireworks, or gunshots. And he asked, "Where?" And they just kind of generally pointed east.

At 2:25:42 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"Some students thought it was firecrackers, but we're not sure, by the football field."*

Deputy Kratz added additional information regarding the gunshots he heard at approximately 2:27:03 PM:

Deputy Kratz stated that he had a see-through, six-foot, chain link fence that had some banners on it, and the bleachers on the football field and both blocked his field of view. He recalled that the gunshots were so loud, that he believed that the shooter was on the field or in the area. He said to himself, *"This son of a bitch can see me, but I can't see him."* (He was focusing on an open field, and had no description). Kratz heard no other gunshots after that volley, and only focused on the field, because he had no information about the building or its location inside MSD.

Deputy Kratz then referred to the LE Response animation by the MSD Commission, and refuted their timeline specifically showing Deputy Marchese walking past him when Sergeant Heinrich and the injured student approached him. He provided the following clarification:

"I take the victim and I escort him down the fence line with my rifle to protect him, still with those buses in my mind and there's a possible shooter on the field, I take them all the way to almost the fence line, where I finally hand him over to Deputy Marchese. He's way over here. He never came at me, nor did he ever pass me."

I asked Deputy Kratz after he received the updated information from CSPD about the 1200 Building and the shooter, why did he not attempt to locate the building and address the shooter. He provided the following response: He was locking down traffic, based on Deputy Peterson's order, and with all the vehicular and pedestrian traffic, he felt obligated to protect them. He did not know if there was more than one shooter, and continued to scan for the suspect based on the clothing description. By that time, there was a large law enforcement presence and he had a job to do where he was.

Deputy Kratz then clarified another timeline inaccuracy in the MSD Commission report. He provided the following: In his statements, he had two events backwards and that he recalled hearing. He referred to Deputy Peterson transmitting keeping away, or keeping back 500 feet, to make sure we keep all pedestrians off the sidewalk, along Holmberg Road. The other was Captain Jordan ordering to set up a perimeter. Kratz failed to recall the times they occurred. He then stated, *"So, with that said, I'm there because of the buses, I'm there for the order of Peterson giving orders of blocking the intersection, keep back 500 feet, no pedestrians on the sidewalk."* He believed that Peterson was the Incident Commander, because he was in a position to provide real time information.

Sometime later, Deputy Kratz recalled that he was approached by an older white male citizen and informed him that the shooter was "Nikolas Cruz." He believed this was important and he broadcasted that information which assisted with possibly locating Cruz. He remained at that location for the remainder of the incident. He testified that he never observed Deputy Eason pass him or ever at the scene.

I asked Deputy Kratz about radio inoperability in the City of Parkland. He said that on a daily basis, the radios will have a beeping sound (lost connection), and transmission are frequently staticky; you could standing next to someone and nothing is transmitted. The district office is not different.

We discussed the Active Shooter policy, and he asserted that his response to the MSD shooting was based on his training, not the policy. He recalled the Active Shooter/ RTF training, but it mainly dealt with RTF, and could not remember anything else.

In addition, Deputy Kratz said that he responded to orders from Deputy Peterson and Captain Jordan, in addition to his observations. I asked Kratz if you hear actual gunshots and you have real time information, are you heading in. He provided the following response:

"That is right. That is what the policy is, but again, I was focusing on an open field, not a building. I did not know exactly where Building 12 was, at the time. And, because of the open field and lack of proper and safe cover and concealment, I chose my vehicle, which is shown to do, quite often in training, when we're at the range."

Deputy Kratz asserted that Sergeant Miller did not provide any supervisory direction at any time, and he said the following,

"Not at all. I did not receive any orders to change anything that I was doing, from Sergeant Miller or Captain Jordan, or any other supervisor that was there."

I asked Deputy Kratz if he did everything he could during the MSD shooting to the best of his law enforcement abilities and training, and he replied,

"I believe with what I was told, and I'll use the word ordered, and what I saw, heard and what I did what or needed to do was based on the orders that were given to me and the circumstances that were provided, and what I saw and what I heard on the football field, not from a building."

[END OF GARRITY SUMMARY]

DEPUTY JOSHUA STAMBUAGH, CCN 7758

The following is a synopsis of the following reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

- BSO Parkland District Supplemental Incident Report under Case number 17-1802-000525 submitted by Deputy Stambaugh on February 16, 2018 (See electronic case file for details). *Stambaugh was provided with no evidence before drafting his report.*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Inspectors Troy Cope and Meschelle Pittman of the Office of Executive Investigations on May 16 2018, at 2300 High ridge Road, Boynton Beach, Florida of Deputy Stambaugh under case #EI-26-0079. IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman attended. *Stambaugh was provided with his BSO report.*
- A recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Special Agent Randy Camp and Pinellas County Detective Walter Vasaro on August 3, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Stambaugh under case #SI-75-0072. IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman attended. *Stambaugh was provided with his report and his previous statement.*

Synopsis:

Deputy Stambaugh has been employed with BSO for approximately 24 years and on February 14, 2018, he was at his off-duty detail at Mary Help of Christians Academy, 600 University Drive, Parkland, Florida, and his radio call sign was 17Foxtrot20, dispatching from channel 8Alpha (The radio channel assigned to the Parkland, Tamarac and North Lauderdale Districts). Stambaugh is assigned to the Tamarac District road patrol.

Deputy Stambaugh recalled hearing a radio transmission that a *"deputy at the high school came over saying that there was shots fired."* He activated his body worn camera (BWC), entered his marked Chevrolet Tahoe, turned on his emergency lights, and travelled northbound on University Drive and then westbound on Holmberg Road toward the school [MSD]. He then stopped and parked on Holmberg Road in front of the school near the West Gate, his perimeter point (The location that Deputies Goolsby and Perry would enter MSD). He testified that he never heard any reference to Building 12 or where it was located inside the school. He could not recall hearing any other transmissions in route to the school and he was unsure if it was a BSO deputy or Coral Springs officer that transmitted earlier. He explained that he stopped on Holmberg Road because another BSO marked unit was ahead of him and he followed. See MAP on Page 71 for details of his position when he heard the last gunshots (See MAP on Page 71 for details of his position when he heard the last gunshots).

At 2:26:31 PM: Deputy Stambaugh arrival time and BWC perspective:

Deputy Stambaugh said that he exited his vehicle (later in this report, his BWC will show he was at the rear of his vehicle), heard four to five gunshots, and then it stopped, but could not say in what direction they were coming from and stated, *"There is a lot you know, looking at it from above, there's a lot congestion with the buildings. I had no idea."* At that point, he walked to the rear of his vehicle, opened his toolbox, grabbed and donned his ballistic vest and then reattached his BWC. He failed to recall if he had any interaction with any law enforcement, either BSO or another agency, during the time he was at the school. He did recall observing two unknown deputies inside the fenced-in area near the west gate, presumably, Deputies Goolsby and Perry, who would have been there during the timeline, and deputies behind him to the east, possibly Sergeant Miller and Deputy Seward (later in the BWC timeline, a CSPD officer stops his marked unit in close proximity to Stambaugh, but he is never mentioned). He asserted that his priority was to locate the source of the gunshots and not the location of patrol vehicles. According to Stambaugh, he did hear a transmission that kids were running and needed bolt cutters because someone had a gunshot to the leg.

By that time, Deputy Stambaugh recalled that multiple units began to arrive and at one point dispatch requested that a unit respond to the *"south side of the school and nobody answered, and I took the position. I answered up on the radio"*

At 2:31:42 PM (Seward) transmits: *"We might want to consider somebody up on the Sawgrass to the south of the school, 10-4?"*

Dispatch: *"I'll get someone."*

At 2:32:08 PM (Stambaugh) transmits: *"Foxtrot 20 I'll go up to the Sawgrass south of the school."*

Deputy Stambaugh entered his vehicle, travelled westbound on Holmberg Road and then south on University Drive (he misspoke, because he actually travelled south on Coral Ridge Drive, entered eastbound Sawgrass Expressway, exited at University Drive, looped around and reentered westbound Sawgrass, stops at the overpass at Coral Springs Drive. He could not recall the length of time his response took or how fast he was travelling. (See the map below for details).

The green dot is his start point. The red dot is his final destination. The red square is Building 12.



Once he arrived, Deputy Stambaugh said that he was at a perfect vantage point to observe the school and used his binoculars to survey the area and possibly locate the shooter. He maintained that position and observed numerous law enforcement personnel arriving and students evacuating the school. He later returned to Mary Help to lock it down, because the shooter was no longer at the school and at large, until 6:00 PM.

Investigators then asked Deputy Stambaugh about BSO Active Shooter training and SOP specifically what is the response for an active shooter. He replied that it was years ago and did not recall the dates or the training itself, but added that we trained to deal with a threat with a group of three or four people, and it was scenario based. During the August 3, 2018 interview, Stambaugh admitted to reviewing the BSO Active Shooter SOP the day before and when asked about his understanding active shooter and he explained *"that if a shooting is in progress and we have good intelligence of where the shooter is that you may enter alone or with additional deputies."* If there are there no active gunshots: *"You're going to collect intelligence where it is occurring and wait for additional units and all go in and clear."*

Deputy Stambaugh said the radio was staticky, but because he was travelling Code 3 (Emergency response) he failed to hear anything. Investigators asked him if he had recommendations that could better the response on that day and he explained that 911 calls transferred to BSO instead of Coral Springs dispatch would have allowed Parkland District deputies to have for real-time information without delay.

BSO BWC VIDEO MSD SHOOTING

February 14, 2018

- **2:23:26 PM**: (Peterson) Shots Fired.
- **2:24:00 PM** - Stambaugh activated his BWC and departs Mary Help Academy travelling north on University Dr. and west on Holmberg Road (emergency response).
- **2:25:08-2:26:20 PM** –The following transmissions are heard on Stambaugh's radio in succession: Deputy Kratz: *"Shots by the football field."*
Deputy Peterson: *"It's going to be the 1200 Building the 300 Building off of Holmberg Road, the senior lot."*
Deputy Kratz: *"...thought it was firecrackers, but not sure by the football field."*
Deputy Peterson: *"We heard by –inside the 1200 Building."*
- **2:26:30 PM** - Stambaugh stops his vehicle and exits on Holmberg Road north of Building 12 (captured on BWC). Opens his SUV hatch dons his ballistic vest and takes cover behinds the vehicle (Stambaugh does not announce his location on the radio). Deputy Goolsby's vehicle can be seen to the east (SUV) and Goolsby is running toward the West Gate of MSD. Deputy Perry's vehicle is in front of Stambaugh's.



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- **2:26:59 PM - 2:27:10 PM** (Approximately 30 seconds) – Stambaugh's BWC captured a volley of several gunshots (high pitch crack). Stambaugh continues to don his vest. Deputy Goolsby: *"We definitely have shots fired."* Kratz: *"Shots by the football field."*

- **2:27:27 PM** - Stambaugh secured his vest and reattached his BWC. Remains standing behind his patrol vehicle in position of cover, never making any attempt to move toward the gunshots occurring directly in front of him.
- **2:27:45 PM** – Perry: *"We have shots fired, trying to get fence open. Building 13 and 900*

Peterson: *"Broward do [not] t approach the 1200 or 1300 Building... stay 500 feet away at this point."*

- **2:30:09 PM** - A Coral Springs Officer arrives and collects his AR15 Rifle and then advances toward Building 12. Stambaugh (still in a position of cover) does not assist him but instead tells him to be careful of the shooter... watch yourself (pointing toward Building 12).



- **2:31:11 PM** – Kratz is told by CSPD Officers the following and he transmits: *"Three additional victims in the 3 story building with ROTC uniform."* Stambaugh does not approach the three story building.
- **2:31:47 PM** – [ONE] announcement is dispatched on the radio for someone to cover a perimeter point on the Sawgrass Expressway.
- **2:27:10 PM – 2:32:09 PM** (5 minutes) - Stambaugh remained at this location in a position of cover.
- **2:32:16 PM** - Once inside his patrol vehicle, his BWC has shifted and pointing up for the remainder of its activation. Before Stambaugh departs, he is captured on audio directing a CS Fire person and says, *"There are three people down...go further west."*

- **2:32:20 PM – 2:37:20 PM** (Approximately 5 minutes) – Stambaugh's travel time to Sawgrass Expressway near Coral Springs Road underpass (BWC pointing up).
- **2:37:04 PM – 3:07:42 PM** (Approx. 24:30 Minutes) Stambaugh is stationary for that period of time. He then decided to leave his perimeter point unattended without supervisor approval and announced via his radio when radio traffic should have been at a minimum. (BWC pointing up).
- **3:07:42 PM** - Stambaugh travels back to Mary Help Academy for the remainder (Cruz had not been captured/surrendered).
- **3:18:40 PM** –Stambaugh is captured speaking to another LEO at Mary Help and says, "*I am good. Shots were coming out... getting out on Holmberg (Road), multiple kids are shot too.*" (Cruz had not been captured/surrendered).

On March 28, 2019, I obtained a sworn, recorded Garrity Statement from Deputy Joshua Stambaugh, CCN 7758, at the BSO Office of Internal Affairs. Also present was IA Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667 and IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman on behalf of Stambaugh. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

GARRITY SUMMARY:

Prior to this statement, Deputy Stambaugh was provided with an electronic file with all the evidence, statements and video related to this investigation.

Deputy Stambaugh responded from his detail at the Mary Help Academy listed in his other statements without locking down the school. He believed a call of shots fired from a deputy or CSPD officer was a priority. He activated his BWC and travelled Code 3 to MSD. He indicated that he knew it was the only high school in Parkland, but admitted that he had never been inside, nor did he know any of the building numbers or locations. Additionally, another deputy was ahead of him on Holmberg Road and he followed him west toward the school and then stopped just north of the school, near the left turn lane into the west gate entrance. He reiterated that during his response, he heard no radio transmissions (on page 102 are pertinent transmissions that were clearly heard on Stambaugh's BWC recording).

Deputy Stambaugh testified in his prior statements that he had heard the gunshots immediately after exiting the vehicle, but during this statement, he indicated that he heard nothing and retreated to the trunk to don his ballistic vest. He recalled hearing Deputy Kratz say, "*There were firecrackers on the football field,*" and later that he needed bolt cutters. His testimony was contrary to his previous testimony that he heard no transmissions.

Deputy Stambaugh had provided previous testimony that he observed two deputies [Deputies Goolsby and Perry] near the west gate when he arrived, and shortly after he heard the last volley of gunshots. I asked Stambaugh, after hearing the gunshots, why did he not run toward them and assist. He replied, "*Because, now I know it was Peterson, came over the air and said, 'Don't anybody enter the school.'*" He said, "*Keep back 500 feet from the 12 and 1300 buildings.*"



This aforementioned statement was contrary to his previous statements:

- The last volley of gunshots occurred at **2:27:03 PM**.
- Peterson transmitted 45 seconds after the gunshots—
Broward do [not] approach the 1200 or 1300 Building stay 500 feet away at this point.
- Stambaugh failed to mention this revelation in any of his previous statements.
- Stambaugh appeared to take cover over assisting deputies entering a possible hot zone.

I asked Deputy Stambaugh if he observed the CSPD officer that stopped in close proximity to him and grabbed his rifle and he replied, *"Yeah, I didn't see him until I watch the video. I did not see him. I informed him that in the BWC video that he was looking in his direction. Later the officer advances toward the deputies at the West Gate and Stambaugh denied ever seeing him. In the video, Stambaugh appeared to follow the officer and yells, "Careful, the shooter. Watch yourself." He testified that he was speaking to another CSPD officer in front him, not visible on the video.*

It should be noted, that Deputy Stambaugh mentioned that after reviewing all the evidence. He was able to remember the transmissions and more of his actions from that day.

- **2:30:09 PM** - A Coral Springs Officer arrives and collects his AR15 Rifle and then advances toward Building 12. Stambaugh (still in a position of cover) does not assist him but instead tells him to be careful of the shooter... watch yourself (pointing toward Building 12).

I asked Deputy Stambaugh why he took a perimeter point on the Sawgrass Expressway when he had established a perimeter point near the school, and he replied that he took that point, because no other deputies answered up, and he believed it was important for him to go up there. I asked him about basic police tactics when responding to an in progress call that you maintain your perimeter until relieved and he agreed that you do not leave your post. He then stated, *"Well, when nobody's answering and the suspect could be going out of the school and going south."*

I asked Deputy Stambaugh about him hearing real time information, about shots fired, and three people down and did he believe that it was more important to stay 500 feet away? What do you think our job is to do? Find the shooter? Is that correct? *"He replied, "Yes. I didn't know where it was coming from, and I was told to stay away from the building."*

The MSD Commission found fault with Deputy Stambaugh's route and response time to the Sawgrass Expressway overpass. I conducted a controlled test and followed the path at an accelerated rate of speed during the early morning hours and 4 minutes elapse from start to finish at time that there was no traffic. Stambaugh's response of 5 minutes was reasonable considering it was dismissal at many school and the beginning of rush hour traffic.

Deputy Stambaugh said that he left his post at Sawgrass after he attempted to contact a supervisor and numerous law enforcement personnel began to arrive at his location. He then responded back to his detail to lock down the school.

I asked Deputy Stambaugh about the BSO Active Shooter policy and training. After reviewing his training summary and the lesson plan, Stambaugh recalled the training and where it was held. He

recalled that a sole deputy may address an active shooter without supervisory approval, but recalled that the prior training two to three would address the threat.

Deputy Stambaugh said he only heard Captain Jordan ask if a perimeter was established and had no interaction with Sergeant Miller. He never spoke to any CSPD officers or obtained any of their information regarding the shooter or the 1200 Building. He indicated if that information would have been provided, he would have addressed the shooter.

In conclusion, I asked Deputy Stambaugh if he believed everything he did during the MSD shooting was to the best of his law enforcement abilities and training that day, and he replied, "Yes."

[END GARRITY SUMMARY]

DEPUTY EDWARD EASON, CCN 10558

The following is a synopsis of the following reports, statements and MSD Commission Report regarding his response to the MSD shooting:

- BSO Parkland Supplemental Incident Report under Case number 17-1802-000525 submitted by Deputy Eason on February 15, 2018 (See electronic case file for details). *Eason did not review audio or visual evidence prior to drafting his report*
- A sworn, recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Inspectors Troy Cope and Luis Negrete of the Office of Executive Investigations on June 25 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Eason under case #EI-26-0079. IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman was present. (See electronic case file for details).
- A recorded transcribed statement taken by FDLE Special Agent Randy Camp and Pinellas County Detective Walter Valsaro on August 3, 2018, at the BSO Public Safety Building of Deputy Eason under case #SI-75-0072. Eason had IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman as his representation. (See electronic case file for details). *Eason had reviewed his Body Worn Camera video and other statements prior to the interview.*

Synopsis:

Deputy Eason's BSO supplemental report had very little information basically that he responded to calls of shots fired at MSD and then to Westglades Middle School to assist with lockdown. The remainder of his narrative was related to his posts after the fact.

In his sworn statements, Deputy Eason testified that has been employed with BSO for approximately 18 years and on February 14, 2018, he was assigned to the Parkland District Road Patrol and his call sign was 17Bravo1. He recalled that during the time of the incident, he was conducting traffic control and Heron Heights Elementary School located in Parkland, Nob Hill Road and Pine Island Road, approximately 1.3 miles north of MSD, and then headed east on Trails End Road when heard Deputy Peterson transmit on the radio at about "1423 hours" either "shots fired or fireworks", but that he was not a hundred percent sure. Additionally, he heard the dispatch say District 15 (North Lauderdale District) but again he was no sure, because Parkland "17" is sometimes confused with North Lauderdale "15;" both prefixes have a "teen."



At 2:24:35 PM (Kratz) transmits: *"I'm shutting down eastbound Holmberg at the divide between Westglades and the high school."*

At 2:24:40 PM (Eason) transmits: *"I'll get the west side of Stoneman on Holmberg."*

During this period of the interview, Inspector Negrete asked Deputy Eason to expound on his answer regarding Deputy Peterson's initial transmission, and he replied, *"I don't remember,"* and then finally agreed that he heard Peterson say something about MSD. He then responded to MSD south on Pine Island Road with his emergency lights activated, arriving within two minutes, where he then made a right turn and travelled west on Holmberg Road. He recalled that along the way, he observed multiple unknown agency patrol vehicles, with their overhead lights activated, along Holmberg Road, and vaguely remembered passing next to Deputy Kratz. At that point, he was at a chain-link fence next to the football field, and his main focus was locking down Westglades Middle School. He could not remember at what point he donned his vest. Eason explained that the reason that he responded to Westglades Middle and lock it down, was that he knew Deputy John India, the school's resource deputy, was not working on that day, coupled with fact that usually 80 to 100 students are outside in the field that separates MSD from Westglades. See MAP on Page 70 for details of his position when he heard the last gunshots.

Deputy Eason explained that he had been the SRD at Westglades for several months and knew the layout. So once there, he positioned his vehicle between the schools, made sure no students were on the field, because many were running around and jumping fences, so he checked the school and confirmed that it was locked down. He admitted to responding on his own to the school and that he was not dispatched or directed to go there. After completing his task at Westglades, Deputy Eason said that he assisted an injured unknown student [REDACTED] onto a CS Fire Rescue truck from the MSD field.

Inspectors asked Deputy Eason if he ever heard any gunshots when he arrived and he stated that he heard several upon his arrival, but that he was at Westglades, but did not know if he was inside or outside his vehicle or if the windows were up or down (later in his testimony, he recanted and failed to remember where he was when the gunshots were heard, but definitely heard 6 to 12 gunshots). He was unsure if deputies were shooting or a suspect was, but that he knew the gunshots were coming from the direction MSD, but unsure where, and then it stopped. He also heard unknown deputies transmit that they heard gunshots, and gunshots by the football field. Eason said that he could not remember if he ever relayed any information on the radio, but admitted that he never entered MSD when he heard those gunshots and provided the following explanation: *"I didn't know where they [gunshot location] were, but I already saw the deputies there, so I passed them,"* and only concentrated on Westglades. He also testified that he never had any radio issues or problems transmitting on February 14, 2018, but that radio transmissions in the City of Parkland have been plagued with inoperability, especially when you are in close proximity to the Everglades

Inspectors asked Deputy Eason about the BSO Active Shoot policy and training, and he answered that he attended training a couple years ago (Training records indicated he attended on April 8, 2016). He explained that his training emphasized responding to the threat and take him [shooter] out. Additionally, he stated that the policy stated that you "may" enter the building by yourself if they are actively shooting but once the shooting stops, you would wait for the incident commander to give you direction; in this case he believed it was Deputy Peterson and stated, *"We do whatever he [Incident Commander] instructs."*



Inspectors asked Deputy Eason about his assigned Body Worn Camera utilized during the incident (Inspectors provided Eason with an opportunity to review his BWC video before answering questions). Eason initially failed to recall at what point he activated his BWC and where he was when he did, but later recalled that he pulled up near a deputy, presumably Deputy Kratz, and donned his vest and reattached his BWC, once he parked at Westglades.

The following is the GPS Data obtained from Deputy Eason laptop located inside his vehicle. The data shows a recorded time stamp at different locations. The time are approximates.



MSD Camera 26 (Building 13 Coach's Car) captured Deputy Eason travelling west on Holmberg Road, approaching the football field with his lights activated at **2:25:38 PM**. On the actual video, you see the emergency lights alternating from red to blue and he appears to be travelling at a high rate speed.

2018-Feb-14 02:25:38.258 PM (EST)
26-Bldg 13, 'Coach's Car'



This appears consistent with the position Deputy Eason would have been after his GPS time stamped him at **2:25:07 PM** (GPS illustration above), just north of Holmberg Road on Pine Island Road (See the GPS DATA above for details).

Therefore, Deputy Eason's arrival time to Westglades Middle would have been at approximately **2:26:00 PM**. No other deputies travelled that route during that timeframe and Deputy Kratz was stopped west of that camera view (This timeframe is approximately 45 seconds sooner than the MSD Commission's LE Response Animation displayed, showing Eason at the same point at 2:26:23 PM along Holmberg Road).

At **2:26:00 PM**, Deputy Eason would have been at Westglades a minute sooner previously documented and would have heard the last volley of gunshots, possibly two. The last volley occurred at approximately **2:27:03 PM**.

BSO BWC VIDEO MSD SHOOTING

DEPUTY EDWARD EASON CCN 10558

10558 Eason Edward BWCTRN Body Worn Camera Training Completed 8.00 08/08/2016 08/08/2016

POLICY: SPM 17.1 BODY WORN CAMERAS (BWC)

17.1.3 Recording Protocol: [CALEA 41.3.8b, CFA 17.13 b]

B. Activation/Deactivation: [CALEA 41.3.8 B, CFA 13.17c]

1. Deputies will activate (initiate a recording) their BWC prior to initiating any investigative or enforcement activity to include:

- a. Vehicle Stops
- b. Pedestrian stops (to include deputy initiated consensual encounters)
- c. Calls for service (to include responding to backup other employees)
- d. Code 3 responses (to include vehicle pursuits)

This Body Worn Camera is assigned to Deputy Edward Eason



DEVICE AUDIT TRAIL

Model: Axon Body 2
Serial Number: x81049580

Date Range: 13 Feb 2018 - 15 Feb 2018
Document generated: 27 Feb 2019
Audit generated by: Lindquist, Barry

86	02/14/2018 12:32:44.026 PM	External ID '17-1802-000522' added to video metadata using Evidence Sync by Eason, Edward (10558)	Unique ID d3ef3920cce44ee59189aca261f5a69b
87	02/14/2018 12:32:56.541 PM	Device disconnected from dataport power	
88	02/14/2018 02:28:33.352 PM	Event button pressed	
89	02/14/2018 02:28:33.410 PM	Event button pressed	
90	02/14/2018 02:28:33.410 PM	Recording started due to event button press	Battery 41% GB Remaining 56.267
91	02/14/2018 02:28:33.412 PM	Video file created	Unique ID 2f9104abe58f417a8cb8108efbe65841
92	02/14/2018 03:42:51.251 PM	Event button held	
93	02/14/2018 03:42:51.252 PM	Recording stopped due to event button hold	Battery 30% Video Count 6 GB Remaining 53.414

A review of Deputy Eason's BWC audit above indicated that he was assigned Axon Body 1 Camera serial number X81049580; the BWC he was using on February 14, 2018. The audit shows that his BWC was powered on at **12:32:56 PM**.

According to BSO BWC policy, the BWC is required to be activated when a dispatch call is transmitted specifically Calls for Service and when the deputy is responding Code 3.

Deputy Eason responded to Deputy Peterson's transmission of "shots fired" at **2:23:26 PM**. Eason's BWC audit shows that he activated his BWC at **2:28:03 PM**, [5 minutes] after he acknowledge the transmission; therefore, he failed to record his response, and any evidence that could have memorialized the incident especially the gunshots that he heard at **2:27:03 PM**.

The following is a synopsis of Eason's BWC video:

- **2:28:03 PM** – Eason's camera is activated (pressed the button to record) (a 30 second delay before audio is heard) Eason's camera captured him standing on the Westglades Middle School parent pickup roadway west of MSD's baseball field. He is facing south toward a field where several students are observed running west away from MSD (Based on the timeline, it presumed that Suspect Cruz is among them. He appears to be given them hand signals (See below).



- **2:28:35 PM** – (Audio is heard) Tamarac District Lieutenant Steve O'Neill is transmitting on the radio and clearly audible, "*Prepare for active shooter response.*" Other deputies [Deputies Kratz and Marchese with [REDACTED]] on scene are transmitting information about gunshot victims several feet away from where Eason is standing, but he does not respond to MSD or assist deputies with the gunshot victim, and remains at his post directing students.
- **2:29:39 PM** – Eason is now facing east toward MSD and is speaking with two older gentlemen (MSD Staff) on the other side of the fence adjacent to the baseball field. He yell to them, "*Active shooter! I got a shooter in the school. Somebody shot someone...at least one in the leg. You heard all those [gunshots]? It sounded like at least a dozen. That's only*

when I got here." At this point, Eason has moved up closer to the two gentlemen and is up on the west perimeter of the MSD fence line. He again warns the two men, "*Be careful guys...male in a hoodie with an [AK] (assault rifle AK 47).*" Eason does not approach MSD or assist with the injured (CSPD officer and deputies have not made entry into the west gate near Building 12) (See below).



- 2:30:14 PM – Information is being transmitted about several gunshot victims and Eason remains stationary at the same location with his firearm in high ready but does not move toward MSD to assist with any victims that are in close proximity to him, even though Deputy Marchese is requesting assistance.
- 2:31:14 PM – Eason enters his patrol vehicle and drives away from his post and then parks inside the field, several feet from where he was earlier. He exited his vehicle and transmitted the following: "*Hey India [SRD Deputy John India] do you have Westglades locked down?*" Deputy India is the Westglades Middle School SRD and was not at the school due to training. Eason testified that he responded to Westglades because he knew India was in training, but his transmission would lead you to believe that he did not.
- 2:32:27 PM – Eason leaves his patrol vehicle and walks toward Westglades Middle School toward parent pickup. Upon arrival, he meets with an unknown parent and informs her that the school is on lockdown (Eason had testified that he responded to Westglades to lockdown the school, but somehow, based on his statement to the female, he already knew). Eason further explained to the parent that he believed the shooter [Cruz] is still in the school and law enforcement has surrounded the building (Eason never responded to MSD to assist). Eason remains at the parent pickup attempting to give direction.





- 2:39.06 PM – Eason is observed walking back toward his vehicle and then the MSD baseball field fence line, but stops behind a palm tree half way there, possibly for cover and only for a couple minutes. Eason continued walking toward the fence line, where there are two unmarked emergency fire vehicles and simultaneously a paramedic truck arrives. Eason makes verbal contact with Deputy Marchese, who has a gunshot victim (student) and informs him that rescue has arrived. Eason is observed assisting the rescue truck and CSFR places the victim in inside and departs.





- 2:45:10 PM – Eason remains standing at the same location and then walks back to Westglades Middle. From 2:26:00 PM to 2:45:00 PM (19 Minutes) this is the first time Eason checks the doors of Westglades to determine it was locked down. Once at the school, he begins to check doors and they are all locked. He takes a cell phone call and informs the caller that he his is busy with an active shooter at the high school [MSD]. Eason makes contact with a Coral Springs PD officer at the school and tells him that he heard only one victim had been shot. He further tells him that he knew the SRD [Westglades] was not here so he responded for a lockdown. Eason relayed all the information in reference to the shooter in detail to the officer.



- 2:51:08 PM – Eason answers a call on his personal cell phone and says the following, *“I am on the scene. I heard the gunshots... they were a few feet away from me. Yeah, I am ok, but I was at the school when the shots were coming out. I will call you back.”*



- 2:52:00 PM- 2:59:50 PM – Eason is observed standing on the Westglades' roadway until he meets with Deputy India [Westglades Middle SRD] near the baseball field fence line. Deputy India left his training class to assist with the incident.



- 3:00:00 PM – 3:18:59 PM – Eason meets with Deputy Marchese who by the MSD baseball field fence line holding his AR-15 rifle. Eason asked him which building it was and then recalls that it was the 3 story building on the other side of the courtyard. Other CSPD officers arrive and begin to run toward the south but Eason does not follow them and establishes cover behind a tree for almost 18 minutes. Eason then meets up with Marchese and during their conversation, he mentions Suspect Cruz and that he probably walked by the canal adjacent to the Sawgrass Expressway (Cruz did take that path). Marchese mentions that the radio system is inoperable.



3:19:00 PM – Margate PD K-9 was cancelled by Incident Command. Eason proceeded to talk to the K-9 officers while on the MSD baseball field and at 3:22:50 PM, he says the following, *“I came here because the SRO was not here today, to lock it down. I heard at least 10 or 12 (gunshots)... minimum.”* During that same conversation, Eason chuckling about not wanting the job of loading students on the bus detail (evacuations) stating, *“That’s not my department.”* The officers depart to survey the area while Eason remains at his current location for the remainder of his video. His video captured Deputy Marchese and other Coral Springs PD unit taking a perimeter point behind the baseball equipment building.



- 3:41:42 PM – Video ends. Suspect Cruz is in custody.

On March 28, 2019, I obtained sworn, recorded Garrity statement from Deputy Edward Eason, CCN 10558, at the Officer of Internal Affairs. Also present was IA Sergeant Mohammad Razi, CCN 6667 and IUPA Attorney Gary Lippman. The following is a synopsis of his statement:

GARRITY SUMMARY:

Prior to this statement, Deputy Eason was provided with an electronic file with all the evidence, statements and video related to this investigation

Deputy Eason testified in his previous statements that he was heading east on Trails End in Parkland when he received the call of shots fired from who he believed was Deputy Peterson, and then responded Code 3, but does did not recall either, contrary to his other statements and report.

I asked Deputy Eason, after showing him the BWC Policy, why he did not activate his BWC when he was responding to an emergency call of shots fired and he replied, "I didn't turn it on. I don't know why." He did recall activating his BWC once he arrived at Westglades Middle School, where he donned his ballistic vest at 2:28:03 PM (5 minutes after hearing Peterson's transmission). Eason provided conflicting statements in reference to this issue.

Deputy Eason recalled turning on to westbound Holmberg Road when he hear a radio transmission of shots or fireworks by the football field (Deputy Kratz at 2:25:08 PM). That would match the GPS DATA timeline for Eason.

Deputy Eason said he did not stop in front of the MSD and travelled toward Westglades because he heard "football field," but actually his transmission was that he "is responding to the west side of MSD." This occurred 28 seconds at 2:24:40 PM before Deputy Kratz transmitted at 2:25:08 PM. This is a conflicting statement.

Deputy Eason said that at 2:27:03 PM, he arrived at the Westglades' parent pickup roadway that divide the schools, and immediately heard at least a dozen gunshots. He failed to recall if he was inside his vehicle. Based on the illustrated screenshot and GPS (See Above), it is more likely that Eason would have arrived at his destination closer to 2:26:00 PM, a minute sooner that he testified to. I asked Eason if heard any of the transmission by any of the deputies in regards to shots fired, and did not recall, he only heard Deputy Kratz' football field transmission. I asked Eason if he recalled where he parked his vehicle at Westglades and he stated that he could not remember where he parked (His BWC video captured his parking spot). Eason could not remember one fact of what he was doing when he arrived and heard the gunshots. I asked Eason why he did not respond toward the gunshots. Eason's response:

*"Well, when I heard the shots, it's unclear if I was still in my vehicle or not when I heard them 'cause the **animation** (not his memory) that we got has within seconds of me getting there, that the last shots were fired. So within that minute, I had kids running at me from the school. I put on my vest and I had to reposition my camera and then activate it."*

It should be noted that Eason is referring to the MSD LE response animation (Cartoon) for his timeline when answering questions, but his BWC video is a real time depiction of his actions on that day.



I asked Deputy Eason about a statement he made to FDLE during his response to Westglades, when he drove by MSD. He stated, "I didn't know where they were but I already saw the deputies there. So I passed them and I only concentrated on Westglades." I asked him to explain that answer and he said the following:

"It means while I was proceeding to Westglades, I saw deputies that looked like they took up a perimeter on Holmberg Road."

I asked Deputy Eason if the deputies could have used more assistance, since the Parkland District has minimal staffing, and he replied, "I don't know. That's an opinion." In his initial statements, he could not recall how many deputies were at the scene when he was on Holmberg Road, but again he referred to the animation and said that it shows him as the sixth deputy arriving (Based on the GPS and Surveillance Video, he was the second deputy to arrive).

Deputy Eason had testified that he was responding to Westglades to lock it down, but never transmitted his actions. I asked him if he responded immediately to the school. He stated that it appeared to be locked down, but denied every getting notification, just that he drove through the lot.

I asked Deputy Eason why he did not assist Deputies Marchese and Kratz when they asked for assistance. He replied that he was dealing with Westglades (There were no middle school students in the video, only high school and Westglades was on lock down already, unbeknownst to Eason). Then Eason believed that he was correcting me, and said that it was actually Sergeant Heinrich. So I asked, "Why did you not assist him, and he replied, "I don't recall."

I asked Deputy Eason about two older gentlemen (MSD Staff) that he captured on his BWC along the MSD fence line on other side of the fence adjacent to the baseball field at MSD warning them, "Active shooter! I got a shooter in the school. Somebody shot someone...at least one in the leg. You heard all those [gunshots]? It sounded like at least a dozen. That's only when I got here. Be careful guys...male in a hoodie with an [AK] (assault rifle AK 47)" I asked him why he did not respond to the school and Eason replied that there were no additional gunshots that was much later (2 minutes after the last gunshots) at 2:29:39 PM.

I asked Deputy Eason that based on the real time intelligence about a male in a hoodie, why was he not actively looking for him. He replied that his mindset was locking down the school and making sure there were no secondary shooters (approximately 5 minutes have elapsed at this point, and he had not approached Westglades to determine its status).

Deputy Eason said that he reached out to Deputy India (Westglades SRD) on the radio because there was not much activity and he believed that the school was already locked down (2:31:00 PM law enforcement teams are beginning to enter Building 12). I asked Eason if his resources were better spent assisting the deputies dealing with a shooter and injured students. Eason's response:

"Well, it's a fluid situation. You know, you had Kratz saying football field, fireworks, and I don't know if there's a secondary shooter at that point, walking around."

At 2:32:27 PM, Deputy Eason finally responded to Westglades parent pickup and is observed assisting the parents, but never touches a door or attempts to contact the school. I asked him if he had confirmed that the school was locked down and he replied that it appeared to be lockdown.



Deputy Eason returned to the MSD fence line and assisted student [REDACTED] into a rescue truck then walked back to Westglades at 2:45:10 PM (19 Minutes after he arrived). He checked a door and it was locked. He explained that the doors are always locked but he tried that one just in case it was not. He testified that he had not contacted anyone in reference to Westglades' lockdown.

I asked Deputy Eason about a personal call he received at 2:51:11 PM, where he said, *"I'm on scene. I heard the gunshots. They were a few feet away from me. Yeah, I'm okay but I'm at the school where the shots were coming out. I'll call you back."* He said that it was a family member, and offered this explanation when I asked about hearing the gunshots a few feet away:

"Well, the football field that Kratz was referring to wasn't that far from my vehicle when I stopped at Westglades. I mean, it was more than a few but that's what I said in the heat of the moment. But I found out later that it was not the football."

I asked Deputy Eason why he did not respond toward the gunshots at the football field, and stated that he had parked his vehicle in the view of the field, did not see the shooter, but could not recall if it covered every perspective.

Deputy Eason met with CSPD officers later around the baseball field and I asked him if they shared any information about the shooting and he replied, *"I don't recall."* Eason testified that CSPD officers never provided him the information they had about the shooting or the building. He recalled that the radio channels never patched with CS.

I asked Deputy Eason if he could explain how every SRD assigned to the Parkland District responded to the MSD Shooting, leaving their respective schools and he made a decision to lock down Westglades. He explained that it was due to the proximity to MSD and that it was separated only by a chain link fence.

I asked Deputy Eason about the Active Shooter policy and training, and he admitted that he was unsure of his thought process during the shooting, but he asserted that we [BSO] always address the shooter.

Deputy Eason testified that he was never directed by Sergeant Miller either by radio or verbally during this incident.

In conclusion, Attorney Lippman asked Deputy Eason several questions and these were his responses:

Deputy Eason stated that he had no knowledge of the campus or its building numbers specifically a three-story building, but knew it was a 45 acre campus and that the west fence separate the schools. He said that he could not see the building from his perspective. Eason then recalled that Deputy Peterson ordered everyone to stay 500 feet away (Eason never mentioned this transmission in my statement, or any of his other statements, until his attorney ask him.

Deputy Eason added that it was his recollection that there was a lot of information compared to what he knew and heard since then in the past year, between our transmissions, Coral Springs' transmissions, the videos. "It's not clear according to my memory what I heard that day."

OVERALL SUMMARY

- The MSD Commission Report submitted their report on January 2, 2019 and indicated that there was an unsatisfactory law enforcement response by the BSO, and as a result, the investigation was expanded to include the review of all BSO personnel that responded to the scene during the initial stages of the shooting and heard gunshots.
- BSO Sergeant Miller and Deputies Peterson (retired), Kratz, Stambaugh, Perry, Goolsby, and Eason were identified as subject employees by BSO Internal Affairs.
- BSO Internal Affairs utilized several resources in completing this investigation to include, all the MSD Commission reports, interviews, documentation and video evidence; all the BSO related investigations, interviews and video evidence, to include BWC video.

911 System:

- Broward Sheriff's Office operates the Regional 911 system that is maintained by Broward County, the City of Coral Springs is not part of this system and operates its own center.
- The City of Parkland contracts BSO for its law enforcement services and the Coral Springs Fire Department for its fire rescue and emergency medical services. ALL Parkland cellular 911 calls are routed to the Coral Springs Communications Center. Coral Springs is then tasked with routing these calls to either CSFD for fire rescue and/or BSO for law enforcement calls.

Radio Communications:

- BSO uses the Broward County radio system and has the ability to monitor and merge channels on those systems during joint operations.
- The Coral Springs Communications System operates separately and attempts to patch these systems prior to the entry of Building 12 were unsuccessful. Therefore, **BSO and CSPD personnel were not able to communicate via a common channel.**

Radio System Failures:

- The capacity of radio communications was impaired when an excessive number of users access the system (Throttling). It occurred at 2:33:01 PM, whereas users may have been unable to transmit or receive some radio messages.

CSPD Dispatch:

February 14, 2108 -**14:22:44 to 14:25:41 hours**

02:22:41 PM (911 timestamp)

First 911 call comes in to Coral Springs regarding the shooting.

02:22:59 PM

First CAD entry on Coral Springs Fire Dispatch regarding possible active shooter incident.

02:23:00 PM (Coral Springs Dispatch timestamp)

Coral Springs Fire Dispatched in reference to active shooter at Stoneman Douglas.

120 Cl


BSO time stamp – 14:23:37 PM:

Coral Springs Operator 546 contacted BSO Communications with second hand information.

Coral Springs advised a caller (student) informed them there is a shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School. Call updated and CS Operator advised shots were heard in the background. Update: No initial location could be provided. Attempt by CS operator to re-contact caller was unsuccessful.

- Regional Dispatch had limited information for BSO deputies responding to MSD and transmitted the following:

02:23:22 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatcher 8A: calls 17J3 (Peterson), 17B3 (Seward) & 17B4 (Hanks) with an alert tone.

02:23:26 PM (BSO Dispatch timestamp)

Dispatch: (Alert tones) "Attention all units in District 15, possible shots fired at 5901 Pine Island Road at Stoneman Douglas High School, possible shots fired at Stoneman Douglas High School."

- Coral Springs Dispatch transmitted information related to an Active Shooter at MSD approximately four minutes after the initial 911 call was received at 2:22:41 PM:

02:26:31 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Kilo 23: "Just had a Fire guy make reference and active shooter at Douglas."

Dispatch: "10-4, K23, There is an active shooter working at Douglas, multiple gun shots are being fired. We can hear them in the background our 911 lines "blowing up." We have multiple units on the phone. Some are getting EMD. It is confirmed.

- Coral Springs Dispatch failed to update Regional Dispatch about an active shooter and gunshots at MSD; therefore, BSO deputies responding to MSD relied on Deputy Peterson's transmissions alone, without the knowledge of a confirmed active shooter at the school. This information that CSPD Officers had from their dispatch was vital when they responded to an active shooter at the school.
- Officer Butler responded to MSD after receiving this dispatched information. Upon arrival, he met with School Monitor Medina, who provided him with detailed information about suspect Cruz and the 1200 Building. Butler transmitted the following to all CSPD officers.

02:28:35 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (Burton): "White male with ROTC uniform, burgundy shirt."

02:29:00 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

J39 (Burton): "J39 Last seen...in the three story building, north parking lot."

02:29:47 PM (Coral Springs timestamp)

Dispatch: there are three victims down in room 1216 in the freshman building.

All the CSPD officers' reports and statements mentioned this information from Officer Butler and their dispatch, as being the key element that allowed them to immediately identify the Building 12; therefore, expediting their response. CS Dispatch never forwarded that information to Regional Communications; therefore, it was not dispatched to BSO deputies responding to the shooting. According to all the BSO law enforcement statements, that dispatch communication was never transmitted and furthermore, CSPD officer never shared that information with BSO deputies either.

Investigative Timeline:

- The Investigation Timeline is self-explanatory and should be viewed as a reference of the events as they occurred on February 14, 2018, at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.

MSD School Staff:

- Several MSD staff who had an opportunity to call a Code Red failed to do so, and there is no evidence to support the claims of other staff members calling a Code Red.
- Monitor Bonner called the first Code Red at 2:24:54 PM, 3 minutes 16 seconds after Suspect Cruz fired the first shots, while Cruz was halfway down the third-floor hallway shooting students.
- Monitor Medina was the first school employee to observe Suspect Cruz walk onto the MSD campus carrying a bag that was obviously a rifle bag and that Cruz was a threat, a fact that he admitted to on video. Medina failed to call a Code Red, or engage Cruz preventing him from entering Building 12. Even after hearing gunshots Medina failed to call a Code Red.
- Student [REDACTED] informed Coach Aaron Feis that Suspect Cruz was in Building 12 with a rifle, and Coach Feis proceeded to enter Building 12 with a school radio and did not call a Code Red.
- Monitor Medina notified Monitor David Taylor via school radio that Suspect Cruz was entering Building 12. Taylor observed Cruz enter the building but failed to call a Code Red. Taylor recognized Cruz when he entered Building 12, as someone they had previously discussed as being a potential school shooter. Taylor had an opportunity to call a Code Red and never did.


LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO THE MSD SHOOTING

On page 42 of this investigation begins a comprehensive synopsis of the BSO deputies' and Coral Springs Police officers' law enforcement response to the MSD Shooting. Included in this section of the investigation are statements, synopses, videos and BWC screenshots, and summaries.

END OF REPORT.

I, THE UNDERSIGNED, DO HEREBY SWEAR OR AFFIRM, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT TO THE BEST OF MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND BELIEF, I HAVE NOT KNOWINGLY OR WILLFULLY DEPRIVED, OR ALLOWED ANOTHER TO DEPRIVE, THE SUBJECT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF ANY OF THE RIGHTS CONTAINED IN ss. 112.532 AND 112.533, FLORIDA STATUTES.

THE UNDERSIGNED INVESTIGATOR ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE FOREGOING REPORT CONSISTING OF 123 PAGES, EACH OF WHICH HAS BEEN INITIALED BY THIS INVESTIGATOR, IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED.


 **Sgt. Carlos Carrillo CCN 7154** 4/8/19
INVESTIGATOR CCN DATE

THE FOREGOING REPORT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Lt. Barry Lindquist CCN 13979  4/8/19
REVIEWING SUPERVISOR CCN DATE

Addendum to IA2018-0040

I, THE UNDERSIGNED INVESTIGATOR, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, DECLARE THAT I HAVE READ THE FOREGOING REPORT CONSISTING OF 124 PAGES, EACH OF WHICH HAS BEEN INITIALED BY THIS INVESTIGATOR, AND THE FACTS STATED IN IT ARE A TRUE AND ACCURATE REPRESENTATION OF THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BASED UPON MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND BELIEF.


SERGEANT CARLOS CARRILLO, CCN 7154

6/25/2019
DATE


SERGEANT MOHAMMAD RAZI, CCN 6667

6/25/2019
DATE

THE FOREGOING REPORT AND ADDEMDUM HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Lt. Barry Lindquist **CCN 13979**


REVIEWING SUPERVISOR

CCN

6/25/19
DATE